When US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth steps up to the podium on Saturday at this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, he will seek to reassure regional defence officials about the Trump 2.0 administration’s approach to the Indo-Pacific. Therein lies the problem: whatever Hegseth might say in terms of strategy or priorities will sound hollow compared to what the US has done since President Donald Trump came to power on 20 January.
Successive US administrations (including Trump’s first) have been remarkably consistent in their approach to the region: working with allies and partners, promoting freedom of navigation, urging against any recourse to the use of force and fostering prosperity. During his first term, Trump even called for a “free and open Indo-Pacific”, a concept borrowed from Shinzo Abe’s Japan.
It is likely that Hegseth will seek to demonstrate the same orthodox approach to the region. In his first trip to the region in March, he sought to bolster US alliances and partnerships under that same free and open Indo-Pacific mantra.
The problem, however, is Hegseth being undermined by his commander-in-chief. The Trump 2.0 administration has set out to right the “wrongs” of trade imbalances between the US and its trading partners. It has shown far less concern for Washington’s strategic approach to Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific. The 2 April “Liberation Day” tariffs demonstrated that the United States is less interested in remaining a benign hegemon which opens its market and provides security guarantees to the region.
The so-called “prioritisers”, counted as China hawks in the US National Security Council, have been moved out from their posts due to internal battles with “restrainers” who call for a more limited application of US force abroad.
It is unlikely that Hegseth will do a J.D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference, when Vance castigated America’s European allies for not spending enough on their militaries. In Asia, defence spending is healthy. According to figures from the IISS’ Military Balance 2025, Southeast Asia’s defence spending grew 8.3 per cent year-on-year in real terms in 2024. In Europe, there is so much concern about Trump’s commitment to the long-standing Euro-Atlantic alliance that the IISS has published a report assessing the costs of Europe defending the continent without US involvement (it will cost about $1 trillion). But in the 2025 State of Southeast Asian Survey, the region’s elite respondents rated the US ahead of China when forced to make a “choice” between the two major powers. This was largely due to perceptions of Trump as a strong leader who would make a deal with China.
But Hegseth should be careful about taking comfort from the numbers. That poll was conducted in January and February. In light of what has happened since, the result is likely to come to be seen as a dead-cat bounce by the time of next survey in 2026.
China is grabbing opportunities by the horns as the US falters in its approach to the region. Soon after Trump announced the Liberation Day tariffs, China’s President Xi Jinping conducted a flying visit to Cambodia, Malaysia and Vietnam to tie up trade deals. Speaking alongside Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, Xi said that the two countries would “stand together” amid “the tide of geopolitical rivalry and bloc-based confrontation, as well the backlash of unilateralism and protectionism.”
There are bigger plans afoot that will see the US left out of future-looking mega trading arrangements. There is talk of incorporating the EU into the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership, which China has already asked to join (Trump withdrew from the CPTPP’s predecessor in 2017).
All this comes at a time when the People’s Liberation Army has made impressive gains in military modernisation, even as the Trump administration has failed to articulate a strategic approach to the region. The US remains the superior military force, but China’s military modernisation is eroding American advantages. According to a recent International Crisis Group report, the PLA has the capacity to frustrate US intervention through the development of hypersonic glide missiles, anti-ship missiles and a growing arsenal of intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles.
In response, the US has ploughed more resources into the region, sought to move away from large surface platforms such as aircraft carriers, and distribute military assets across the region. Only Trump does not sound reassuring when it comes to deterring potential Chinese actions, whether in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea. One US think tank analyst offered me a favourite Trump quote about the relationship with Xi: “I wouldn’t have to (use military force), because he respects me and he knows I’m f****** crazy.” And the so-called “prioritisers”, counted as China hawks in the US National Security Council - such as Mike Waltz and Alex Wong - have been moved out from their posts due to internal battles with “restrainers” who call for a more limited application of US force abroad.
In the words of fictitious Dr Strangelove, the protagonist in the 1964 black comedy about a madcap American general who launches a first strike at the Soviet Union, deterrence is “the art of producing in the mind of the enemy … the fear to attack.” Whatever Hegseth says at the Dialogue this weekend has to be measured against whether China will be deterred. But Trump is the one they will really be listening for, and there, the answer is no, not really.
