Russia cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is expanding – the incentive for the new-found cosy relations largely stemming from Moscow’s confrontation with the European Union and the United States over Ukraine. Moscow has looked to Asia to mitigate the economic pressure from the imposition of Western sanctions that followed its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s growing partnerships with China, North Korea and Iran have been central to its pivot, but cooperation with ASEAN has been little discussed.
Yet progress in bilateral military and economic ties between Russia and partners in Southeast Asia is readily apparent.
According to Russian figures, in 2023 Russia’s trade turnover with ASEAN reached a record high of $22 billion and grew by 14.6% compared to the previous year. In the first half of 2024, the positive trend continued with growth of 20.5%. Russia exports mineral fertilisers, metals and engineering products to the countries of the region, purchasing textiles, industrial raw materials and engineering products. ASEAN countries export high-tech products to Russia, including electronics, as well as equipment and components. Last week, ASEAN Secretary General Kao Kim Hourn opened an exhibition on ASEAN-Russia Cooperation in Civilian Nuclear Energy and Technologies at ASEAN headquarters in Jakarta, Indonesia.*
Russia has also pursued closer military cooperation with separate members of ASEAN.
Russia’s biggest partner is Indonesia, with bilateral trade growing from $3.3 billion in 2021 to $4 billion in 2023. The volume of mutual trade between the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the ASEAN member countries has likewise increased, exceeding $27 billion in 2023. In March 2023, ASEAN and the EAEU also held a seminar on Digital Transformation, which focused on sharing experiences and best practices in digitalisation within the two regional blocs. The event was part of the cooperation program under the Memorandum of Understanding between ASEAN and the Eurasian Economic Commission for 2020-2025, which ideally was a step towards a potential ASEAN–EAEU free trade agreement, yet the progress has been slow, as evidenced by the fact that the negotiations began in 2016.
Russia and ASEAN are also planning to sign in 2025 the Strategic Program for Trade and Investment Cooperation as a new five-year roadmap for trade and investment. The inflow of Russian money into ASEAN remains minuscule. The most recent figures for foreign direct investment from Russia to ASEAN countries reached just $159 million, far short of US foreign direct investment in the region of $40 billion.
Russia has also pursued closer military cooperation with separate members of ASEAN. For instance, Moscow has signalled that Indonesia, despite Western pressure, might follow through with a purchase of Su-35s, Russia's state-of-the-art fighter jets. Russia also held its first naval exercises with Indonesia in the Java Sea in November 2024, the move reflecting the Indonesian leadership’s increasing willingness to forge closer ties with Moscow.
Similarly, the Russian side increased military engagement with Vietnam through defence strategy dialogues, reflected in Vladimir Putin’s visit to Hanoi in June 2024. Both sides issued a statement on expanding the comprehensive strategic partnership, which includes elements of military cooperation.
Russia’s push for closer ties with Southeast Asia fits into Moscow’s vision of international relations, namely its emphasis on the need to usher in a multipolar world order. In this new system, ASEAN will be one of the major global actors. As part of this, Russia will be eager to avoid overdependence on other actors and will seek closer cooperation with the Association. It was this cooperation that led to Moscow’s support for Indonesia’s BRICS membership, which commenced from 2025.
The relationship, however, is not without its challenges, as ASEAN countries have diverse foreign policy interests, with some nations maintaining close ties with the United States and its allies. The geopolitical tensions, such as those arising from the South China Sea disputes and Russia's war in Ukraine, also have an indirect impact on ASEAN-Russia relations. Then there is also China, which considers itself a primary power in the region and Moscow has to walk carefully not to compromise its close ties with Beijing.
On a more practical level, another problem is the distance from Russia to Southeast Asia. Given that Russia’s Far East ports infrastructure is relatively poorly developed, the link between the two parties is limited. There is also the question of Western sanctions, which limit the room for ASEAN to engage Russia more robustly. With the potential end of hostilities in Ukraine, this might change, but for Russia the economic and military potential ASEAN holds still remains largely untapped.
* This article was corrected - ASEAN headquarters is in Jakarta, not Singapore as previously stated. The mistake was made in production.
