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The United States and China are closer in power than at any time recorded. The gap between their military capabilities is at its narrowest since the Asia Power Index began in 2018.
The gap in comprehensive power between the United States (78.9) and China (73.6) continues to shrink, this year reaching its narrowest point since the inception of the Index, with the two superpowers now separated by only 5.3 points. This dramatic change largely reflects the Trump administration’s preoccupations in the Middle East, which have diverted US attention and resources from Asia, as well as China’s growing power and deepening partnerships in the region.
The United States saw notable declines in Economic Capability, Military Capability, Defence Networks, and Diplomatic Influence, while China held steady on most measures, gaining in Military Capability, Cultural Influence, and Resilience but slipping in Economic Relationships. The Trump administration has continued to press Asian states to spend more on their own defence to bring about greater burden-sharing. At the same time, it has softened its approach to China after presidents Trump and Xi agreed in Beijing in May 2026 to pursue “constructive strategic stability”. Nevertheless, US–China economic and technological competition remains fierce, and Washington has shown no sign of abandoning unilateral tariffs as a tool of political and economic pressure.
The conflict in the Middle East, following coordinated US and Israeli strikes on Iran in February, has fuelled perceptions of Washington’s waning interest in Asia. The Trump administration’s reallocation of military resources from the 7th Fleet in the Pacific to the Persian Gulf to support its war effort has underscored this shift in US attention. Meanwhile, the United States has held fewer joint exercises and defence dialogues with its primary regional allies over the past year, including Australia, Japan, and South Korea. US strikes on Iran have also depleted American missile stocks and weakened its military capabilities.
By contrast, China’s ongoing military modernisation added to its comprehensive power. Its maritime warfare capabilities continue to expand, particularly in sea control and sea denial, while it maintains a sizeable lead over the United States in ground-based missiles and ground forces. Beijing is increasingly willing to use its growing maritime dominance to challenge the territorial claims of smaller powers such as the Philippines — a US ally — and test Washington’s resolve to honour its security commitments.
The United States’ lead over China in Military Capability is at its narrowest on record. Nevertheless, Washington still retains clear advantages in defence spending — the US military budget is nearly three times that of China — land warfare firepower, air power, and transportation capabilities, which allow it to deploy its forces and project military power across the globe. It also maintains a considerable advantage over China in ballistic missile submarines and long-range maritime forces, such as aircraft carriers and amphibious landing vessels. However, in the Pacific, China’s military posture and ability to deploy force quickly and at scale outmatch those of the United States.
The two superpowers remain almost tied in Economic Capability. The United States still leads China by a significant margin in its number of corporate giants and the strength of the US dollar as a global reserve currency. However, China’s economy continues to outgrow that of the United States when adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP), and China’s official reserves are nearly three times those of the United States. Further levelling the playing field, global purchases of US dollars fell in 2025–26, eroding the dollar’s reserve-currency status — though de-dollarisation remains a long way off.
About the authors
Hunter Marston
Dr Hunter Marston is the Director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Lowy Institute and Project Lead for the Asia Power Index.
Jack Sato
Jack Sato is a Data Analyst for the Asia Power Index at the Lowy Institute.
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