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Bangladesh, explained.
Graffiti depicting former Bangladeshi prime minister Sheikh Hasina in Dhaka, Bangladesh (Syed Mahamudur Rahman/NurPhoto via Getty Images)
India’s ties with Bangladesh had begun to recover but an old ally might create bigger problems.
Hasina’s homecoming pledge is a headache for New DelhiHasina’s homecoming pledge is a headache for New Delhi
About the author
Grace Corcoran
Grace Corcoran is the Senior Policy and Projects Manager – Geopolitics and Security at the Australia India Institute.
Sheikh Hasina’s recent promise (Opens in new window) to return to Bangladesh could be destabilising for the country, but it also carries much wider consequences for India. As New Delhi attempts to rebuild relations with Bangladesh’s new government, Hasina’s continued presence in India is becoming increasingly difficult to separate from the broader contest for influence in Bangladesh between India and China.
In a video appearance at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of South Asia in New Delhi on 5 August, the former Bangladeshi prime minister said she intended to return to Bangladesh in December. Hasina, who fled to India in August 2024 after a student-led uprising toppled her government, having ruled for roughly 20 of the previous 30 years, said (Opens in new window) her return would be aimed at restoring democracy and promoting national reconciliation – a claim Dhaka’s protesters would likely dispute.
This is also a striking risk to take, given what awaits her in Bangladesh.
In 2025, Hasina was sentenced to death in absentia by Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal over her government’s violent suppression of the 2024 uprising. A UN investigation estimated (Opens in new window) that as many as 1,400 people were killed between July 1 and August 15, 2024, with the vast majority shot by security forces. Hasina rejected the charges as politically motivated.
Elections have also since been held. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) won a landslide election victory in February after years in opposition, having also boycotted several elections during Hasina’s long rule with complaints the polls were neither free nor fair. The BNP, under Prime Minister Tarique Rahman, promised to restore democratic institutions and revive an economy damaged by political upheaval.
Continuing to shelter Hasina preserves its relationship with a former ally, but risks deepening mistrust with Rahman’s government and pushing Bangladesh closer to Beijing.
Yet the new government faces serious economic pressures and the additional impact of higher energy prices from the conflict in West Asia. A recent report by Transparency International has also found (Opens in new window) that there are clear signs that the BNP is backtracking on its election promises and highlighted growing concerns about media freedom and freedoms of expression.
Hasina’s return, as a direct challenge to Rahman’s authority, could be extremely destabilising for the country.
For India, the timing is particularly awkward. Hasina was widely seen as close to India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and her Awami League party maintained close ties with New Delhi, particularly on security cooperation and regional connectivity. Ties between the two countries became acutely strained after her overthrow. The interim government in Bangladesh under Muhammad Yunus adopted a more independent foreign policy, and public anti-India sentiment became much more visible.
Since the February election, Delhi has been (Opens in new window) working to improve ties, inviting Rahman to attend the BRICS summit in New Delhi in September. But the latest developments now (Opens in new window) leaves Rahman’s attendance less certain.
Dhaka has repeatedly sought Hasina’s extradition from India. New Delhi has not complied, leaving Hasina’s presence in India as one of the many persistent sources of tension between the neighbours. Her latest address has only made this worse. Rahman was angered (Opens in new window) that the event was allowed to go ahead, while Indian officials said the government was not involved in the private gathering. Protests subsequently broke out across Bangladesh.
While India-Bangladesh ties are resetting, Bangladesh-China ties continue to expand. Rahman chose China for his first major foreign visit (Opens in new window) as prime minister, meeting President Xi Jinping in June to seek Chinese support for infrastructure and economic development. Bangladesh’s embassy in Beijing states that (Opens in new window) “both the countries share identical views on most international and regional issues”.
That makes Hasina’s return more than a domestic political move. It is another test of India’s relationship with a strategically vital neighbour. New Delhi faces a difficult choice. Continuing to shelter Hasina preserves its relationship with a former ally, but risks deepening mistrust with Rahman’s government and pushing Bangladesh closer to Beijing.
The impact on India-Bangladesh relations may therefore depend less on whether Hasina actually returns in December than on what her presence in India represents: the unresolved legacy of Bangladesh’s political transition and Dhaka’s long term concerns about India’s presence in its internal affairs.
