For the first time since its founding in 2009, the BRICS summit convened without China’s or Russia’s top leaders present.
China’s President Xi Jinping stayed home and delegated to Premier Li Qiang. The official explanation was scheduling challenges; however, analysts point to deeper reasons including domestic economic pressures and a shift toward diplomatic platforms where Beijing can exert greater control.
Russia’s Vladimir Putin, under an International Criminal Court warrant, participated only by video. Egypt and Iran, two of the bloc’s newest members, were also absent. While no official explanation was given, regional instability – and in Iran’s case, political turmoil – may have played a role. These absences were more than logistical. They signalled a bloc expanding in size but eroding in cohesion.
BRICS began as a compact alliance of emerging powers with ambitions to reshape a global order historically dominated by Western institutions. That vision has weakened with each wave of expansion. The inclusion of countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Iran, and Indonesia has broadened the group’s geographic scope but diluted its political and economic alignment. The membership now encompasses democracies and autocracies, energy exporters and industrialising economies, with few mechanisms to reconcile divergent interests.
Many of the 180 working groups launched under Brazil’s BRICS presidency reportedly failed to meet, underscoring the bloc’s limited follow-through.
Despite regular calls to reduce reliance on the US dollar, BRICS has made only limited progress on financial coordination. Intra-BRICS trade accounts for just 18 per cent of the bloc’s overall trade flows, underscoring limited economic interdependence – especially as this figure is largely driven by China–Russia exchanges, where more than 90 per cent of transactions are settled in yuan and rubles. Beyond that corridor, local currency adoption remains minimal.
Globally, the yuan still accounts for just 3.8 per cent of cross‑border payments, according to SWIFT’s December 2024 RMB Tracker. Brazil, for its part, has shown little interest in such a change. The central bank holds its reserves in dollars, and the and the New Development Bank’s 2022–2026 strategy sets a 30 per cent target for local currency lending, meaning roughly 70 per cent remains dollar‑based.
Meanwhile, many of the 180 working groups launched under Brazil’s presidency reportedly failed to meet, underscoring the bloc’s limited follow-through.
Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva approached the Rio summit with a clear emphasis on multilateral reform, climate finance, and sustainable development, reflecting Brazil’s intent to balance its foreign policy between China, the United States, and Europe. This strategy helped sustain consensus in a bloc expanded by new and diverse members. Yet while the summit produced a lengthy joint declaration covering topics such as artificial intelligence and climate investment, it fell short of delivering major policy breakthroughs. There were no binding commitments or concrete implementation plans to address the structural challenges the group has long debated, including currency coordination, institutional reform, and deeper cooperation. The bloc’s expanding membership appears to have outpaced its ability to act decisively, exposing a persistent gap between ambition and execution.
The final communiqué reaffirmed BRICS’s support for reforming institutions such as the United Nations Security Council and the International Monetary Fund but stopped short of outlining specific proposals or implementation pathways. On global crises, including the war in Gaza and heightened tensions between India and China, the bloc limited itself to general appeals for dialogue and adherence to international law. The absence of concrete initiatives underscored the constraints of consensus-based diplomacy in a group marked by growing ideological diversity and strategic divergence.
BRICS was intended to be more than just another multilateral forum. It was conceived as a platform where emerging powers could reshape the global order on their own terms. That ambition remains relevant, particularly in a world defined by geopolitical fragmentation and the erosion of long-standing alliances. Yet the atmosphere in Rio felt distant from that vision. While the bloc continues to expand in size and rhetoric, it lacks the cohesion and strategic alignment needed to drive meaningful change. Without clearer direction and stronger political will, BRICS risks becoming what its critics have long suggested: a diplomatic stage with no script, where purpose is proclaimed but rarely pursued.
