When Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his “special military operation” – in reality, a full-scale invasion – against Ukraine on 24 February 2022, few expected it to drag on for years. Unable to achieve any of its objectives in the Eastern European country, the Kremlin now appears to be seeking a way to end the conflict that would allow Putin to save face. But that is unlikely to succeed.
In February and March 2022, shortly after it became clear that Russian forces did not have the capacity to capture Kyiv, the Kremlin sought to reach a peace deal with Ukraine – first in Belarus, then in Istanbul. The talks failed to end the conflict, which is actually a continuation of the Donbass war that erupted in 2014 following the overthrow of the allegedly pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych.
Ever since, Moscow and Kyiv have engaged in various negotiations, whether over prisoner exchanges or the grain deal known as the Black Sea Grain Initiative – an agreement brokered in July 2022 by the United Nations and Türkiye to allow Ukrainian grain exports to continue despite the Russian invasion.
But over the next three years, there were no serious attempts to end the conflict.
Only in May 2025 did the Russian and Ukrainian delegations meet once again in Istanbul, which Russia sought instead of a ceasefire – but those talks failed. Earlier this year, negotiations between the United States, Ukraine and Russia were held in Abu Dhabi and continued this month in Geneva, aimed at laying out potential paths toward ending the war. There is the prospect of further rounds of talks. But the chances of Moscow and Kyiv reaching a lasting peace appear slim.
It would allow Moscow and Kyiv – both exhausted by the conflict – to consolidate their positions and prepare for another round of fighting.
Vladimir Medinsky’s position as head of the Russian delegation signals that the Kremlin might be ready to make certain concessions to Ukraine and the United States. Medinsky led the Russian delegation in Istanbul in March 2022. Following the talks, he announced that Russia would “radically reduce” its military activity in northern Ukraine, including near the capital Kyiv, after what he described as “meaningful talks” in Türkiye. Soon after that, in early April 2022, Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that Russia had withdrawn its forces from the Kyiv and Chernihiv regions as a “goodwill gesture”.
Three years later, in January 2025, Putin, speaking about the Istanbul talks, explained that European leaders asked him to withdraw troops from the Ukrainian capital “so that Kyiv could sign a peace agreement”. However, Putin claimed the Europeans had “deceived” the Kremlin. Whether true or not, Russia has not attempted to launch another offensive aimed at capturing Kyiv up to the present.
Instead, Russian forces remain bogged down in the Donbass, as well as in parts of southeastern Ukraine, where they continue to assault well-fortified Ukrainian positions and suffer heavy losses. Without a large-scale mobilisation – which could have serious consequences for the country’s economy – Russia lacks the capacity to capture Kyiv, let alone seize the four regions it annexed in 2022: Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson.
Fully aware of this, the Kremlin insists on Ukraine’s withdrawal only from the Donbass – which, at this point, is a relatively small portion of Donetsk Oblast – but not from other regions that Russia formally considers its territory. Although such an approach might appear to be a Russian concession to Ukraine, Kyiv – backed by European powers – does not seem willing to withdraw from the Donbass voluntarily. Consequently, the war goes on, with little hope of a long-term settlement.
The most that Moscow, Kyiv, and Washington could achieve is a ceasefire deal similar to the Minsk Agreements, signed in 2014 and 2015. The accords signed in the Belarusian capital only froze the conflict, turning it into a low-intensity positional war that lasted until 24 February 2022.
At the same time, it would allow Moscow and Kyiv – both exhausted by the conflict – to consolidate their positions and prepare for another round of fighting.
All that, however, would not resolve the conflict, but would only put it “on hold”. Neither side has suffered a decisive defeat, yet their strategic goals remain unfilled. So, the conflict is likely to continue – either as a Minsk-style positional standoff or as an ongoing war of attrition, in which it is unclear whether Russia is exhausting Ukraine more or itself.
