“[S]upporting jihad,” S. Paul Kapur writes, “constituted nothing less than a central pillar of Pakistani grand strategy.” Kapur, who was nominated for a key US State Department position by the Trump administration in February, argues that as a key tool of the country’s statecraft, the pursuit of jihad is coterminous with Pakistan’s existence as an independent state. Drawing on voluminous internal Pakistan military documents, Christine Fair argues that the country’s military has long maintained an explicitly Islamic orientation that legitimises jihad as an instrument of state policy.
But just why this strategy persists remains something of a riddle. After all, despite occasional bluster, India has never made an honest attempt to seize Pakistan-administered Kashmir by force. Even after carving an independent Bangladesh out of Pakistan in 1971, New Delhi did not foist its terms on Kashmir upon Islamabad; nor did it occupy the newly independent country.
Others have argued that Pakistan’s support for militancy persists largely because of multiple competing power centres within the military and the ISI, where the left hand is often unaware of what the right hand does. As an example, the ISI has an “S directorate” dedicated to Afghanistan and Kashmir so compartmentalised from the rest of the organisation as to render it functionally independent. I have argued in the past that inter-group bargaining reinforces this “non-unitary” nature of the Pakistani state.
And then there is of course the sharp rightward shift in Pakistani military culture under Zia-ul-Haq, in the 1980s, legitimised by the United States’ framing of its proxy war in Afghanistan in explicitly religious terms.
Whatever the case, the Pakistan army’s strategy of jihad seeks to ensure that the country’s periphery will forever remain off-kilter.
From India’s perspective even if the Kashmir problem was to disappear tomorrow, deus ex machina, the country will remain in the crosshairs of ISI-cultivated groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (literally, “army of the pure”). The distance from Mumbai to Srinagar is some 2,000 kilometres; framing the 2008 attacks as insurgent action makes little analytical sense. Kashmir and the Indian Northeast are 3,000 kilometres away. That did not stop the ISI from supporting assorted Naga and Assamese insurgents between the 1960s to 1990s. The list goes on.
The Australian government’s backgrounder on the LeT notes the group’s maximalist agenda, which “include establishing an Islamic Caliphate across the Indian subcontinent.” “To this end,” the Australian intelligence community judges, “Lashkar-e-Taiba intends to pursue the ‘liberation’ of all India’s Muslim population, even in areas where they do not form a majority.”
Assuming New Delhi continues to focus on Kashmir’s economy and generate opportunities for the region’s youth despite the Pahalgam carnage, while providing enough political space for the region’s grievances to play out, Kashmir is likely to go the way of contemporary Indian Punjab, which battled a serious Sikh insurgency a few decades ago. If all goes well, even as bad blood will undoubtedly continue to circulate, Jammu and Kashmir is unlikely to face sustained security challenges, discounting episodic, contained flare-ups. But that does not mean India’s terrorism challenges will fade away too. As far as New Delhi is concerned, India must now reach for a radically muscular security doctrine to meet them.
And for that, we have Cawthorn’s creation to thank.