For decades, much of the world was expected to fall in line with one of two powers: follow Washington’s lead or move into Beijing’s orbit. From infrastructure lending to digital finance, global influence was assumed to flow from dominant capitals outward. But that logic is beginning to fray. Across the Global South, countries are quietly testing new paths – no longer waiting to be chosen, but exploring how to choose more on their own terms.
For this group of countries, a different order is emerging. It is not a return to Cold War blocs. It is not a zero-sum game between superpowers. Instead, countries are asserting their own priorities through regional platforms, local financial systems, and homegrown strategies that reflect national interests.
This shift is not ideological. It is practical. Many countries have learned that promises from Washington or Beijing often come with strings attached. Rather than reject cooperation, they are reshaping it on better terms.
Critics in the West framed these efforts as protectionist. But for the countries involved, they are a safeguard – an effort to reduce exposure to geopolitical risk and external shocks.
In Southeast Asia, for example, governments are quietly building a new regional payments infrastructure. The ASEAN Regional Payment Connectivity initiative links financial systems in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, and more recently Vietnam, Brunei, and Laos. Indonesia’s QRIS system plays a central role. These networks allow real-time cross-border transactions using local currencies, reducing dependency on dollar-clearing mechanisms and enhancing regional financial resilience.
Critics in the West framed these efforts as protectionist. But for the countries involved, they are a safeguard – an effort to reduce exposure to geopolitical risk and external shocks.
Africa is moving in the same direction. The proposed AfCFTA (African Continental Free Trade Area) promises broader and deeper economic integration and would attract investment, boost trade, provide better jobs, reduce poverty, and increase shared prosperity in Africa. It reflects a growing desire to rely less on extractive trade with global powers and more on regional self-sufficiency.
In Latin America, development banks are prioritising cross-border infrastructure and climate resilience over ideological alignment. The Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean (CAF) approved more than US$2.7 billion in financing in 2024 for projects that strengthen regional cooperation, not geopolitical dependency.
The expansion of BRICS to include countries such as Argentina, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates has often led Western media to describe the grouping as an anti-Western bloc. But that overlooks a more basic motivation: the desire for negotiating power. For many Global South countries, the goal is not to choose sides. It is to diversify their options.
India’s recent trade talks with the United States reflect this careful calibration. While seeking relief from Trump-era tariffs, Delhi publicly refuted claims that it had offered full concessions, emphasising that negotiations are ongoing and must be mutual. India is also pursuing free trade deals with the European Union, showing how Global South actors are expanding their economic space without exclusive alignment.
Even within the West, alliances are showing signs of strain. US President Donald Trump recently described the European Union as “nastier than China”. Just days later, he announced a proposed $142 billion defence deal with Saudi Arabia and hinted at lifting sanctions on Syria and revisiting terms with Iran. These remarks and proposals may sound transactional, but they expose something deeper: the world is shifting too quickly for long-standing partnerships to be treated as fixed or reliable. For many countries outside the traditional power centres, this unpredictability is reason enough to chart a more independent path.
China remains a key player in all of this. Its economy, infrastructure investments, and financial reach are deeply embedded in global development. But many of its partnerships are now more transactional. Projects such as Cambodia’s Funan Techo Canal, while supported by Chinese finance, are majority-owned and managed locally. These are not passive client relationships but cautious efforts to retain control on an uneven playing field.
The current moment is not about nostalgia for past models or celebration of new powers. It is about recognising that power itself is changing shape.
The United States is still influential. Its diplomacy, institutions, and soft power remain strong. But credibility is now earned through cooperation, not claimed through legacy. Many Global South leaders no longer see alignment with the West as automatic or necessary.
In Western policy circles, the dominant question remains whether the liberal international order will survive or whether China will replace the United States. But these are the wrong questions. A better one would be whether the institutions that once governed the global order are willing to adapt to a world where leadership is more widely shared.
The Global South is not walking away from multilateralism. It is demanding a voice within it. And increasingly, it is building the tools to operate without permission.
This trend carries risks. Multipolar systems can create overlapping rules, competition, and even instability. But they also open space for more pluralism, more regional ownership, and greater resilience against any single point of failure.
The current moment is not about nostalgia for past models or celebration of new powers. It is about recognising that power itself is changing shape. It is moving sideways rather than staying concentrated.
For the United States to remain relevant, it must engage on equal terms. For China to succeed, it must respond to criticism and build trust. Neither power can afford to treat the rest of the world as a passive arena.
The Global South is no longer waiting to be included. It is building something of its own – shaped by necessity, grounded in local priorities, and driven by the hard lessons of dependency.
The Global South is not demanding dominance. It is seeking more equitable terms of engagement. Whether this leads to durable influence remains to be seen. But what is clear is that neither Washington nor Beijing can dictate outcomes unilaterally. They now operate within a terrain that is increasingly shared, evolving, and shaped by a broader set of actors.
