Defence & security, explained.
An NZ Army soldier near Mt Ruapehu during a training exercise at Waiouru Military Training Area in October, Waiouru, New Zealand (Hagen Hopkins/Getty Images)
A pivot to spending 2% of GDP and combat-capable rhetoric signals a deeper shift in how NZ sees the world.
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New Zealand’s defence reckoning: From shelter to stormfrontNew Zealand’s defence reckoning: From shelter to stormfront
That the world is becoming more contested and dangerous has become a familiar refrain. A recent article in the Wall Street Journal noted that even small countries like New Zealand are responding with substantial investments in military capability.
In 2025, New Zealand released a new Defence Capability Plan that lifts the country’s defence spending to 2% of GDP over eight years. The ambition includes, among other things, new maritime helicopters, uncrewed vehicles, increased strike capabilities and new space technologies.
Perhaps more surprising – certainly to New Zealanders themselves – was the use of sharper vocabulary around the need to have a combat-capable force with enhanced lethality and an ability to deter actions that run counter to New Zealand’s interests. This kind of language is not often seen in New Zealand government communications, especially for a country whose nearest neighbour is about 2,000 kilometres away and is a friendly ally.
What once felt like the shelter of a Pax Americana security umbrella now resembles dogged bad weather.
Taken together, the Defence Capability Plan and the shift in rhetoric suggest that New Zealand’s trajectory is not simply an ideological pivot of the kind that might accompany a change of government, but a more fundamental recalibration of its strategic posture. The external environment has eroded the viability and effectiveness of values-led foreign policy to such an extent that New Zealand is now redesigning how it acts and engages internationally.
Longstanding assumptions of New Zealand inhabiting a benign strategic environment, one geographically distant from conflict, have given way to a view of a world in which coercive diplomacy is backed by hard power, where risks are proximate and persistent. What once felt like the shelter of a Pax Americana security umbrella now resembles dogged bad weather.
New Zealand’s approach aligns with wider Western reassessments, captured in concepts like “values-based realism” – articulated by Finland’s President Alexander Stubb and “rupture” by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney in his Davos speech. Values remain important, but they are now balanced more explicitly against interests, hard security and strategy. The stakes in this new world are high – they include security, sovereignty, trade, energy, resources, and the stability of the South Pacific neighbourhood.
Longstanding assumptions of New Zealand inhabiting a benign strategic environment, one geographically distant from conflict, have given way to a view of a world in which coercive diplomacy is backed by hard power (Hagen Hopkins/Getty Images)
New Zealand knows that it needs friends. Australia has always been a key security partner, but its importance has deepened – as highlighted in the recent joint statement following Australia–New Zealand Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations. Strengthening interoperability and expanding cooperation are high priorities, but so too is coordinated diplomacy and information sharing. Differences in tone or policy between the two countries are being treated as manageable divergences rather than deeper constraints, as they might have been viewed in the past.
There is also growing recognition that New Zealand must work harder to broaden and strengthen its other partnerships across Southeast Asia, and with countries such as Japan, Korea and India. There is interest in using minilateral constructs – including the NATO Indo-Pacific 4 (IP4) involving Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand – to bolster security cooperation on issues of mutual interest.
Domestically, capability discussions are broadening beyond traditional force structure to a focus on effects in cyber, space, AI and information domains. These are areas where New Zealand can make meaningful contributions to collective security despite its size, and where geographic isolation is less of a constraint. New attention to supporting New Zealand’s small but growing Defence industrial base will help deliver the capabilities needed for the country’s security.
This growing unease with major powers makes New Zealand’s reliance on trusted regional partners all the more important.
The New Zealand government has been explicit in discussing this changing environment. Ministers have drawn a clearer link between national security and economic resilience, highlighting risks that range from fuel supply resulting from the Iran crisis to attacks on undersea cables, supply chain shocks, military and economic coercion, claims on resources and sovereignty, along with disasters – to which New Zealand remains disproportionately vulnerable.
Cost of living pressures aside, the public response to this increasing focus on defence posture has been notably muted. The Defence Capability Plan received little criticism despite the large outlays promised. Public opinion polling appears to show support for increased defence spending. Polls also show New Zealanders are deeply wary of major powers – China and the United States – even though they recognise them to be hugely consequential to the future of the country.
This growing unease with major powers makes New Zealand’s reliance on trusted regional partners all the more important. Of all New Zealand’s friends, Australia comfortably sits as number one and has done so for many years. Almost nine in ten New Zealanders say Australia is important or very important to New Zealand’s future, and 93% say Australia is a friend or close friend – or in other words, practically everyone.
This year in November, New Zealand has a general election and party polling shows it will be a close contest, with a coalition government likely. It is possible that the words the next government uses to describe concepts such as values-based diplomacy and the rules-based order might change, but it’s unlikely the overall posture will. There is now bipartisan recognition that even small countries like New Zealand must invest in the capabilities and resilience required to hold their own in a much harsher security environment.
About the author
Suzannah Jessep
Suzannah (Suz) Jessep is chief executive of the Asia New Zealand Foundation, a position she’s held since January 2024.
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