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Why Oman? Explaining the choice of venue for US-Iran talks

Oman’s skill as a facilitator has been fine-tuned over decades – not that many know.

The Grand Mosque Sultan Qaboos, Oman (Getty Images)
The Grand Mosque Sultan Qaboos, Oman (Getty Images)

The United States chose veteran Emirati diplomat Anwar Gargash to deliver President Donald Trump’s message offering direct talks to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, reinforcing an open message to Iran that Trump would much rather pursue negotiations than military options. Gargash flew to Tehran to deliver the letter on 12 March, meeting with the Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Reflecting splits within the senior Iranian leadership, local media were at first reluctant to admit that the letter had been passed on to its intended recipient.

But its contents appear, as intended, to have kicked off a dialogue process, even if the Iranians have insisted that the dialogue should be via Oman. Negotiations between US Middle East special envoy Steve Witkoff and Araghchi are scheduled to start in Muscat on Saturday, 12 April.

The Iranians are still suggesting that the talks will be via proxies rather than face to face. But if both parties turn up in Muscat on Saturday, the Omanis are likely to find a way of progressing the dialogue. Oman’s skill as a facilitator has been fine-tuned over decades, although it draws little fanfare – deliberately so.

US Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff after a meeting with Russian officials at Diriyah Palace, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on February 18, 2025 (L); and Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi
US Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff, left, and Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (Evelyn Hockstein and Amer Hilabli via Getty Images)

The United States opted to use the UAE as its initial intermediary in part because of the strong diplomatic links between the two countries in Washington, but perhaps also because the UAE has made strenuous efforts to improve its relations with Iran over the last year. Reciprocal naval visits have been one such example.

Nonetheless, differences between the UAE and Iran still loom large. The two parties support opposing sides in the Sudanese civil war, have fierce differences over Israel and the Abraham Accords, and still have the open wound of the disputed islands in the Gulf to contend with.

Oman genuinely positions itself as a neutral in such dialogues. It acts as a facilitator of exchanges rather than as a mediator.

In contrast, Oman has tried hard to remain neutral between Iran and the United States – sometimes attracting criticism in the United States for doing so and for leaning too far towards Iran. But US Navy ships still refuel and refit in Duqm, there are logistic stockpiles in Oman, and Oman has discreetly acted as an intermediary between the United States and a long list of political adversaries in matters concerning Yemen, Syria, and previously with Iran over reviving the nuclear deal Trump abandoned in his first term, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Oman genuinely positions itself as a neutral in such dialogues. It acts as a facilitator of exchanges rather than as a mediator, in accordance with the views of the present and previous Sultan, and Oman’s current Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr Al Busaidi. The approach is a key tenet of the Ibadi strand of Islam to which most Omanis adhere, and was encapsulated in a speech Sayyid Badr made at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies in the United Kingdom in February last year, entitled “Talking to Anyone for the Good of Everyone – Diplomacy in a Multipolar World.”

Embed Oman’s Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr Al Busaidi delivering his speech in Oxford (MOFA Oman)
Embed Oman’s Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr Al Busaidi delivering his speech in Oxford (MOFA Oman)

This neutral approach is reflected in day-to-day business in Muscat. The United States Embassy, and the Oman American Business Council are both very active, with a free trade agreement working well for both parties, and with Oman scoring the lowest 10% rate in the Trump tariff proclamation. At the same time, Oman permits trade with Iran in categories allowed under sanctions regimes, even while the Omani Central Bank puts heavy emphasis on its frameworks for anti-money laundering and countering terrorist financing. Oman scored a positive mutual evaluation report from the Financial Action Task Force in December 2024. Oman helps the United States with its diplomatic problems, and does likewise for the Iranians; a Foreign Ministry official once told me that the Iran desk is the busiest in his ministry. Although typically Omanis are discreet – officials in the Foreign Ministry do not gossip about their facilitation activities even with the best of friends.

The net effect is that the Iranian leadership places a high degree of trust in Oman’s good offices. The value of this Omani relationship with Iran is likely to become further apparent to the United States in the coming weeks. In the most intractable of diplomatic problems, Omanis appear to have an inexhaustible supply of patience and persistence, which may well be needed given the gap in the negotiating positions of the American and Iranian sides.




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