Where geopolitics and development meet

“National interest” needn’t be a banned phrase, and acknowledgement can help make aid partnerships more honest.

Lucy Pennington

31 January 20254 min read

Some years ago, I found myself taking minutes for a meeting between a senior Papua New Guinean government official, an Australian ex-government-official-turned consultant (my boss), and a diplomat colleague from Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. It was my first time travelling for work and I was desperately trying to keep up with the acronym-laden, diplomatic, guarded-yet-friendly manner of speech.

The conversation followed a familiar script: Australia asked what PNG wanted, Australia said maybe, nobody spoke about why. At a somewhat awkward impasse when discussing competing infrastructure priorities, I began to scan the room, my eyes falling on the PNG official’s desk, where lay a dog-eared copy of historian Ian Morris’ Why the West Rules – For Now, the argument of which reflects precisely what is written on the cover. I chuckled to myself knowing that while everyone danced carefully around the many reasons as to why Australia might want to invest in Papua New Guinea’s critical infrastructure, there was a kind of “pact of silence” around the competing geopolitical interests in the development program.

Driven by this curiosity, I began to research how Australia pursues its interests via infrastructure development programs in Papua New Guinea, the published paper tracing two key patterns that most are aware of but tend to avoid making explicit.

DFAT speaks between the lines on geopolitics in aid. Yet, external media, think tanks and the aid community outside of government bureaucracy are quick to speculate about, and notice, links between the two. Studying Australia’s major infrastructure investments from 2018–2023, I found the written reporting omitted geopolitics and soft power as a consideration in aid delivery, while the media and development professionals responded quickly and strongly in individual interviews when asked about similar topics.

PNG government officials’ perception of Australia is significantly influenced by the Australian they work with.

To take an example, a DFAT concept note warns “if Australia does not provide sufficient resources for road maintenance, PNG may seek assistance from other sources, which may have less favourable terms. The end results may be of poorer quality, higher cost and undermine Australia’s efforts in the sector”. This sotto voce reference to “other sources” is far more explicit in a Lowy Institute assessment about the same string of investments tied to the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific, which notes “spurred by concerns over the geostrategic implications of China’s overseas infrastructure activities, other governments have sought to respond with their own enhanced infrastructure efforts”. Similar differences between implicit or explicit acknowledgement of geopolitical considerations were evident in my interviews with officials and researchers.

This might appear good diplomatic practice to avoid friction, but at the risk of leaving recipients as well as the public confused as to the goal of Australian aid. It can leave a void for other actors to interpret and speak for the government’s intentions, such as individual advisers, who often work for commercial managing contractors.

This has implications for statecraft, as these advisers are political actors working outside of formal government structures. Most of these individuals are technical specialists in areas such as engineering, human resources, law or economics assigned to a specific government counterpart. Through the nature of their work, managing contractors engage with individuals and government departments in the region as political actors and representatives of Australia in their own right. Their proximity to foreign government officials is viewed positively by some, especially partner governments, and as a risk by others. Advisers are both praised for their political savvy, cleverly manoeuvring through complex environments, as well as chastised for overstepping into political territory. PNG government officials’ perception of Australia is significantly influenced by the Australian they work with.

Ultimately, actors are aware of the many aims of the aid program, including the geopolitical objective, yet seem to make only a certain portion explicit and visible, just to ensure things work in practice. Australia’s International Development Policy, released in August 2023, acknowledges that “geostrategic competition is exacerbating existing vulnerabilities and threatens stability” but is then largely silent on the direct consequences. Aid is effective when it is geopolitically literate but focuses on the conditions and processes that are necessary for human development.

My research found that practitioners are optimistic about the possibility of focusing on human development while serving Australia’s broader national interests, without giving conditional support for short‐term gain. Australia has a long way to go in delivering on and measuring its political objectives in aid, critically evaluating the impact on human development of linking these two processes and determining if there are unintended consequences.

Delivering on national interest in aid should be a dividend of investment in human development but it is often treated as a driver. The findings of my research indicate that, considering the negative perception of geopolitics in aid, Australia should be cautious in how it chooses to apply this rhetoric with its partners. A more principled, nuanced understanding of national interest in aid would provide direction for Australia’s role in building the global communities of which it wants to be a part.

About the author

Lucy Pennington

Lucy Pennington is an international affairs ‘pracademic’ and policy commentator whose work focuses on the intersection of aid and geopolitics.

Topics

Aid & development Australia