Australia and Papua New Guinea can cement defence ties

Following Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s May 2025 re-election, Canberra can return to pressing regional security matters. High on Canberra’s agenda is negotiating a historic defence treaty with Papua New Guinea, first announced in February 2025. This agreement — Papua New Guinea’s first with any country — could reshape regional security, strengthen both countries’ resilience and highlight Australia’s longstanding partnership with Papua New Guinea.

Australia and Papua New Guinea share a unique defence relationship rooted in their Second World War experience, Papua New Guinea’s status as a former Australian-administered territory and decades of defence cooperation. A formal treaty is the natural next step.

The strategic rationale is clear. Intensifying geopolitical rivalry — particularly with China — requires Australia to deepen Pacific ties. Papua New Guinea holds vast territories and strategic assets — including extensive maritime zones — that are crucial in this broader competition. A formal defence treaty would underscore Australia’s commitment to regional stability.

While details of the proposed treaty are yet to be publicly released, a well-resourced and effectively implemented agreement could significantly enhance Papua New Guinea’s Defence Force’s operational capabilities. An ambitious treaty could improve interoperability through joint exercises, standardised military protocols and coordinated responses to threats including illegal fishing, transnational crime, cyber threats, internal instability, disasters and humanitarian emergencies.

Port Moresby has signalled interest in possible provisions for Papua New Guinea citizens to serve in the Australian Defence Force as a means to address youth unemployment and expand training opportunities through vocational and degree qualifications. Australia, facing chronic recruitment shortfalls, would gain a valuable boost to its uniformed services ranks.

But ensuring returning personnel find suitable employment in Papua New Guinea, where economic opportunities remain limited, is required to translate these gains into lasting development benefits.

Logical areas for cooperation, based on the countries’ 2023 Bilateral Security Agreement and typical defence treaties, could include joint operations across land, air, sea and cyber domains, protocols for operational interoperability, intelligence-sharing and logistics.

Personnel integration is another priority. Additional joint training programs would standardise operational procedures, align strategic doctrines, enhance crisis responses and streamline bilateral cooperation in multinational exercises, making this partnership potent in regional security initiatives.

Papua New Guinea has long expressed interest in expanding its role in international peacekeeping outside the Pacific. Lifting standards and other capacity gains from Australian Defence Force support would bring this ambition within reach for Papua New Guinean officers, who could gain experience and income from overseas deployments and contribute to community development back home.

But timing is everything. Papua New Guinea’s 50th anniversary of independence from Australia in September 2025 offers both nations a symbolic milestone to showcase their enduring partnership. It is an opportunity to cement ties in an atmosphere of mutual respect, helping to dispel the perceptions of neocolonial interference that defence negotiations may trigger.

Papua New Guinea’s Prime Minister James Marape must be cautious not to sour relations with China or provoke domestic criticism.

The path to a successful, ambitious treaty is narrow. Domestic sensitivities in Papua New Guinea are acute, particularly regarding sovereignty. A significant Australian military footprint could provoke nationalist backlash or suspicion that Canberra seeks undue influence over Papua New Guinea’s security decisions, particularly regarding third-country partnerships.

Critics might highlight the substantial resource commitment required, questioning whether funds might be better spent on policing or development. Canberra must counter perceptions that the considerable capability gap between the countries’ defence forces risks creating dependency rather than genuine partnership.

The two countries must resolve historical difficulties around Status of Forces Agreements — defining Australian personnel’s rights, privileges and immunities. Port Moresby previously restricted Australian forces to advisory roles, wary of domestic jurisdictional concerns and operational friction.

There is a very real chance that for political convenience, the treaty will not be ambitious, just a paper trophy for the two prime ministers to hold up at Independence Day celebrations. While Marape holds a large parliamentary majority, a few vocal dissenting voices garnering public opposition could be enough to derail ambitious provisions. Marape must also balance a delicate and demanding multi-party coalition.

A careful approach initially focused on shared values, strategic alignment, capacity-building and limited operational deployments should mitigate concerns. Gradual well-communicated integration rather than rapid militarisation will be key.

Transparency and regional diplomacy will be critical. Australia has actively sought greater security integration across the Pacific — bilaterally and regionally through the Pacific Policing Initiative and Pacific Response Group, focusing on law enforcement and defence humanitarian deployments. Briefing other Pacific Islands Forum members early can allay fears of exclusion or regional polarisation.

Strategically, the treaty should advance commitments made in the non-binding Bilateral Security Agreement — which stopped short of military obligations. It should establish binding commitments to mutual defence and consultations, especially around third-party security arrangements perceived as destabilising, like the opaque 2022 China–Solomon Islands pact.

China’s increasingly frequent naval visits to Pacific countries, enhanced police training in the Solomon Islands, Kiribati and Fiji, and a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with the Cook Islands — alarming Wellington — underscores the urgency of securing Australian strategic interests. Chinese warships’ circumnavigation of Australia in February 2025 serve as a stark reminder of Beijing’s expanding regional ambitions.

Beyond bilateral security gains, a successful treaty would buttress Australia’s role as a regional security provider, shoring-up norms embedded in the Boe and Biketawa declarations. If handled deftly, this agreement could set the standard for Pacific security cooperation and contribute to stability for decades.