Russia, explained.
Fighters fire towards Syrian Army troops in the Rashidin district on the outskirts of Aleppo (Bakr Alkasem/AFP via Getty Images)
Moscow cannot meaningfully aid its ally, and that’s not gone unnoticed.
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Is Russia the loser in the fall of Syria’s Aleppo?Is Russia the loser in the fall of Syria’s Aleppo?
While Russia struggles to capture strategically insignificant villages in eastern Ukraine, its client in Syria, President Bashar-al Assad, has lost control over Aleppo – the war-torn nation’s second largest city. Türkiye-backed rebels, in a surprise offensive, have seriously undermined not only Assad’s reign, but also Russia’s position in the Middle East.
In 2015, after signing the Minsk Agreements and effectively putting the Donbass conflict in eastern Ukraine “on hold”, Russia launched a military intervention in Syria. At the time, Assad’s Syrian Arab Army (SAA) was on the verge of defeat. With the help of Moscow and Tehran, the SAA managed to recapture Aleppo from opposition forces in 2016.
Eight years later, the city, as well as the surrounding towns, are in rebel hands again. This time, Russia is unlikely to be in a position to help Assad. Moscow can no longer count on the Wagner Group, which has played a significant role in safeguarding the Kremlin’s interests in Syria in the past. Bogged down in Ukraine, Russia cannot send serious reinforcements to its military contingent in the Middle Eastern country either.
Fully aware of these limitations, Assad has reportedly asked Iran, not Russia, for help. Although, according to unconfirmed reports, he might have gone to Moscow to seek the Kremlin’s support, it was Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, rather than any Russian official, who travelled to Damascus to openly back the Syrian leader. As a result, on 2 December, Iranian-backed militias entered Syria from Iraq, aiming to help the SAA stabilise the situation in the country.
Now Assad, who has been loyal to the Kremlin, seems to have little choice but to actively play the Iranian card.
Following its invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has effectively lost several allies from the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Now it has the chance to lose Syria as well. If Assad does not succeed in stopping the rebels’ offensive, he might end up being overthrown, a move that can force the Kremlin to eventually shut down its Khmeimim Air Base in the Latakia area, and the naval facility in Tartus.
Since Russia and Syria have no land connection, Moscow is forced to ask for permission from NATO member Türkiye every time its vessels pass through the Bosporus and Dardanelles on their way to Syria. In other words, the Kremlin’s involvement in the Syrian civil war is heavily dependent on Ankara’s “goodwill” The fall of Aleppo has yet again showed that Türkiye has significant leverage over Moscow, and that it can use rebel groups as a method of pressure on Russia.
Bashar al-Assad meeting with Vladimir Putin in July in Moscow (Valery Sharifulin, TASS)
The Syrian rebels’ offensive has, therefore, put the Kremlin in a difficult position. It has undoubtedly done serious harm to Russia’s reputation in the global arena, clearly demonstrating that Moscow cannot protect its ally. Now Assad, who has been loyal to the Kremlin, seems to have little choice but to actively play the Iranian card. If he, with Tehran’s support, manages to stabilise the situation, and potentially recapture Aleppo and other cities from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and various rebel groups, Russia could lose Syria to Iran.
From the Kremlin’s perspective, Syria holds an important place in its energy strategy. In October 2016, former Russian general Leonid Ivashov explained on Russian state-owned Channel One that Moscow’s engagement in the Syrian conflict was “critical to prevent the construction of the Qatar-Türkiye pipeline, which would be catastrophic for (Russia’s state-owned energy giant) Gazprom”.
If the Kremlin aims to restore Gazprom’s positions in Europe, it will have to end the war in Ukraine, hoping that this will allow the energy company to resume gas supplies to European countries. At the same time, it will have to maintain its presence in Syria, aiming to secure Gazprom’s monopoly in Europe. But all that is easier said than done.
Russia, having not achieved its strategic goals in Ukraine, and having suffered a series of humiliations on the global stage, it is unlikely to have both Kyiv and Damascus in its sphere of influence. Sooner or later, policy makers and strategic planners might be under serious pressure to, once again, put the war in Ukraine “on hold”, and shift their focus to the Middle East instead.
About the author
Nikola Mikovic
Nikola Mikovic is a freelance journalist, researcher and analyst based in Serbia.
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