The “Global South” is everywhere in diplomatic language today. The term appears in summit declarations, ministerial speeches and strategic documents, invoked as a shared voice with a common set of interests. That idea is appealing, particularly when the international order feels uncertain. The notion of a wider group of states outside the Western core – and not tied to any single great power – sounds like a meaningful collective. Yet the more frequently the term is used, the more a question comes up: who, exactly, speaks for the Global South?
In recent years, India has positioned itself as a leading voice, especially during its presidency of the G20 Summit. Through outreach to developing countries, including the convening of “Voice of the Global South” meetings, India is attempting to claim representational space. This points to a broader ambition, where India speaks not just for itself, but also on behalf of a wider constituency whose concerns have been sidelined.
India is not the only country staking a claim. Brazil regularly invokes its role in terms of development equity and climate justice, presenting itself as a harbinger for the Global South in negotiations on finance and sustainability. China regularly employs similar language through a different route, linking its credentials to infrastructure financing and institutions such as the BRICS grouping. Each presents itself as a representative voice, though they speak to different priorities and sometimes to different audiences.
All three powers converge in one respect. They assume that the Global South can be represented, which is harder to sustain on closer inspection.
The Global South appears in diplomatic language as a unified presence – but it functions as a space where representation is contested.
Unlike formal groupings, the Global South lacks institutional structure and agreed-upon criteria for representation. It is a category based on a mix of historical experience and political identity, and it does not translate into a clear or unified constituency. Countries that are placed under this label approach the international system from very different starting points.
For some, development remains the central concern, such as access to finance, technology, and markets. For others, questions of sovereignty and strategic autonomy take precedence. This is evident in how different states respond to the same issue. During the war in Ukraine, for instance, countries across the Global South did not line up behind a single position. Some condemned Russia. Many, meantime, prioritised energy and economic ties over political alignment.
This raises a more fundamental question: on what basis can any single country claim to speak for all?
In the Cold War era, the Group of 77 sought to present as a bloc but was regularly divided. Likewise, with the Global South, the meaning of the term shifts depending on who is using it. When one country invokes the Global South, it may be emphasising development concerns. Another may use it to highlight questions of equity in global governance. A third may frame it in opposition to Western dominance. These uses overlap, and they are not identical.
For example, when Indonesia invokes the Global South, it does so through the language of development and economic cooperation, particularly in trade and regional stability. South Africa tends to emphasise historical inequality and the need for reform in global governance, especially within multilateral institutions.
This pliability helps explain its appeal. It allows states to position themselves within a broader narrative without being tied to a fixed set of commitments. The problem is that, at the same time, it also makes representation difficult to pin down. If the constituency itself is fluid, then claims to speak for it are inevitably partial.
Nevertheless, the idea of the Global South still holds relevance, particularly in contexts where questions of inequality and access to global decision-making structures are at stake. It provides a language through which states can articulate shared frustrations and, at times, coordinate their positions.
But does it offer a stable basis for representation? This is where much of the current discussion tends to overreach. References to the Global South assume it can act or be spoken for as a collective, overlooking how contested that representation actually is.
Countries step into the role of spokesperson in particular contexts, on particular issues, and for particular audiences. Those claims may carry weight, but they are not universally accepted, nor are they consistently aligned with one another. Although the Global South appears, in diplomatic language, as a unified presence, it functions more as a space in which representation is negotiated and contested.
Even for the sake of argument, if the Global South is treated as a coherent actor, then the question becomes how it will act or what position it will take. If, instead, it is understood as a field of competing claims, the focus shifts to how those claims are made, and whose interests are reflected. When the international order is under strain, the appeal of broader coalitions is understandable. But clarity also matters. Speaking for the Global South is easier than representing it. And that gap is likely to remain.
