Australia, explained.
Security screening absolutely has a place in protecting our academic research, but we would need to think very carefully about the implications of doing so (Getty Images)
Already facing a fractious international education environment, Canberra must avoid creating an isolationist police state.
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The Netherlands will screen 8,000 academics a year – here’s why Australia shouldn’t The Netherlands will screen 8,000 academics a year – here’s why Australia shouldn’t
If I asked you to think of a spy, you might picture a tuxedo-clad secret agent, or a shadowy Cold War-era figure in fedora and trench coat. But the face of spying has changed – a tweed-clad university professor is just as likely as James Bond to be the centre of international intrigue. In 2023, a lecturer from the Arctic University of Norway was arrested and charged with espionage. At his court hearing last year, he revealed his true identity as Mikhail Mikushin, a colonel with one of Russia’s intelligence services.
Spying in our universities shouldn’t be surprising. A massive chunk of basic and fundamental research on which new military and intelligence capabilities are premised comes from universities. Most of this research isn’t classified or protected, so universities and governments don’t usually conduct background checks on the researchers who perform it.
The government of the Netherlands wants to change that.
A Bill has recently been introduced into Dutch Parliament called Wet Screening Kennisveiligheid – the “Knowledge Security Screening Act”. From mid-2027, the Act would legally obligate Dutch universities to screen every researcher – no matter their background – seeking to work on emerging tech such as AI, nuclear, quantum, biotechnology, microchips, or any technology with potential military applications.
The Dutch Integrity and Screening Agency (Justis) will apparently perform this role on behalf of the Dutch government, with both AIVD and MIVD — the Dutch signals and military intelligence services – refusing to take on the job. Based on publicly reported figures, the Dutch government estimates 8,000 individuals will be screened each year, meaning roughly 30 risk assessments to be completed every working day.
The Bill has polarised the Dutch scientific and academic community.
Security screening absolutely has a place in protecting our academic research, but we would need to think very carefully about the implications of doing so.
The Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) called such screening “too imprecise and virtually impossible to implement”. Delft University of Technology, one of the Netherlands’ most prominent research institutions, said the law would “encourage complacency and potentially alienate non-European Union researchers”. Hatte van der Woude, a former staffer for AIVD and now a member of Dutch Parliament, rejected the Bill, saying any form of proper screening was simply not possible to implement in an academic environment.
So, could we see something like this in Australia? And if we could, should we follow the Dutch example?
Australia already has a screening mechanism for people employed in “critical infrastructure”. Under the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018, “critical workers” in critical infrastructure must be cleared by an Australian government agency called AusCheck. In 2023–24, AusCheck completed more than 173,000 background checks across the maritime, aviation, and regulated infrastructure domains.
Although universities are considered “critical infrastructure”, they are exempted from these screening rules – but this exemption is something the Minister for Home Affairs could change very easily.
Security screening absolutely has a place in protecting our academic research, but we would need to think very carefully about the implications of doing so.
First of all, Australia doesn’t actually have a policy platform around “research security”; that’s the term describing how academic and university research is protected from national security threats. Our Parliament and our elected officials simply don’t talk about it. Even in the throes of an election – during which national security is a pretty common platform – neither of the major parties has articulated anything approaching a research security policy.
Security screening would further alienate foreign students and researchers from working with Australia. The abortive attempts by the Albanese government to set international student caps, the scapegoating of foreign students as causing the rental market crisis, and creation of the most expensive student visa in the world have all already compromised Australia’s ability to attract and recruit the best and brightest.
The Dutch proposal also applies to researchers even if they never travel to or visit the Netherlands – and applying academic policies outside your own country doesn’t usually end well. The Trump administration has already drawn fierce global criticism earlier this year for threatening (and then cancelling) funding to foreign researchers unless they self-disclosed research links with China and any “offensive” policies around diversity, equity or inclusion.
Last of all, security screens aren’t a silver bullet. Once a researcher or student has been checked, that doesn’t mean they can’t be recruited by foreign intelligence services later down the track.
If Australia wants to get serious about research security, it needs a policy platform – and more importantly, political investment – to do so. Research security needs to be on our national agenda. Then the government needs to work with academia establishing mechanisms that seem to have worked well, such as an advisory body inside government that can give tailored security advice to universities and researchers. In fact, the Netherlands already has one (called the National Knowledge Security Contact Point), making its rush to screen researchers even more nonsensical.
Australia is already facing a fractious and divisive international education environment. Security in that space remains absolutely critical – but rashly executed security screening is not the answer, and especially not if it makes our country an isolationist police state.
The views expressed are personal, and do not represent the University or any other organisation, agency or government.
About the author
Brendan Walker-Munro
Brendan Walker-Munro is a senior lecturer at Southern Cross University.
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