Beijing appears to be returning to a familiar Taiwan playbook: selective engagement with political forces on the island. The opposition Kuomintang (KMT) chairperson Cheng Li-wun’s current visit to mainland China at the invitation of China’s President Xi Jinping is a case in point. But this is not mere diplomatic theatre. It reflects a deeper logic to treat Taiwan’s domestic – and democratic – politics as a central arena of competition.
For decades, Beijing has sought to cultivate preferred ties in Taiwan as a way of shaping the island’s political landscape. It has long differentiated between political actors, rewarding those more open to engagement while isolating those associated with pro-independence positions. This approach is not only about managing cross-Strait relations, but about shaping political incentives and debates within Taiwan itself. By elevating certain actors and narratives, Beijing signals that conflict is not inevitable, but contingent on choices made within Taiwan’s political system.
Engagement with opposition figures, particularly from the KMT, serves several purposes. It preserves channels of communication, demonstrates an alternative to confrontation, and reinforces the idea that engagement with Beijing remains a viable political option.
This dynamic has become more pronounced after the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) secured a third consecutive presidential term in 2024. With limited prospects for political alignment under the current government, engagement with opposition actors takes on added significance. It allows Beijing to sustain influence within Taiwan’s political system while signalling a preference for a future shift in political leadership, particularly towards the KMT.
Political engagement within Taiwan is therefore not an alternative to strategic competition – it is part of it.
None of this is new. What has changed is how this playbook now fits within Beijing’s broader framing of the Taiwan issue – and the weight it now carries.
In recent years, Beijing has come to present the Taiwan question as part of a broader contest with the United States. As the 2022 White Paper on Taiwan makes clear, “external interference” is now seen as a central obstacle to reunification. Opposition to “Taiwan independence” is increasingly linked with resistance to “external interference,” particularly from Washington. In this manner, Taiwan’s domestic politics becomes a key site where this wider competition plays out.
At the same time, this is not simply a story of continuity. Beijing’s growing emphasis on “external interference” reflects a view that the Taiwan issue is no longer just about cross-Strait relations, but about the broader balance of power and influence in the region. Political engagement within Taiwan is therefore not an alternative to strategic competition – it is part of it.
This shift matters because it places greater emphasis on influencing outcomes from within Taiwan, rather than just relying on coercion or military signalling. Beijing has political tools of its own – tools that operate through engagement, narrative shaping, and political influence within Taiwan’s democratic system.
Seen in this light, Cheng’s visit serves a dual purpose for Beijing. Within Taiwan, it reinforces engagement with Beijing as a viable political option. Internationally, it signals that the Taiwan issue cannot be shaped solely through deterrence, arms sales, or diplomatic support from Washington.
For policymakers, this carries several implications.
First, it highlights the limits of viewing the Taiwan issue primarily through a military lens. While deterrence remains central to maintaining stability, Beijing is not confined to coercion or the threat of force. Studies of Chinese influence operations point to a broad toolkit that spans elite engagement, media narratives, and efforts to shape public opinion and electoral dynamics.
Second, it underscores how central Taiwan’s domestic politics has become as a key arena of broader competition. Beijing’s approach does not bypass Taiwan’s agency but seeks to mould it. Elections, party dynamics, and public opinion are not just internal matters, but integral to how cross-Strait relations evolve. External actors, including the United States and its partners, must therefore pay close attention not only to military balances, but also to the internal political dynamics that Beijing is trying to influence.
Third, it complicates the signalling environment. Engagement with opposition figures allows Beijing to project an image of restraint and openness, even as it maintains military pressure and diplomatic isolation of Taiwan’s current government. This dual-track approach can make it harder to interpret Beijing’s intentions and calibrate responses accordingly.
None of this suggests that Beijing has abandoned its longstanding positions. References to “peaceful reunification” and established formulas remain in place. But the emphasis has shifted. The return of this old playbook is therefore less about continuity than adaptation. It reflects an effort to integrate familiar political tools into a more complex regional context, in which domestic politics, external competition, and narrative control are tightly intertwined.
For Taiwan, this means that its political system remains at the centre of the contest over its future. For external actors, it is a reminder that the Taiwan issue cannot be understood – or managed – through military means alone.
Beijing may be playing an old game, but it is doing so on a changed board.
