Debate about the value of Australia’s 1951 alliance with the United States has long focused on the pledge that the parties “will consult together” and how much this ensures action “to meet the common danger”. But the answer is that ANZUS is no longer fit for purpose given contemporary power dynamics.
This isn’t about whether China or the United States is bigger or smaller than the other. The weakness of ANZUS has been made plain by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the American response in the years since.
The 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances bound Russia to respect Ukrainian borders, but also required that the United States would both immediately seek UN Security Council assistance and consult with Ukraine in the event Russia attacked. Australia’s treaty with the United States uses almost identical treaty wording in Article III and Article IV as regards responding to armed attacks. In contrast to both, under the NATO treaty, an attack on one signatory commits all to respond militarily in the threatened country’s defence.
Ukraine’s and Australia’s security treaties being alike is both good and bad. Good in that US support in extremis might be forthcoming, but bad news given that after three years Ukraine is still at war and US support remains conditional and appears wavering.
Contrast this with China’s declarations of a “no limits partnership” with Russia immediately before the invasion of Ukraine. China’s almost three years of support have tangibly demonstrated this deep ongoing commitment. Without China’s support, Russia would arguably not be able to continue waging this major war that has fundamentally altered the contemporary international system and made questionable the value of Australia’s present US alliance agreements.
The stakes for Australia are now too high to simply be receiving US orders in a time of another great war.
Ukraine gave up owning nuclear weapons for its ANZUS-like treaty. Today, almost three-quarters of Ukrainians wish they hadn’t. The war, hundreds of thousands of dead and injured, and catastrophic damage to their nation would probably have been avoided. On the other hand, Ukrainians strongly believe that getting a NATO-like treaty that has binding collective defence obligations would make them safe, end the current war and avoid it being repeated in a few years’ time.
Russia’s continual making of nuclear threats over Ukraine has reinforced for US allies the importance of the extended nuclear deterrence guarantees given by the United States. However, President Donald Trump seeks to be unpredictable and disruptive; traits that nervous allies might not find reassuring if there is a future existential crisis for their nations like Ukraine’s today.
NATO treaty allies have long enjoyed nuclear sharing and have more confidence. But nuclear sharing is actually a misnomer. The United States only shares how to handle certain of its nuclear weapons with Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. Seven more NATO countries participate in planning to support nuclear operations if needed, while all 30 NATO members (excluding France) are part of the Nuclear Planning Group.
Given China’s support for Russia’s active destabilisation of the international system, Australia needs the United States to improve the alliance in three ways.
First, Australia should have a treaty as strong as the NATO treaty. In recent years, others have signed this collective defence treaty including Sweden, Finland, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and Croatia. With the rise of China, Australia’s geostrategic importance to the United States has also undoubtedly risen to be at least as comparable to say, North Macedonia or Montenegro. Both joined NATO in the first Trump presidency.
Second, Australia needs to work with the appropriate American headquarters’ staffs in regional operational defence planning. The stakes for Australia are now too high to simply be receiving US orders in a time of another great war. Australia needs involvement in their formulation, just like NATO nations as well as South Korea already have.
Third, Australia needs to be included in America’s nuclear sharing, that is in nuclear weapon information sharing; as with NATO, the United States would retain full ownership and control. NATO’s nuclear sharing is the benchmark, but the United States has formed a US-South Korea Nuclear Consultative Group. Such arrangements should be possible for Australia also.
The Trump administration offers an opportunity to advance such ambitions. It is expected to be transactional and maybe demand higher Australian defence spending. However, transactions cut both ways.
Australia is not just spending big on US defence equipment but is also hosting ever-increasing short and long-term deployments of US forces across northern Australia. Moreover, significant infrastructure is now being built south of Perth to support US Navy nuclear attack submarines. Australia is now as important to American military strategy in the Indo-Pacific as it has been ever since the Second World War and certainly much more so than in 1951.
Moreover, the Trump administration aims to also counter China geo-economically. This is likely to involve tariff wars, trade restrictions and ever-widening sanctions being placed on Chinese companies. Australia’s economy will be disrupted, with the negative financial impacts being exacerbated by further US demands for increased defence spending and a broader Australian effort in the South West Pacific. American actions and requests will adversely impact Australian households and living standards. A better alliance treaty might help soften the domestic political pushback from Australia supporting America’s hardline China policies.
In the new bipolar world, Australia is stepping up to America’s benefit. It’s time for the United States to also, with a new treaty that elevates Australia to NATO standard and all that follows. In simple terms, Australia should surely be accorded the geostrategic status of North Macedonia, a small Balkan nation that Trump admitted to NATO. Surely.