United Nations, explained.
Peacekeeping missionshave in many cases mitigated violence and supported recovery (Pasqual Gorriz/UN Photo)
The world body is neither a global policeman nor an impartial arbiter – and no amount of reform will make it so.
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The UN is not broken – it was built this wayThe UN is not broken – it was built this way
The United Nations appears paralysed in response to the world’s most consequential conflicts, unable to fulfil its ambitious mandate to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”. Whether in Ukraine or Iran, the UN is neither a forum nor an actor in conflict resolution.
The finger of blame is regularly pointed at the veto power granted to the Security Council’s permanent members, which allows major powers to block any action against their interest. But this diagnosis, while not wrong, is incomplete. The problem stems from a mismatch between the organisation’s institutional design and common expectations of what the United Nations is meant to do.
Calls for UN reform emphasise the need for a more efficient, better represented, and functionally coherent organisation. These proposals are both necessary and overdue. The UN system is too fragmented, with overlapping functions and thinly spread resources. Improvements in coordination and leadership would enhance its ability to deliver on many of its mandates. But such reforms cannot tackle the organisation’s most visible failures in acting decisively in major conflicts. Bureaucratic inefficiency and institutional fragmentation are not the primary reasons for such failures. Instead, these are embedded in the structure of the UN, particularly the Security Council.
The veto power was a foundational compromise, ensuring that the major powers would remain within the system rather than act outside it. Without such a safety valve, there was a plausible chance of a repeat of the League of Nations collapse, where key powers simply walked away when the institution constrained them. This helps explain why the UN’s record appears so uneven.
The challenge is not to transform the UN into something it cannot be, but to understand it more clearly for what it is.
In conflicts where the stakes for major powers are limited, or where their interests align, the organisation can and does play a meaningful role. Peacekeeping missions, humanitarian coordination, and post-conflict stabilisation efforts have, in many cases, mitigated violence and supported recovery. In Liberia, they supported post-conflict stabilisation and political transition, while in South Sudan they have provided protection to civilians. In more challenging settings such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, UN missions have helped contain violence, even if they fall short of resolving it.
Where major power interests collide, the UN becomes toothless. In the Russia-Ukraine war, as in the US-Israel-Iran war, Russia’s and the United States’ position as permanent members has ensured that the Security Council cannot move beyond limited or symbolic action.
Extending this logic, even widely discussed reforms such as expanding the Security Council do not resolve the problem so much as redistribute it. A larger council may better reflect contemporary geopolitical realities and address long-standing concerns about representation. Yet if new permanent members are granted veto powers, the result would be a multiplication of potential veto points, increasing the likelihood of deadlock. Either way, the underlying constraint remains unchanged. Decision-making within the Security Council would continue to be shaped by the interests of powerful states, and collective action would remain contingent on their alignment.
The UN Security Council votes on 30 April 2026 to extend the mandate of the mission in South Sudan with Russia and China abstaining (Loey Felipe/UN Photo)
The UN’s most visible failures cannot be reformed away because they stem from the political conditions within which the organisation operates. The more practical response is to recalibrate expectations of what the organisation can realistically achieve. Judging the UN for the failure to enforce a mandate it was never structurally equipped to fulfil is unfair. Understanding the UN in more modest, more accurate terms clarifies where its value lies.
That value is better understood in terms of mediation, containment, and coordination rather than decisive enforcement. Evaluation should be conducted across a narrower, more realistic set of functions.
First, the UN should be assessed as a mechanism for conflict management rather than conflict prevention. Its role lies in slowing escalation, sustaining dialogue, and preserving diplomatic channels even when formal negotiations break down. Even in moments of geopolitical deadlock, the UN sustains diplomatic channels that might otherwise close. For instance, in Ukraine, UN-backed arrangements on grain exports and humanitarian access show the organisation’s continued utility in specific domains.
Second, it should be judged by its capacity to coordinate large-scale humanitarian responses. In situations where political consensus is absent, the organisation’s ability to mobilise resources, facilitate access, and maintain basic cooperation becomes a central measure of effectiveness.
Third, the UN should be understood as a platform for legitimacy and norm contestation. Even when it cannot enforce outcomes, it compels states to justify their actions, shaping how conflicts are framed and understood in international terms.
None of this is to suggest that reform is unnecessary – improving efficiency, strengthening leadership, and addressing institutional fragmentation are worthwhile goals. But reform alone cannot resolve the tensions that arise when sovereign states, particularly powerful ones, pursue conflicting interests. The UN is neither a global policeman capable of preventing all wars, nor an impartial arbiter standing above the politics of its member states.
It is an organisation embedded within an international system defined by unequal power and competing interests. The challenge, then, is not to transform the UN into something it cannot be, but to understand it more clearly for what it is: a limited but indispensable instrument in a world still governed by power, not principle.
About the author
Abhinandan Kumar
Abhinandan Kumar is a PhD Candidate at the Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University.
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