Although Abe is the beneficiary, his administration has to deal with potential challenges.
First, the regional security environment has changed dramatically. The cornerstone of Abe’s security policy is enhancing Japan’s alliance with the US, regardless of who is US President. He has cultivated friendship and trust with Donald Trump over the past 18 months.
However, Japan is simultaneously seeking to tackle its constitutional limitations on self-defence because of a possible decline of US willingness to materially engage in Northeast Asia.
Meanwhile, Sino–Japanese relations have, if temporarily, improved since the end 2017, marked by a new atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation. The Trump–Kim summit on 12 June also lowered tensions for a while. This makes it more difficult for Abe to convince the public of the need to beef up Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and even amend its constitution, given it is still seen as a low priority, without demonising North Korea or China.
Second is the risk of economic downturn. Even though recent economic indicators were generally positive, including 1.8% GDP growth in 2017 and a low unemployment rate, Japan cannot escape domestic and global economic risks.
Domestically, one urgent task is super-ageing, as the population over 65 years of age reaches 35.1 million, or more than a quarter of Japan’s total population. The number of those over 80 years old has also exceeded 10.7 million. While the Basic Policy 2018 promised fiscal reforms, further reforms of government expenditure, especially social welfare, are getting harder for the administration to achieve.
Globally, US foreign economic policies under the Trump administration that have sparked fears of a US–China trade war, as well as the deterioration of US–Iran relations, will affect Japanese businesses. So far, Abe has done well by concluding TPP-11, Japan–EU EPA, and committing to RCEP negotiations. He also coped with Japan’s difficult position at the last G7 summit in Canada by seeking to bridge the divide between the Trump administration and other global partners in Europe.
Although the Japanese government adheres to dispute settlements in the World Trade Organisation before taking legitimate retaliatory measures, the Abe administration is expected to play a bigger global role as a leader of free trade, while working on domestic structural reforms.
This does not mean there is no Abe fatigue. Yet, unless his successor emerges with a relevant alternative policy package, support for Abe will continue.
Ryosuke Hanada