In less than two months since assuming the Indonesian presidency, Prabowo Subianto has already visited six countries – China, United States, Peru, Brazil, the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates.
However, it is Prabowo’s visit to China which has garnered particular attention due to a controversial joint statement following his visit about having “reached (an) important common understanding on joint development in areas of overlapping claims”. Since Jakarta’s long standing position has been that it is not a party to the South China Sea dispute, the implicit acknowledgment of “overlapping claims” is seen by many as a shift away from an “independent” foreign policy and yielding to China. This set off lively debate among observers about how much change this really involved from Indonesia’s past position.
Another bold foreign policy move by the Prabowo administration was holding the first ever joint bilateral military drills with Russia in the Java Sea, conducted early last month, in a bid to “improve diplomatic relations … especially the navies.” This follows Prabowo’s visible outreach to improve ties with Kremlin, including a key visit to Russia as defence minister and president-elect earlier this year, where he described Moscow as a “great friend”. With the intensification of Russia-Ukraine conflict and Indonesia’s own ambivalent position on the war so far, many saw this as Jakarta clearly “siding” with Russia.
Prabowo’s outreach to China and Russia is being seen as a tilt away from the United States, in the face of incoming Trump administration. However, a closer look reveals how Prabowo’s foreign policy moves continue to reflect longstanding commitment to “bebas dan aktif” (free and active foreign policy).
Indonesia is actively working towards positioning itself as a leader of the Global South.
Just days after releasing the joint statement, Jakarta issued a further clarification that it does not recognise Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea. At his second stop after China, the United States, when asked about the South China Sea, Prabowo said he would “always safeguard our (Indonesian) sovereignty”, adding that partnerships are better than conflicts and that “we respect all powers”. Mutual support for the ruling of the 2016 arbitral tribunal, which rejects the existence of the nine-dash line, also finds mention in the joint statement released after Prabowo’s visit to the White House.
The swift action by the foreign ministry and repeated reassurances that Jakarta does not recognise China’s claims potentially indicate that reference to “overlapping claims” in the statement may have been a technical and administrative error.
Whether Indonesia is siding with Russia is equally debatable. Although Prabowo is courting Russia, reading too much into the joint exercise would be a mistake. As analyst Joseph Rachman points out, the four day exercises were “more surface than substance,” with participation of only the navies from both sides, totalling to about a few hundred soldiers.
Prabowo’s push for membership in BRICS+, which follows Indonesia recently joining the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership trade pact, and engagement with bodies such as the Gulf Cooperation Council and International Court of Justice, reflects his ambition to position Jakarta as a global player. At the same time, Indonesia is actively working towards positioning itself as a leader of the Global South. Following his election, Prabowo vowed to strengthen Jakarta’s ties with African counties, which, in his words, see “Indonesia as an example of a successful developing country in the Global South”.
Although shifts in foreign policy reflecting changes in domestic politics and the regional and international environment have long been a hallmark of Jakarta’s approach, concerns about Indonesia’s foreign policy choices arise from apprehensions over Prabowo’s personalistic style of diplomacy and an increasingly fragmented world order due to heightened tensions between the United States and China, pressuring countries to take sides. In fact, it speaks to Prabowo’s chutzpah that so early into his presidency, he is setting an example for Asian countries on how to skirt the US-China rivalry by using foreign policy as a means to achieve domestic ends.
Equating Jakarta’s moves with either a “pro-Beijing” or “pro-US” orientation indicates a fundamental misreading of the concept of non-alignment. As the Cold War era binaries re-emerge, non-alignment has more relevance than ever, making it imperative to understand that non-alignment does not mean passive neutrality or disengagement. Neither is it idealistic, but rather a pragmatic approach to allow countries to – in the words of Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono – “create more alignments in the economic sense...”
With 2025 marking the 75th anniversary of diplomatic ties between China and Indonesia, increased bilateral exchanges are anticipated, including the inaugural 2+2 Dialogue between Foreign and Defence Ministers, already scheduled. A lot will, of course, depend on how economic and security relations evolve between Indonesia and the United States under the Trump administration.
But it is clear that Indonesia will retain its traditional non-alignment strategy. This comes with its own set of challenges as it would require a delicate balancing act, not only between United States and China, but also between Jakarta’s own domestic needs and external expectations. A lot remains to be seen, but Indonesia’s foreign policy is still free and more active.
