Bangladesh, explained.
Border Guard Bangladesh personnel at the India-Bangladesh border of Petrapole, about 100km north-east of Kolkata on 6 August 2024 (Dibyangshu Sarkar/AFP via Getty Images)
A careful balancing act for a country that stands as a bridge between South and Southeast Asia has been upended.
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The binary trap after Bangladesh’s unrestThe binary trap after Bangladesh’s unrest
What started as a student protest against a High Court ruling that reinstated a quota system for government jobs has rocked Bangladesh to its core, leading Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to flee in the middle of the night in a helicopter to New Delhi. The total death toll stands at 440 since 16 July, and the country’s domestic economy is battered, with losses estimated at billions of dollars.
A couple of weeks ago, a situation of this magnitude would have been unthinkable – the protests escalated quickly and violently, with photos and videos of vandalism and brute force rampant on social media. Such a quick collapse of the government was unimaginable. Hasina had only in the weeks before paid visits to neighbours India and China, and the general optics of Bangladesh’s active “participation” in the international system had been favourable in the last few years or so.
So, far from being confined to domestic matters, these events carry regional repercussions.
With imminent graduation from Least Developed Country status due in 2026, Dhaka was seemingly on track to be the “rising star” of South Asia. Bangladesh’s active participation in important multilateral mechanisms, such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and sub-regional frameworks including the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation and most recently the Colombo Security Conclave, bolstered its profile as an important partner, not only in South Asia, but Southeast Asia as well.
As IORA Chair in 2023, Bangladesh was invited to participate in the ASEAN Summit in Indonesia. This year, Dhaka expressed its desire to be ASEAN’s sectoral dialogue partner by October 2024. Being a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum already, Bangladesh’s deeper engagement and cooperation with ASEAN would have been the missing piece in addressing the key spillover effect of the Myanmar crisis.
Major political parties in these countries often distinguish themselves from being either pro-India or pro-China and base their campaigns on these “leanings”.
But Bangladesh’s potential as a key regional player may remain just that now. The “hedge” Dhaka had adopted between formidable neighbours India and China could now change.
To put things into perspective, there is value in talking about the “binary trap” that often plagues South Asian politics. Major political parties in these countries often distinguish themselves from being either pro-India or pro-China and base their campaigns on these “leanings”.
This is, of course, also based on the intensified contest between India and China for regional primacy and influence, and their constant “wooing” of these countries with promises of development cooperation. This played out most recently in Maldives, with President Mohamed Muizzu’s “India out” campaign. In an attempt to recalibrate its hedging, Muizzu went too far with his anti-India and pro-China rhetoric and had to play damage control after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi assumed his third term.
Bangladesh, in that sense, had done a fairly good job in keeping both powers at equal arm’s length, sticking to the mantra that “India is a political friend, China is a friend for attaining development”. This balancing act was challenged by the Teesta River Project, where both China and India were looking to get involved, although it was increasingly clear Hasina would lean towards India for this project, which has security and sustainability implications for both countries. This was met with ire in Beijing, and Hasina’s official trip to China in early July was cut short mainly due to several disappointing outcomes.
What happens next will be closely watched. Anti-India sentiment is running hot in Bangladesh, and that could be to China’s advantage.
Geopolitics aside, regional implications could also flow from extremist activity in Bangladesh, which has long posed a danger. The actions of Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing, Chhatra Shibir, in the protests will leave neighbouring countries on high alert about the prospect of cross border threats.
Managing its “political friend” and “developmental friend” effectively and autonomously will be a major challenge for Bangladesh. The risk to regional security should not be underestimated.
About the author
Yanitha Meena Louis
Yanitha Meena Louis is Analyst at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia.
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