Asia, explained.
Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim (L) hands over the rotating chair gavel to Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr at the 47th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, 28 October 2025 (Cheng Yiheng/Xinhua via Getty Images)
Will Manila shake off its “deputy sheriff” badge to become the anchor of a new coalition in Southeast Asia?
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Where the Philippines might lead ASEANWhere the Philippines might lead ASEAN
The Philippines has assumed the rotational chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at a particularly challenging moment. Not only has the regional body struggled to assert its “centrality” in shaping the Indo-Pacific security architecture amid renewed great power competition, but Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr has openly acknowledged that “tides of change may be unpredictable” and that his country’s chairing role “arrives at [a] defining moment for ASEAN, one marked by both promise and complexity”.
Thanking Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who worked hard to assert ASEAN’s role, Marcos Jr emphasised the need for “maintaining a stable and secure region, built upon a shared vision of an open, inclusive, transparent and rules-based ASEAN regional architecture”. The mild-mannered Filipino statesman has promised to leverage his role as chair to address pressing regional challenges, most notably the South China Sea disputes, which involve multiple Southeast Asian nations as well as China.
It's hard to understate the unusual circumstances surrounding the Philippines’ assumption of regional leadership.
To this end, Marcos Jr personally reached out to Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in South Korea last week. During a brief exchange, the Filipino leader congratulated Xi on China’s assumption of APEC leadership next year and, crucially, reaffirmed his country’s “commitment to partnership and meaningful cooperation in our region”. By all indications, Marcos Jr’s ASEAN priority is finalising a South China Sea code of conduct and securing the Chinese leader’s first visit to Manila since 2018.
However, the Philippines is also rapidly fortifying its defensive capabilities through reinvigorated partnerships with traditional allies. In addition to new defence pacts with likeminded regional players, Manila is also pursuing minilateral security arrangements such as the so-called “Squad” with the United States, Australia and Japan, which just held its latest meeting on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit. Yet Marcos Jr’s attempt at enhancing his country’s strategic position in tandem with Western partners could complicate the Philippines’ ability to project neutrality and win over more Beijing-friendly Southeast Asian nations as ASEAN’s new chair.
It's hard to understate the unusual circumstances surrounding the Philippines’ assumption of regional leadership. Manila (temporarily) replaced Myanmar, whose ruling military junta has been at odds with the broader region since the democratically-elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi was usurped in 2021. The junta has refused to abide by the ASEAN “Five Point Consensus”, which is supposed to serve as a roadmap to restoration of legitimate government in Myanmar and, more broadly, normalisation of ties with the international community. Breaking the deadlock over the Myanmar crisis will be a key aim of the Philippines next year.
Many Southeast Asian nations see Beijing more through the prism of trade and opportunity rather than conflict and threat (TY/Unsplash)
An added challenge will be integrating the regional body’s latest member, Timor-Leste, especially given ASEAN’s difficult experience integrating less developed member states such as Cambodia, coupled with China’s growing influence in the South Pacific. Facilitating the integration will be a top priority for the Philippines, which has historically been a major backer of democratic transition in the only other Catholic-majority regional state.
The Trump administration’s tariffs, a global economic slowdown, and new challenges brought about by climate change and artificial intelligence will be atop ASEAN’s agenda next year. Given rising tensions in the South China Sea, however, the Philippines will also need to zero in on festering maritime disputes.
The last time the Philippines was ASEAN chair was 2017, when then Filipino president Rodrigo Duterte was singularly committed to developing a new “golden age” of bilateral relations with China at the expense of traditional Western allies. Despite his initial alliance with the Dutertes, however, Marcos Jr has largely followed in his father’s footsteps by adopting a more assertive and multi-aligned foreign policy. Thus, the Philippines has simultaneously developed robust strategic ties with multiple powers in recent years as well as taken a tougher stance on the South China Sea disputes.
In private, Beijing-friendly ASEAN leaders tend to dismiss the Philippines as “America’s deputy sheriff” in Southeast Asia.
In response, China has upped the ante by constantly harassing Philippine maritime forces, culminating in multiple near-clashes close to disputed areas, and signalled Beijing’s willingness to fortify its hold on Philippine-claimed land features by approving plans for a 3,500-hectare nature reserve in the hotly contested Scarborough Shoal. Cognisant of its limited defensive capabilities, the Philippines has doubled down on its security cooperation with Western partners.
From conducting joint naval drills in disputed waters to finalising new defence pacts with Canada, New Zealand, and European powers to welcoming the institutionalisation of the Squad via a new Indo-Pacific defence council, the Philippines is fast becoming the anchor of a new coalition aimed at constraining China’s ambitions. In the words of the Philippines defence chief: “We need to think of ways to rally the world as our ally to stop this.” Such efforts, however, could potentially alienate fellow ASEAN countries, which tend to have a more sanguine view of China.
As former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has argued, many Southeast Asian nations see Beijing more through the prism of trade and opportunity rather than conflict and threat. Even Vietnam, which has historically been a vocal critic of China’s naval assertiveness, has adopted a more pragmatic line in recent years amid booming economic ties with its northern neighbour.
No wonder then, China has confidently spoken of "pool[ing] Eastern strength" along with other ASEAN nations in order to counter the West in Asia. In private, Beijing-friendly ASEAN leaders tend to dismiss the Philippines as “America’s deputy sheriff” in Southeast Asia. The main challenge for Manila, therefore, is to seek military assistance from Western partners without risking isolation within the region, especially as it assumes ASEAN’s rotational chair through a critical year. It will be a difficult balancing act.
About the author
Richard Javad Heydarian
Richard Javad Heydarian is a Manila-based columnist, academic, and author.
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