When gauging the implications of Trump 2.0 for Australia, experts regularly look to draw insight from Canada’s recent interactions with the United States. After all, as Sam Roggeveen notes, there is a strong basis for doing so – “Canada is safe, likeable, reasonable, wealthy, friendly, Western, English-speaking. Australia and Canada share a colonial heritage, membership to the Commonwealth, and a long-established alliance with the United States, reinforced by deep historical, economic and cultural ties.”
Taking this transitive approach mistakenly considers the similarities though – and not what matters most in Trump’s administration, the president himself. By instead drawing the comparison from Trump’s perspective, Australia and Canada have several consequential differences, and these differences leave Canberra much better positioned under Trump 2.0.
Trump holds a transactional view of alliances. As he puts it, American partners must “take a direct and meaningful role in both strategic and military operations, and pay their fair share of the costs”. Against this standard, Canberra has a stronger appeal to history. Over the courses of their respective alliances with the United States, Australia has committed a greater share of its GDP to defence, purchased more American weapons (despite only having four-fifths of Canada’s wealth), matched or exceeded Canada’s burden-sharing in every non-NATO US-led combat coalition since 1945, and suffered personnel losses in twice as many US-led ground wars.
Likewise, by Trump’s measure, Australia offers greater prospective alliance utility. Canberra already spends more on defence (US$32 billion vs $27 billion in 2024) and has budgeted greater medium-term increases than Ottawa. The Australian Defence Force also has more capability than its Canadian counterpart, especially in the critical air and naval domains. Canada cannot match the geographic advantages afforded by Australia’s Top End either – which provides Washington with relatively safe in-theatre bases for deterring (or responding to) its principal strategic competitor, Beijing.
Moreover, under Trump 2.0, Canberra has demonstrated greater alliance loyalty (a value cherished by the president) – effectively doubling down on ANZUS/AUKUS by making its first AU$798 million payment towards acquiring American nuclear submarines. Ottawa, by contrast, has threatened Washington with retaliatory tariffs and pledged “deeper economic cooperation with the EU”.
Canberra currently holds an advantage – as Trump recently described Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese as a “very fine man”, whereas his relationship with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is notoriously tense.
Trump also dislikes trade deficits, believing they are indicative of unfair trade practices against the United States. In this regard, Canberra maintains a more favourable balance-of-trade – forming Washington’s fourth-largest trade surplus in 2024, while Ottawa constituted its ninth-largest deficit. Trump has directly acknowledged the implications of this difference – noting, “We actually have a surplus [with Australia] … that’s something we’ll give great consideration to [when evaluating tariff exemptions]”; whereas “Canada's been treating us very unfairly on trade … We're not going to allow that to happen.”
Interpersonal connections have considerable bearing on Trump’s foreign policy, too. During his first administration, for example, German Chancellor Angela Merkel lacked rapport with the president and relations with Washington suffered accordingly. Conversely, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe leveraged his friendship with Trump – not only to temper critiques of alliance free-riding and unfair trade practices (that the president continued to level against Germany), but also to secure Washington’s support for his “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy.
Here again, Canberra currently holds an advantage – as Trump recently described Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese as a “very fine man”, whereas his relationship with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is notoriously tense.
The 2025 Australian and Canadian elections are unlikely to shift this advantage: the president generally gets along well with Australian conservatives (who are currently projected to defeat Albanese), while the Canadian frontrunner, Conservative Party leader Pierre Poilievre, has already outlined an adversarial approach to Trump – noting, “We must respond with strength … we have leverage. I will use that leverage.”
Trump has also prioritised border security, which has naturally increased tensions with neighbouring states. His initial tariffs, for instance, punitively targeted Canada and Mexico for failing to fulfil “their promises of halting illegal immigration and stopping [drug inflows]”. By being “rather far away”, as Trump noted, Australia remains shielded from the perils of proximity that Canada must endure (along with the ensuing societal frictions that further undermine relations).
So, the traditional Canada comparison falls short – because it ignores differences in alliance burden-sharing, trade policy, interpersonal diplomacy, and geographic proximity that are consequential to Trump. Canberra faces a test as to whether it can leverage these differences, but it certainly will encounter fewer obstacles than Ottawa when negotiating with Washington.
