But sceptics disagree. However noble its intended purpose, AUKUS, they aver, subverts the strategic order in Asia. First, it is baldly provocative to China, which could potentially destabilise the Western Pacific (with inevitable consequences for Indian Ocean states). Second, the pact’s intended aim – to build Australia’s naval muscle – does not mitigate India’s strategic challenge in the Himalayas. More importantly, AUKUS is prejudicial to French interests. By alienating Paris, it injects distrust in the Western alliance. That, too, could have unintended consequences.
From a maritime operations perspective, AUKUS gives Indian observers pause. With the Indian navy’s conventional underwater capability fast shrinking, the possibility of Australian submarines in the Indian Ocean isn’t reassuring for India’s security observers. While they are happy for Australia – a Quad member and close partner of India in the Indo-Pacific – to receive nuclear submarine technology from the United States and the United Kingdom, Indian watchers apprehend a crowd of friendly nuclear attack subs in the Eastern Indian Ocean. Increased foreign submarine presence in India’s near-seas would serve only to erode Indian influence and authority in the neighborhood.
New Delhi is also troubled by the prospect of an AUKUS-generated backlash from China. The agreement could provoke Beijing into expanding military activity in the littorals – not so much in the congested South China Sea, already gridlocked with posturing and counter posturing, but in the Indian Ocean, where China has so far been relatively quiet. The Chinese navy could assume a more adventurous posture in the Eastern Indian Ocean, deploying more warships and submarines. China’s ships may well stay clear of Indian waters, but their mere presence in the littorals is bound to put more pressure on India’s naval leadership. In response, New Delhi might have to deploy Indian warships in the South China Sea, pushing India-China maritime dynamics into a negative spiral.
The possibility of Chinese aggression in the Indian Ocean isn’t merely hypothetical. Spurred by China’s military and non-military activity in the Indian Ocean region, the Indian navy has in recent months announced a plan to develop a fleet of nuclear attack submarines. Tellingly so far, the United States has made no offer of help. The “very rare” nature of AUKUS – as announced by US officials immediately after the unveiling of the pact – is a reiteration of Washington’s stand on the matter: US policymakers do not anticipate the sharing of submarine propulsion technology with any US partners, other than the United Kingdom and Australia.