When China’s Premier Li Qiang touched down in Jakarta last month, he was welcomed with the usual fanfare of red carpets, military salutes and photo ops. But what stood out wasn’t the ceremony – it was the subtle shift in tone from Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto.
At a business reception, Prabowo veered off script. While touting economic ties and mutual respect – standard fare at such events – he also praised China’s opposition to colonialism and apartheid, and voiced support for the Palestinian cause. In another context, these remarks might have passed as boilerplate rhetoric. But coming at a moment when US-China geopolitical tensions are escalating, they sounded like something more: a quiet nod to Beijing’s worldview and a subtle jab at Washington’s.
Was this a pivot? A realignment? Probably not. If there’s one thing Prabowo has shown in his brief time as President, it’s that he is less interested in picking sides than in keeping all options open.
That balancing act is nothing new for Indonesia, which has long championed a “free and active” foreign policy – maintaining autonomy and avoiding entangling alliances. But under Prabowo, it’s starting to look more like an act of diplomatic ventriloquism: telling China what it wants to hear in Jakarta and then turning to Washington with an entirely different voice.
In diplomacy, as in poker, bluffing only gets you so far.
It’s no secret that Prabowo has shown admiration for the United States, especially President Donald Trump. He’s openly expressed a desire to meet with him. At the same time, Prabowo knows that China holds the economic keys to many of his domestic promises. The two countries signed a host of agreements during Li’s visit, including a $3 billion “twin industrial park” initiative linking Fujian and Central Java — expected to create more than 100,000 jobs. It’s a major pillar of Prabowo’s plan to accelerate manufacturing and infrastructure growth.
Then there’s his ambitious – and politically popular – free school meal program. Estimated to cost billions annually, the lunches will require serious financing and logistical support. Chinese investment, already crucial to Indonesia’s infrastructure and food processing sectors, will likely play a role in delivering this cornerstone policy.
Other agreements signed last week included memoranda of understanding in public health, tourism, finance and currency cooperation. Notably, Indonesia’s central bank and the People’s Bank of China agreed to promote trade in local currencies, part of Beijing’s broader effort to erode the US dollar’s dominance.
Security cooperation was also touched on, with a renewed agreement between Indonesia’s Maritime Security Agency and China’s Coast Guard. But here, things get trickier. China’s aggressive maritime moves in the South China Sea – including encroachments into Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone – remain a source of quiet tension. Unsurprisingly, those disputes were left out of the public statements following Li’s visit. For now, Jakarta seems content to compartmentalise: push back quietly on sovereignty, cash in loudly on trade.
This is calculation. Prabowo isn’t choosing China over the United States, or vice versa. He’s choosing flexibility. And in today’s sharply divided geopolitical environment, for him, that might be the most strategic choice of all.
Still, ambiguity has a shelf life. The more Indonesia deepens economic and security cooperation with both sides, the more pressure it will face to show its hand. For now, the ambiguity works – it keeps Chinese capital flowing, American jets flying in joint military exercises, and Indonesian officials welcome in every capital. But that equilibrium is precarious.
There’s also a question of authenticity. Are Prabowo’s words on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and colonialism a reflection of deep conviction or just clever diplomacy? Domestic politics may offer a clue. There is rising pressure inside Indonesia, especially from Islamic organisations and younger voters, for stronger action in response to fighting in Gaza. By speaking out in front of China’s Premier, Prabowo not only earned points with Beijing but reassured a vocal domestic base without needing to confront Washington directly.
It was a message aimed at multiple audiences. And that, more than any MoU or dinner toast, is the real story of Li Qiang’s visit. Not what China brought to Jakarta – but what Indonesia chose to say, and what it left unsaid.
As the world’s major powers compete for influence in Southeast Asia, Prabowo is trying to play them both. So far, it’s working. But in diplomacy, as in poker, bluffing only gets you so far. Eventually, everyone wants to see your cards.
