In recent years, Australian foreign policy has centred on two highly visible regional arrangements, AUKUS and the Quad. But no one seems to remember the TSD – the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue.
For all the focus on minilateral diplomacy and the sprouting of new pacts and forums, it is the TSD that might offer the most potential impact.
Created in 2002, the TSD joins the United States, Japan, and Australia to facilitate coordination among the three democracies “to advance a free … Indo-Pacific region”. Its last meeting, in 2022, reaffirmed the relationship and the trio’s common values while repudiating China’s use of ballistic missiles. Yet the TSD has no treaty ensuring its continued existence or obligating members to make commitments.
And that’s a missed opportunity.
If Australia formalises the TSD, it has the chance to favourably transform regional security dynamics. Such an arrangement would allow Asia-Pacific integration while giving the United States an incentive to invest in the region. The potential of this simultaneous achievement is core to Australia’s time-sensitive foreign policy objectives.
After decades of identity crisis, Australia has recognised Asia as its critical region. Japan, a powerful and strategically aligned country, must be prioritised in this. Some argue that this stance inflames tensions with China. However, observers such as former prime minister Kevin Rudd suggest that this is the very reason Australia should work with Japan, to improve Canberra’s position vis-à-vis Beijing. Despite this, recent governments have failed to move towards a formal relationship with Tokyo. The current Albanese government has taken steps to reverse the trend with coordinated military exercises showing an increased willingness to improve interoperability.
This aligns with one of Australia’s central foreign policy goals – to achieve stability in the region. Aligning with Japan would promote Australia as a stabilising influence. Japan has built a regional reputation through substantial aid financing to bodies such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). If Australia joins these efforts, it can boost its regional standing. This has already occurred with coordinated Australia–Japan gender equality and climate efforts targeting the Asia-Pacific.
The TSD often corresponds with improved Japan–Australia relations. The two countries’ Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation mentions the TSD as central to the partnership, and both have used it as an instrument to improve foreign policy relations with each other.
Australia and Japan are America’s closest Asia-Pacific allies and both need regional US investment to reinforce their defensive posture against China.
Moving towards the TSD’s formalisation would indicate a strengthening of these ties and maximise the benefits beyond the current security arrangements. Despite Japan being a Quad member, and even if Japan were to join AUKUS, both bodies include non-US members with substantially incompatible goals. The United Kingdom is more focused on Europe, while India has a vastly differing risk assessment of China. The TSD allows Japan–Australia relations to flourish, which is key for Australia’s broader goal of regional integration.
Australia’s second central foreign policy goal is balancing against China in an era of superpower competition. Albanese has acknowledged China and Australia’s “strategic competition”, while Australia’s 2024 National Defence Strategy shows that the country is taking an increasingly active military stance to counter Chinese aggression. However, even if the United States abandons Asian primacy, Australia’s military will need supplementary US support to curb China’s ambitions. Notably, the Trump administration’s withdrawal from Asia, and its rising isolationism, threaten Australian security.
Australia and Japan are America’s closest Asia-Pacific allies and both need regional US investment to reinforce their defensive posture against China. Australia and Japan delivering a coordinated message on Asia-Pacific investment would have more impact on the United States than any other regional pairing. Importantly, Washington will have tremendous abandonment fears stemming from its dependence on Australian facilities, such as Pine Gap, and on Japanese missile bases. Long-term abandonment fears ensure this model’s success regardless of who is in the White House.
A longstanding US concern regarding the Asia-Pacific has been the perception that allies pass the military burden onto the United States. However, the TSD reflects Japan’s willingness to engage in trilateral strategic cooperation. If the TSD were formalised, Australia and Japan could offer conditional military support pending Chinese aggression. These actions would rebut arguments of “passing the buck” and build Washington’s confidence in regional investment. Moreover, they may encourage Washington to make commitments beyond a “free and open Indo-Pacific”.
The TSD offers an unmatched opportunity to encourage US re-engagement in the Asia-Pacific, to balance China’s rise and secure Australia’s interests. A formalised agreement would allow Australia to reap the full foreign policy benefits and capitalise on its greatest geographical asset.
