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India, explained.
Throughout India’s modern approach to foreign policy, defending policies using moral principles does not necessarily mean those principles were the main reason the policies were adopted (George Wood/ECB via Getty Images)
The Nehru-to-Modi thread is realism more than moralism.
India’s foreign policy isn’t idealist – it never wasIndia’s foreign policy isn’t idealist – it never was
About the author
Sanchari Ghosh
Sanchari Ghosh is a PhD candidate at the Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata.
Non-alignment has long been regarded as the defining example of India’s supposed foreign policy idealism (Opens in new window) – a view stretching back to assessments of the country’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, who has been widely portrayed (Opens in new window) as a champion of moral universalism, peaceful coexistence, and anti-colonial solidarity.
Contemporary perspectives continue to perpetuate this view. Chietigj Bajpaee’s “Principled to a fault: India’s foreign policy trap (Opens in new window)” in The Interpreter last month raises a genuine question about whether India’s normative commitments have, at times, constrained its flexibility. Bajpaee’s thoughtful and timely analysis sees India’s persistent preference for principle over pragmatism in Narendra Modi’s refusal to endorse (Opens in new window) President Donald Trump’s claim that he mediated the 2025 India–Pakistan ceasefire, arguing that a more flexible response could have generated diplomatic goodwill for New Delhi with Washington.
But the incident is better understood as an extension of India's long-standing interests rather than as a victory of principle over pragmatism. Indeed, throughout India’s modern approach to foreign policy, defending policies using moral principles does not necessarily mean those principles were the main reason the policies were adopted. The underlying strategic calculations may have been different.
Defending policies using moral principles does not necessarily mean those principles were the main reason the policies were adopted.
Consider Nehru’s aspiration to reduce Cold War tensions and promote peaceful coexistence (Opens in new window). Undoubtedly idealistic in presentation, yet an objective coexisting with equally pragmatic considerations. Non-alignment enabled India (Opens in new window) to preserve its autonomy, avoid entrapment in superpower rivalries, maximise diplomatic manoeuvrability, and compensate for its limited material capabilities. In an international system dominated by two rival blocs, refusing to align with either was not merely a moral position but also a pragmatic strategy for protecting India’s national interests. Nehru sought to reconcile moral purpose with national advantage.
This same calculus is evident in Modi’s approach to Trump. Acknowledging Trump’s mediation claim would not have been a cost-free diplomatic gesture. It would have implicitly validated the proposition that an external power had played a mediating role in Kashmir. Successive Indian governments, irrespective of party or ideology, have for decades opposed (Opens in new window) third-party mediation on Kashmir. This position was a long-standing objective: preventing the internationalisation of a dispute that India has maintained must be resolved bilaterally, preferring to maintain New Delhi’s control over the framework within which future negotiations are conducted. This objective has persisted even after changes in governments, changes in the global balance of power, and transformations in India’s broader foreign policy.
So any immediate diplomatic benefit of accommodating Washington had to be weighed against the longer-term costs of weakening India’s carefully maintained position that Kashmir is a strictly bilateral issue.
India's then prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1960 during a UN General Assembly meeting (Yutaka Nagata/UN Photo)
In Nehru’s era, a more stable, less polarised international order was normatively desirable, but as scholars such as A.P. Rana have long argued (Opens in new window), non-alignment is better understood as a security policy than a purely moral doctrine. By refusing to align with either bloc, India preserved freedom of action and sought to create an international environment conducive to the security of a newly independent and materially weak state. Far from rejecting power politics, Rana suggests that non-alignment constituted “a particular type of balance-of-power policy”. In fact, a substantial body of research now labels Nehru as a “liberal realist (Opens in new window)” leader who attempted to balance normative goals with the demands of statecraft rather than as an unqualified idealist.
For Bajpaee, a preference for idealism and moralism has permeated India’s foreign policy across generations. Yet the thread from Nehru to Modi has been the preservation of strategic autonomy (Opens in new window) – a term that is used as the contemporary expression of non-alignment. Strategic autonomy, however, should not itself be mistaken for idealism. It brings out India’s colonial legacy of resisting external dependence, its structural preference for flexibility in a competitive international system, and its aspiration as a rising power to maximise influence while avoiding binding alignments.
