North Korea, explained.
Ukrainian soldiers on the frontline in Pokrovsk region, Ukraine, just before the New Year (Piotr Sobik/Anadolu via Getty Images)
Deeper military ties between these partners in arms reflect a stronger strategic alignment than the transactional relationship first anticipated.
Subscribe to The Informer for monthly expert analysis, and to Events for advance notice of visiting world leaders and distinguished guests.
You may unsubscribe from Lowy Institute newsletters at any time. For information on our privacy practices and how to unsubscribe, see our Privacy Policy.
The message North Korea sends by rotating its troops in RussiaThe message North Korea sends by rotating its troops in Russia
The Moscow-Pyongyang partnership has crossed into uncharted territory. The major shift in the dynamics of North Korea-Russia relations was epitomised by Kim Jong-un’s decision to bolster Vladimir Putin’s army with an additional contingent of 11,000 troops to fight in Russia’s Kursk region. Never before had the regime deployed such a large force abroad, let alone troops specifically tasked with engaging in direct ground combat.
Now reports suggest North Korea is preparing to rotate its troops currently stationed in Russia, with emerging evidence that, since November, arms have been flowing not just in one but in both directions across the Russia-North Korea border.
What was initially viewed by many as a transactional arrangement has started to increasingly resemble a long-term strategic commitment, reflecting a deeper alignment between the two regimes.
While the exact motivations behind Kim’s decision to deploy troops to Russia remain unclear –particularly given the high risks of defection and the broader implications for regime stability that come with exposing North Korean soldiers to the outside world – intelligence reports claim that the initiative came from Pyongyang rather than Moscow. This challenges earlier assumptions that Russia pressured North Korea for reinforcements to address its estimated shortfall of 500,000 soldiers amid faltering mobilisation efforts.
If the decision was indeed Kim’s, his motives likely rest on strategic rather than economic considerations, as evidenced by the regime's readiness to dispatch additional troops, despite growing fears of domestic unrest over the Russia-bound deployments.
A 27 December broadcast in Seoul of a suspected North Korean soldier reportedly captured by the Ukrainian military (Kim Jae-Hwan via Getty Images)
The call for rotation, only two months into the initial deployment, might be driven by a two-fold calculus.
First, North Korean forces have reportedly suffered between 1,000 and 3,800 losses since November, which equates to a casualty rate of 9–35%. Casualty rates of 10–15% typically impair cohesion, morale, and offensive capacity across units, while rates exceeding 30% often render them combat-ineffective, necessitating either full withdrawal or substantial reinforcement. A withdrawal would not only invite international embarrassment but also deprive Kim Jong-un’s forces of a chance to gain valuable modern warfare experience.
Second, the decision to commit additional troops might reflect Kim’s broader objective to entrench Moscow in a deeper strategic alignment, likely motivated to secure reciprocal support in the event of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula. By committing more troops now, Pyongyang might be seeking to pre-empt a Russian rapprochement with the West following a settlement of the conflict with Ukraine and reduce the risk of future isolation.
Another indication of the deepening ties between Moscow and Pyongyang is the intensified scale and pace of military transfers. On North Korea’s end, in addition to 20,000 containers filled with over six million rounds of 152mm and 122mm ammunition, shipments now have expanded to include 50 North Korean-made “Koksan” 170mm self-propelled howitzers and 20 240mm multiple launch rocket systems. Given Russia’s limited use of these calibres, accompanying munitions have likely already been delivered or are expected to follow. Deployed in sufficient numbers, these systems could significantly bolster Russian firepower, as North Korea’s heavy artillery is designed to deliver overwhelming salvos capable of saturating and crippling enemy defences.
Pyongyang also appears to have scaled up its missile supplies. Alongside approximately 100 KN-23/24 short-range ballistic missiles already delivered to Russia, reports suggest the potential transfer of at least 5 KN-15 medium-range ballistic missiles. While Ukrainian intelligence has denied these claims, such a move would not be surprising given Russia’s recent use of the Oreshnik. Like the Oreshnik, the KN-15 has a range capable of striking deep into Europe, which aligns well with both the Kremlin’s current efforts to use such weapons to deter Western aid to Ukraine and North Korea’s apparent intent to test the full extent of its military arsenal on the Ukrainian battlefield. Another system that Kim appears eager to deploy is its suicide drones, reportedly set for imminent delivery to Russia following a mass production order in November.
While these transfers were long anticipated, claims that they are tied solely to North Korean troop deployments appear to be an overstatement.
If, until now, Russia has primarily been the recipient in its exchanges with North Korea, this trend now also appears to be shifting. Over the past two months, mounting intelligence reports have suggested that Moscow has not only transferred advanced air defence systems to Pyongyang – most likely the S-400 – but also reached an agreement to supply Kim’s regime with MiG-29 and Su-27 fighter jets. While these upgrades would still leave North Korea far behind the vastly superior capabilities of the combined US-South Korea forces, such transfers could potentially alter the security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula by depriving South Korea of its current absolute advantage in the air.
Furthermore, North Korea has recently unveiled its largest-ever warship equipped with what appears to be a vertical launching system capable of deploying cruise or anti-aircraft guided missiles. The ship’s design bears a striking resemblance to Russia’s Project Derzky, raising questions about potential Kremlin assistance. Although no reports directly link Russia to advancements in North Korea’s navy, Pyongyang’s first-time participation as an observer in recent Russian naval exercises suggests the possibility of ongoing or future collaboration in this domain.
While these transfers were long anticipated, claims that they are tied solely to North Korean troop deployments appear to be an overstatement. By most estimates, the value of the 11,000-strong North Korean contingent would barely exceed $314 million for one year of service – and this including the one-time bonuses Russia typically provides to new recruits.
For comparison, the cost of an S-400 air defence system ranges from $500 million to $1.3 billion, depending on the recipient country. China, for example, paid $500 million per regiment in 2014, Turkey $625 million in 2017, and India $1.3 billion in 2018. Even at the lowest price tag of $500 million, the value of the North Korean troop contribution would fall far short of covering the cost of a single S-400 system. The same applies to the cost of fighter jets.
Based on the uneven dynamics of exchanges between the two regimes and the likelihood that payments are structured as a barter system with some infusion of cash, Russia’s recent transfers appear to represent its share of a broader agreement likely reached sometime in 2023, with possible amendments in 2024. Factoring in the value of troop deployments and the recent expansion of supplied weaponry, alongside earlier estimates by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, the total worth of the military deal between Moscow and Pyongyang now likely exceeds $7 billion. Even excluding the value of oil and food supplies, the remaining figure would comfortably account for Russia’s recent deliveries.
If a deferred barter system was indeed in place, it could explain Pyongyang’s extensive military shipments over the past two years and Moscow’s sudden willingness to share expensive advanced systems.
About the author
Olena Guseinova
Olena Guseinova is a Lecturer at the Graduate School of International and Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (HUFS), Seoul, Korea.
Topics
The most-pressing world events explained by Lowy Institute experts and global contributors, in your inbox, every Thursday.
You may unsubscribe from The Interpreter at any time. For information on our privacy practices and how to unsubscribe, see our Privacy Policy.
