While Western powers urge China to help end the Ukraine war, Beijing shows little urgency in pushing Russia to halt its military operations. The world’s second-largest economy benefits both politically and financially from Moscow’s isolation from the West, as the Kremlin’s room for manoeuvre has become increasingly limited.
Prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine – which is a continuation of the Donbass war that began in 2014 in the former Soviet republic’s coal-rich region – Europe was Russia’s main trading partner, particularly for energy. And even when, in 2014, Russian energy giant Gazprom and the China National Petroleum Corporation signed a 30-year purchase and sale agreement for the supply of 38 billion cubic metres of natural gas annually, Europe remained Russia’s primary customer for many years.
It is an open secret that Moscow relies on Beijing not only economically but also militarily.
In 2021, Russia exported only 16.5 billion cubic metres of natural gas to China – a drop in the ocean compared to the 155 billion cubic metres it sold to Europe. Things, however, began to change rapidly after Moscow launched its invasion of Ukraine and the European Union initiated an energy divorce from Russia. China is now a major buyer of Russian fossil fuels, as the Kremlin – almost completely cut off from Europe’s energy market – sells natural gas to Beijing at prices 23.2% lower than those charged to European countries.
From an energy perspective, Beijing gains an advantage while Russia remains bogged down in Ukraine. It is, therefore, no surprise that China repeatedly rejected US President Donald Trump’s demands to stop buying Russian oil, especially since it is being offered at a discounted rate.
Moreover, as a result of Western sanctions on Moscow and the exodus of European and American brands, the People’s Republic has significantly increased its presence in the Russian market. Russia has now emerged as an important destination for Chinese car sales, while China has become the largest exporter of beer to the Russian Federation.
It is an open secret that Moscow relies on Beijing not only economically but also militarily. Even if reports that China is helping Russia with drone production and providing key components are not true, the fact that the Russian and Chinese militaries conducted joint anti-missile drills in early December clearly indicates that the Kremlin aims to strengthen defence ties with its strategic partner.
But the problem for Moscow is that it has become too dependent on China. Russia now even plans to ask the Chinese leadership to build the 410-kilometre Kuragino–Kyzyl railway in Tuva, Siberia, in exchange for granting Chinese investors the right to develop rare and rare-earth metal deposits in the region. Igor Sechin, a long-time ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin and CEO of Russian oil giant Rosneft, has recently stated that Russia is “ready to serve as a resource base for China”. Under such circumstances, with Moscow having turned itself into Beijing’s junior partner, does China really have any interest in forcing the Kremlin to end the war in Ukraine?
The meeting on 2 December between China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Russia’s Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu clearly showed that Beijing is in a dominant position vis-à-vis Moscow. While Shoigu firmly supported China's positions on Japan, Taiwan, Xizang, Xinjiang and Hong Kong, Yi took a rather neutral stance on Ukraine, “supporting all efforts conducive to achieving peace”.
Beijing refuses to openly side with Russia and back its goals in Ukraine, but rather seeks to benefit economically from Moscow’s deepening reliance on China. Yet Beijing’s capacity to play a decisive role in ongoing efforts to end, or at least freeze, the Ukraine conflict are questionable. Despite Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi arriving in Moscow for a visit on the same day that US special envoy Steve Witkoff visited the Russian capital to meet with President Vladimir Putin, the peace initiative remains entirely in US President Donald Trump’s hands.
Moscow now depends on China economically while expecting the United States to help it end the war on Putin’s terms.
What could worry Chinese leaders is Moscow’s ambition to normalise relations with the United States, Beijing’s major geopolitical rival. According to the recently published National Security Strategy, in the coming years Washington is likely to prioritise the Western Pacific over Russia. The document gives more explicit attention to China through detailed discussion of economic competition, supply chains, and the Indo‑Pacific, than to Russia’s actions. Unsurprisingly, the Kremlin praised Washington’s new strategy while proposing the construction of an undersea tunnel linking the United States and Russia.
Parts of the Russian elite, fully aware of Beijing’s upper hand, undoubtedly seek to improve relations with the United States, possibly as a counterweight to China’s dominance in their partnership. This comes amid fears in Moscow that China allegedly has territorial aspirations towards Primorsky Krai in Russia’s Far East. On the other hand, some in Russian political circles are concerned that the United States aims to “drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing”.
The Kremlin, therefore, seems to be cornered. Unable to achieve any of its strategic goals in Ukraine yet still far from defeat, Moscow now depends on China economically while expecting the United States – which it has repeatedly accused of being a major geopolitical adversary – to help it end the war on Putin’s terms.
In such circumstances, China is likely to continue capitalising on Russia’s weakened position, seeing the war in Ukraine as an opportunity to expand its influence at minimal cost.
