From a European perspective, security in Europe and Asia are intrinsically linked. The arrival of North Korean soldiers in Ukraine is the most palpable proof for this trend from a military perspective.
More globally, the relationship between the United States and China, which finds its geographic focal point in the Indo-Pacific, can also be expected to directly affect the transatlantic relationship. Key European interests such as prosperity and the respect of the rules-based international order hinge on the trajectory of the region, as a major conflict between the US and China or around Taiwan would imply a significant economic shock and question fundamental principles European powers advocate for.
All this has led the Indo-Pacific to become an increasingly important region in European security and defence policy in recent years. France was the first EU member state to publish a strategy dedicated to the region in 2018, after which Germany, the Netherlands, and the EU itself followed. The region took a central place in the UK’s 2021 Integrated Review and will again in the upcoming “refreshes”.
The increased military engagement of European powers in the Indo-Pacific, such as deployments of naval assets or naval and air exercises with partners, demonstrate that the commitments to the region are more than lip service. But with the uncertainty about US strategy under President Donald Trump, tailoring European strategy to the connection of the European and Indo-Pacific security theatres becomes increasingly complex.
Ahead of the publication of the National Defence Strategy in the coming months, European powers therefore need to prepare different scenarios and anticipate their responses.
Three aspects are particularly challenging in this regard.
The first uncertainty is the question whether, and to what extent, the US administration sees the European and Indo-Pacific theatres as linked. As the security guarantee for European allies, nuclear deterrence and the provision of critical enablers, are indispensable pillars of the current European security order, the linkage of US strategy across theatres could play out either in Europe’s favour or against it.
If the United States considers the theatres and its approaches to be linked, a willingness to deter China or demonstrate strength could benefit European allies in the form of a stronger US stance vis-à-vis Russia.
It seems unlikely that those European states which have significantly stepped up their military engagement in the Indo-Pacific in recent years would be willing to completely revise their engagement because of sudden shifts in Washington.
If, however, US foreign policy in Europe is seen as disconnected from the Indo-Pacific, arguably Washington’s most important priority, this could imply a quicker shift of political and material resources away from Europe – with the effect of weakening European deterrence.
While it seems to be common sense that competition with China is the key pillar of US foreign policy, the extent of prioritisation of the Indo-Pacific constitutes a second uncertainty for Europe in designing its approach to the region. The debate on US foreign policy to the region is currently, at least from a European perspective, dominated by two camps: those advocating for a clear focus of US foreign policy on China, often referred to as prioritisers, and those advocating for restraint in US foreign policy across regions, including in Asia. Yet, it is difficult to anticipate which camp is more influential and whether Trump’s desire for deal-making might ultimately also be at odds with both of them or partly reconcile them.
For European states, a more aggressive US posture in the region would probably be bad news because it could imply more US demands for alignment and, more generally, increased tensions in the region, especially if the United States and China fail to construct meaningful backchannel diplomacy.
Another question for European states is whether the logic of spheres of influence is returning to US strategy. In the past, the United States has called on European states to focus on the European theatre, and likewise for Asian partners to engage more in balancing China. Given the evolution of European approaches towards the Indo-Pacific and, more generally, the increased cooperation between many Indo-Pacific and European states, a spheres of influence approach, where the US expects regional allies to focus on their own region, would be a significant hindrance to European strategy. It seems unlikely that those European states which have significantly stepped up their military engagement in the Indo-Pacific in recent years – France, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain – would be willing to completely revise their engagement because of sudden shifts in Washington. In this situation, transatlantic tensions or even an open rift would be almost sure to follow.
European states will need to tailor their policies once they have clarity about the US posture, but preparation can and must start now. Most importantly, Europe’s Indo-Pacific partners, and especially those who are also US allies, share the same strategic challenges, albeit with potentially even more significant ramifications. Engaging with these partners on ways of balancing the US strategy in case it threatens to undermine key shared interests – including cooperation across theatres – should rank high on Europe’s priority list.
