The recent US strikes in Venezuela and the capture of President Nicolás Maduro have led some to celebrate what they see as the end of an authoritarian regime and others to condemn the operation as a clear breach of Venezuela’s sovereignty and violation of international law.
Realists have long argued that international institutions possess only as much authority as great powers allow them.
European countries and governments across the Global South have called for international law and legal norms to be upheld. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez said "Spain did not recognize the Maduro regime. But neither will it recognize an intervention that violates international law and pushes the region toward a horizon of uncertainty and belligerence".
Yet this episode highlights a familiar reality in international relations: when vital interests are at stake, power often trumps rules. In practice, military might matters more than legal principles, and international law becomes secondary when powerful states decide it should be.
There are three reasons why this case reinforces a realist reading of global politics.
First, Thucydides still matters. As he famously wrote, “the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.” Whether viewed as legitimate or not by foreign states, the US operation in Venezuela suggests this ancient insight remains deeply relevant.
Under the UN Charter, the use of force is permitted only in cases of self-defence against armed attack or when authorised by the UN Security Council. In this case, Venezuela was not attacking the United States, nor was there explicit Security Council authorisation. Yet force was used regardless. This underscores how international legal constraints tend to apply unevenly, binding weaker states more than stronger ones.
Second, the limits of international organisations are once again exposed. Since the creation of the United Nations and its Security Council, there has been a widespread hope that international peace and security would be managed through institutions and rules. Proponents of liberal institutionalism explain that organisations such as the UN facilitate cooperation, constrain unilateral behaviour, and help prevent conflict among states.
Realists, however, have long argued that international institutions possess only as much authority as great powers allow them. When institutional constraints clash with major power interests, they can be ignored or bypassed. The US operation in Venezuela appears to confirm this realist view. The UN was effectively sidelined, reinforcing the idea that international organisations cannot restrain powerful states when core interests are perceived to be at stake.
Third, this US operation reinforces realist expectations about how norms function in the international system. From a realist perspective, international norms do not constrain great powers in any consistent way. Instead, they are applied selectively and instrumentalised to justify action after the fact.
International legal constraints tend to apply unevenly, binding weaker states more than stronger ones.
The United States has long portrayed itself as a champion of the rules-based international order and the promotion of democratic governance. Yet past interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya demonstrate that when interests are at stake, military force is used regardless of legal or normative concerns.
These interventions have rarely produced stable democratic outcomes, instead resulting in prolonged instability, civil conflict, and deep societal divisions. A substantial body of scholarship has shown that democracy is difficult to impose from the outside. Sustainable political change must come from within societies themselves, reflecting local political dynamics and popular consent. Venezuela is unlikely to be an exception. The gap between official rhetoric and practice confirms the realist perspective once again.
More importantly, such behaviour by a leading power reshapes the wider international environment. When a dominant state uses force without clear legal authorisation, it lowers the political and normative costs for others to do the same. Authoritarian governments and other great powers can point to such precedents to justify their own use of force, particularly against smaller and weaker states that resist their influence. Recent statements by the US naming other countries, such as Cuba and Colombia, that could be targeted only reinforce this dynamic.
Rather than weakening the realist account of world politics, the Venezuela case strengthens it by demonstrating how power and selective observance of international law continue to shape state behaviour.
