Iran was supported, quietly but materially, by China and Russia. China’s largest chipmaker, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, provided Iran with chipmaking tools and technical training; satellite companies provided real-time imagery of US forces; Iran acquired a Chinese spy satellite and was able to use it to capture images that were used in drone and missile strikes; and China provided Iran with sodium perchlorate, a precursor used for solid missile propellant. Meanwhile, Russia reportedly provided Iran with targeting intelligence, spare parts, missile components, and advanced drones. Trump was largely dismissive of both countries’ efforts, saying that the United States also helped Tehran’s and Moscow’s enemies, and that their assistance was not making much of a difference anyway.
By early May 2026, Trump confronted a set of choices that ranged from poor to worse. He did not want to fight a war of attrition that could drag on for the rest of 2026 and perhaps longer. But each alternative option had been narrowed by the choices that came before it.
Trump thought about escalating. One option was to conduct a raid on Iran’s nuclear sites to seize its highly enriched uranium. This could provide a spectacular tactical success that would allow him to declare victory and end the war. But such an operation would be extremely difficult to pull off. It would likely require thousands of troops deployed to the site for up to a week, to extract hazardous material from under rubble, transport it out by air, all while under attack. Another idea was to seize Kharg Island, a critical hub for Iran’s oil industry, only giving it back to Iran after it accepts US terms. But US troops needed would find themselves within range of Iranian rockets. A third escalation option was to deploy ground forces to the coastal area of Iran near the Strait to clear out Iran’s military positions but this could lead to a protracted ground war.
Finally, having considered and discounted all of these options, Trump threatened to destroy all of Iran’s infrastructure, including its energy plants and bridges. But this appeared certain to result in Iranian retaliation against the Gulf states’ critical infrastructure, including energy and water desalination plants. On 7 April, Trump posted on Truth Social that “a whole civilisation will die tonight, never to be brought back again”, shocking many of his own supporters. As the clock ticked closer to his own deadline, he agreed to a ceasefire brokered by Pakistan.
The other option was to agree to a deal with Iran, closer to its terms. This would impose limits on Iran’s enrichment program but not abolish it entirely; it would not touch its missile program; it would recognise Tehran’s effective control over the Strait of Hormuz; and it would give Iran full sanctions relief. In the ceasefire announcement, Trump said that Iran’s 10-point plan was “a workable basis on which to negotiate”. Within days he was backing away, and in talks in Islamabad, Vice President JD Vance found that Iran had no intention of accepting US demands on its nuclear program. Trump then imposed a counter-blockade on Iran in the expectation that it would cause the regime to quickly accept his terms. It did not.
The United States had imposed significant military damage on Iran, destroying its navy and air force, much of its missile program, and its defence industrial base. Trump was puzzled that the regime was not accepting defeat. But there is a difference between tactical and strategic success. The regime had survived, which was an accomplishment in itself. It discovered the equivalent of an economic nuclear weapon in its ability to close the Strait of Hormuz. And it was able to hit the Gulf states and Israel with missiles and drones throughout the war, despite the aerial bombardment. In effect, both sides sincerely believed they won and were in little mood to compromise.