Elsewhere, Myanmar and Thailand border closures have disrupted the movement of goods, migrant workers, and remittances. In the Sulu‑Celebes Seas, maritime disputes among the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia have heightened security risks for shipping and fishing, deterring investment in maritime infrastructure.
These disruptions hit small- and medium‑sized enterprises (SMEs) and informal cross‑border traders hardest. Large corporations can reroute shipments or absorb higher costs; small traders and informal workers cannot. Rising border tensions also carry a political cost: when two ASEAN members exchange fire, it chips away at the bloc’s credibility as a guarantor of peace.
While tariffs and border conflicts make headlines, a quieter but equally consequential shift is also under way.
Western aid budgets are shrinking. Constrained by domestic cost‑of‑living crises and costly wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, donors including the United States, the European Union, and Japan are cutting development assistance.
The pain is uneven. Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, highly aid‑dependent, face the sharpest squeeze. In Cambodia, aid funds significant shares of education and health budgets. In Laos, it helps sustain macroeconomic stability amid mounting debt. Myanmar’s political crisis has already slashed inflows. Even middle‑income ASEAN members are seeing targeted programs in climate action, governance, and skills training scaled back.
Without aid, governments will need to rely more on domestic revenue, bond markets, and public-private partnerships. But building strong tax systems, deep capital markets, and investor confidence takes time – time the region may not have in a world of faster‑moving shocks.
All this amounts to a triple test for ASEAN.
Tariffs, border frictions, and aid cuts are not isolated threats; they interact. Tariffs can shrink export revenues, while aid cuts remove fiscal cushions. Border closures can nullify whatever gains a country might make from trade diversion. This interlocking pressure threatens ASEAN’s goal of becoming a competitive, integrated economic community.
The region has weathered crises before – financial crises in 1997‑98 and 2008, the Covid‑19 pandemic – through adaptability, pragmatism, and cooperation. But today’s shocks are simultaneous, more interconnected, and unfolding in a world with fewer safety nets and a highly fragmented global economy.
Whether ASEAN can emerge stronger depends on its ability to deepen internal market linkages, negotiate with external powers as a united bloc, and invest in domestic capacity. This is not just about surviving 2025’s turbulence; it is about shaping a more resilient and prosperous decade ahead.