Following the normalisation of relations in 1990, the Vietnamese government maintained a cautious approach for about three decades, often discouraging remembrance of the war. Media coverage and public discussion of the conflict was limited, reflecting the government’s desire for a stable relationship with China and to avoid escalating tensions. The conspicuous absence of the war in official accounts extended to both nations – in China, textbooks make no mention of the conflict whatsoever, while Vietnamese students only encounter a brief reference in their final year of high school education.
However, in recent years, the Vietnamese government has begun to cautiously allow more open discussion and media coverage of the war. This change can be attributed to a confluence of factors.
First, Vietnam’s diversified diplomatic relations and reducing dependence on China. Vietnam has continuously strengthened its relations with world powers in recent decades, establishing a series of comprehensive strategic partnerships including with India, South Korea, the United States, Japan, and, as of this month, Australia. This marks the end of more than three decades of economic dependence on the relationship with neighbouring China that began with the 1990 Chengdu Meeting.
Second, veterans and their families have increasingly demanded public acknowledgement of the sacrifices made during the 1979 war and a proper honouring of fallen soldiers. This pressure has also been echoed by the public and scholars.
Third, the evolving relationship with China has provided Vietnam with more space to address sensitive historical issues without sparking an immediate diplomatic crisis. In addition to commemoration of the Sino-Vietnamese War, this extends to territorial disputes in the South China Sea, illustrated by the recent decision by the Vietnamese government to commemorate the Johnson South Reef skirmish as another apparent shift in policy.
Vietnam asserts its longstanding territorial claims over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. However, unlike the Philippines, Vietnam avoids officially participating in international lawsuits with China to maintain a stable relationship. This accords with Vietnam’s “bamboo diplomacy” approach, meant to invoke “strong roots, stout trunk, and flexible branches”. In practice, it allows Vietnam the flexibility not to confront China, yet continuously conduct dredging and landfill work, and strengthen the military infrastructure on the islands it currently controls. It is clear this strategy is intended to deter China, as other countries in the region lack the capability or motivation to occupy these islands.
The memorial commemorations illustrate Vietnam’s delicate balancing act: to honour fallen soldiers and acknowledge the impact of the 1979 war, particularly in border provinces, all without straining relations with China. Calibrating remembrance and diplomacy allows Vietnam to send a message.