A soldier lying prone with a rifle in the bush (Jason Slape/Defence Department)

The unspoken ability to project from land, to take control of land, and to establish powerful positions on that land is just as impactful as being able to achieve it (Jason Slape/Defence Department)

To “protect-and-project” – A call for Australian land power in the Indo-Pacific

The changing character of war may mean fighting more than just one type of war against one type of adversary.

Iain MacGillivray

27 February 20255 min read

The control of land has a physical, psychological, and symbolic dimension to populations. “Land control” primarily acts as a tool to secure that from where our political and economic power emanates.

For Australia, the ability to “protect-and-project” land power will be a critical tool in securing its national defence. While the Indo-Pacific region contains many waterways and large expanses of oceans that need protecting and defending, it also contains hundreds of islands, archipelagic nations and countries with large landmasses that maintain large land-based armies to secure those landmasses. Despite the sheer size of the Indo-Pacific, it is clear that the “strategic terrain” of our region lies in the seams between the land and the sea, just as it always has.

The importance of “land” in strategy – and the resulting utility of land power – tend to be a lower priority in the conversation on the future of defence in the Indo-Pacific. The changing character of war, however, may mean that Australia will need to prepare to fight more than just one type of war against one type of adversary (just as we did in the Pacific in the Second World War). While the sea, and sea denial, is of critical importance, we must remember that the land is a domain that speaks to the fundamental foundation of society – it is where we live, thrive and survive, and is therefore a critical factor in strategy and defence. It is important that we do not preference one domain to the detriment of the others. Australia must instead look at all dimensions of our defence and strategic outlook with a holistic lens.

Stemming from this geostrategically important reasoning, I want to provide two justifications on why I view Australian land power as important for Australia’s military and defence strategy.

While the sea, and sea denial, is of critical importance, we must remember that the land is a domain that speaks to the fundamental foundation of society – it is where we live, thrive and survive.

First, there is the physical attribution to land power – Army’s ability to engage in littoral manoeuvre and amphibious operations. Navigating the islands and archipelagic environment through land power in the Indo-Pacific is a critical aspect of Australia’s ability to hold ground and/or deny an adversary objectives if a situation arises in the region. This is primarily where the Army will have the most impact now and in the future and may include working with regional partners to secure key access points into our region.

Northern Australia and the areas to the north are Australia’s shield and sword: collective security is as valuable as domestic security. The deployment of Australian Army personnel and rotating our allies in Northern Australia and through our northern approaches to protect and project our positions into our immediate neighbourhood adds another important physical dimension to Australian military and defence strategy.

Additionally, the ability of the Australian Army to project and undertake long-range strikes from the land throughout Northern Australia through missile batteries is another critical physical attribution that provides strategic depth.

Composite image of test firing a Javelin Guided Missile near Townsville, Queensland (Gregory Scott/Defence Department)

Second, there is the psychological attribution to Australian land power. The ability to “project” is not just a physical one but just as important in signalling and deterrence. Having the credible capability with intent to conduct an action gives pause to others. Australia must be genuinely able and ready to secure the strategic terrain in the region against a determined adversary in the short, medium, and long term. If the Army has the real capacity to apply force from and onto the land and this is proven, this is a powerful signal to deter adversaries.

The unspoken ability to project from land, to take control of land, and to establish powerful positions on that land is just as impactful as being able to achieve it. Psychological projection and signalling using land power is a critical tool in the Strategy of Denial, and will make any adversaries think twice about attempting to project their own interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Genuine readiness and credibility within the Army – and across the Australian Defence Force – are the two key factors in achieving this. Both allies and adversaries know that it is the will, combined with means, which will successfully allow the Army and ADF to deter and ultimately deny adverse behaviour and actions in the Indo-Pacific.

Land power must be considered as one of the key instruments of national power in the whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach to strategy, if the nation is to “protect-and-project” Australia’s interests and objectives in these coming years of strategic uncertainty. The Australian Army’s Contribution to the National Defence Strategy 2024 outlines how the Army can provide such a role in protecting and projecting land power. The five advantages it outlines on Australian land power (presence, persistence, asymmetry, versatility, and value) provide a blueprint for how land power (and as an extension the Australian Army) are valuable tools for Australia to “protect” our landmass, while also simultaneously “projecting” our interests abroad.

Without consideration of the strategic importance of the land, there is a risk that Australia may not be adequately able to defend itself and its interests if and when deterrence fails, or if a situation arises in the immediate region that Australia is not prepared for. To move towards a truly integrated force, there must be a careful consideration of the benefits of land power to Australia’s maritime strategy in a way that can “protect-and-project” Australia’s military interests as a responsible but serious middle power in the Indo-Pacific.