Indonesia’s KHAN missiles aren’t targeting China

The Indonesian military’s (TNI) recent deployment of the Turkish-built KHAN ballistic missile system has attracted widespread attention. It has been described as a game-changer given that for the first time a Southeast Asian state now possesses a ballistic missile system.

The missiles have been described as extending “Indonesia’s strike radius into disputed maritime corridors”, notably near the oil and gas-rich Natuna Islands. Such an argument rests on the assumption that the system could be aimed at China, given the overlapping maritime claims between China and Indonesia around the Natuna Seas.

Yet, a more detailed analysis would suggest China and the South China Sea are not the target of Indonesia’s KHAN ballistic missile system.

Jakarta’s primary concern is about its territorial integrity, especially its sovereignty over West Papua – a point that is emphasised throughout my conversations with Indonesian military and intelligence officials.

This concern is translated on the ground. The proposed upgrading of military bases with coastal radar and long-range cameras will allow the TNI to operate seamlessly around West Papua. Two of these bases face Australia, and one faces Guam – a reflection of Jakarta’s concern, stemming from the 1999 Timor intervention, about potential foreign interference in the province.

China is not presently a major security concern for Jakarta. The situation in the North Natuna Sea has stabilised, with China’s presence in the waters, including its navy and fishing fleet, diminishing in recent years.

The location of the KHAN missile system likely signals its strategic objective. With a maximum range of 280 kilometres, its missiles cannot even reach Brunei from its present position, let alone the South China Sea. It is currently deployed in Kalimantan, Borneo, the site of Indonesia’s future capital. The defence plan for the new capital calls for a layered defence system anchored in stronger air and maritime capabilities.

Interestingly, the new capital’s defence plan identifies several core security concerns such as Indonesia’s long land border with Malaysia, maritime security near Kalimantan (including in the Makassar Strait), and the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), under which Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom consult each other in the event of an armed attack on Malaysia or Singapore.

Furthermore, the new capital’s defence plan is aligned with Indonesia’s national defence strategy, which emphasises modernising the navy and air force and deploying missiles at key maritime chokepoints.

The KHAN deployment should therefore be seen as part of Jakarta’s efforts to build up defensive capabilities to safeguard its future capital and strategic locations within the Indonesian archipelago, and also the broader Indonesian military modernisation program, which includes acquiring new advanced combat aircraft and warships.

With its limited range and land-attack profile, the KHAN missile system is optimised for striking fixed targets and is not suitable for engaging moving warships. Unlike the Philippines’ anti-ship BrahMos missiles, which could threaten Chinese warships, the KHAN is a surface-to-surface system designed to strike artillery, air defence systems, radar installations, and logistics hubs.

If repositioned to Sebatik Island near Borneo on the Malaysian–Indonesian border, the KHAN missiles could place Malaysian naval bases at Tawau, Semporna, and Sandakan in the Malaysian state of Sabah within range. This is significant given the overlapping maritime claims between Malaysia and Indonesia in the Ambalat Sea off Sabah, which is also near Kalimantan. The area has featured past clashes and recent tension.

It is clear the KHAN ballistic missile system is neither aimed at China nor designed for operations in the South China Sea. Its deployment reflects Jakarta’s other strategic priorities: protecting the future capital in Borneo and reinforcing its position in overlapping maritime claims with Malaysia.