Of the three Axis Powers in the Second World War, Italy’s future evolved differently from that of Germany and Japan. Italy deposed Benito Mussolini in 1943 and signed an armistice with the Allies, escaping the label of a defeated enemy and being treated as “liberated” from the occupying Germans. In contrast, the Allies occupied West Germany and massive investments under the Marshall Plan and reconstruction followed. The West wanted to rapidly create a prosperous West Germany to counter Soviet influence. Similarly, the United States did not occupy Japan for long, allowing Hirohito to continue as Emperor while the country adopted a US-drafted democratic constitution. Japan became an economic powerhouse through its integration, for the first time in its history, in the liberal international order.
Italy’s non-enemy status may have deprived it of the gains made by Japan and Germany, yet it had a flip side too; while Japan and Germany became states “protected” by the United States, Italy was able to maintain its independence. Shortly after the war ended, in June 1946, a republic was established and Italy escaped becoming a sub-culture of America.
Both Germany and Japan remained in the shadow of the United States, for security guarantees and within the US-led economic and political framework. American troops have been in both these countries since 1945 and both countries pay for these foreign forces on their soil, the German bill was more than $1 billion over a decade, while Japan has budgeted $8.6 billion during 2022–27. These two rich countries were sometimes perceived as “client states”, defined as “happy to have parts of its territory under military occupation by a protector, anxious to satisfy that state’s demands across multiple policy areas, and determined at all costs to avoid offending it”.
In a world sought to be dominated by Donald Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, both Germany and Japan have felt compelled to recalibrate their defence strategies.
That perception changed in 2025. The war in Ukraine and the half-hearted US response during the Biden years created ever louder murmurs in Europe about the reliability of the US protective umbrella. The murmurs became howls after Donald Trump returned and declared his intent to throw Ukraine to the Russian bear. Shortly after Trump’s inauguration, German elections brought Friedrich Merz to power. On 23 February 2025, even before the results were declared, Merz made his “declaration of independence” saying: “My absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we can really achieve independence from the USA.” He wished he did not have to say that but ascribed it to the fact that Trump’s administration was “largely indifferent to Europe” and he went to the extent of talking of replacing NATO with a “new European security structure”. Merz’s statement has been called a “seismic shift in transatlantic relations”.
Japan, as part of the first island chain, has been even more dependent on US protection than Germany and its China strategy has been, so far, in sync with that of the United States. Yet during Trump II doubts have been openly expressed, among the US allies around the South China Sea, about the depth of US commitment to get militarily involved if China invades Taiwan.
Russia, North Korea and China, the three traditional enemies of Japan have, for the present, formed a firm axis, in spite of their long-term strategies not being in complete alignment. Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin may take steps to deter Japan from interfering if and when China tries to force its way into Taiwan. The statement made by Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, in her first parliamentary address in the job, has to be seen in the context of this threat. She said that an attack on Taiwan could be deemed “a situation threatening Japan’s survival” which, by implication, would allow her to use the self-defence forces. It does not appear that this position was taken in consultation with the US. The brutal reaction from Beijing, including one of its diplomats calling for her beheading, shows that it was unexpected.
Both Germany and Japan have been steadily increasing their defence expenditure and they have large R&D and production capabilities in the weapons sector. Japan has at least 8.6 tonnes of plutonium stored domestically with another 35.8 tonnes stored overseas, ostensibly to be reprocessed as reactor fuel but it could be readily repurposed to make fission bombs. It is no more a taboo in Japan to talk of going nuclear and the enthusiasm for the pacifism enshrined in the US-imposed constitution appears to be waning.
Japan is ranked 8th and Germany 14th in the Global Firepower Index for 2025 and they are increasing security cooperation with each other. In a world sought to be dominated by Trump, Xi Jinping and Putin, both Germany and Japan have felt compelled to recalibrate their defence strategies. Instead of remaining forever under the protective umbrella of the US for even conventional warfare, they want empowerment not only to deter attacks but also to be significant partners of the US in any future confrontation with the China-Russia-North Korea axis.
