How future progressive Korean governments decide to act will not occur in a geopolitical vacuum. On this score, there could be grounds for pragmatism, as there has been in the past. Seoul’s traditional strategy of using conventional force to deter North Korean provocations is steadily eroding, particularly as Pyongyang develops tactical nuclear weapons. Both Russia and China have reasons of their own to be much more accommodative of Pyongyang. Recently, proposals were even tabled for trilateral naval drills.
The delta between Beijing and Seoul on managing the North Korean threat was forcibly illustrated by China’s retaliation against South Korea’s deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence missile defence system in 2017. The once genuine hopes that China would meaningfully restrain Pyongyang look positively Panglossian in current circumstances. Indeed, Beijing may be re-appraising its view of North Korea, now seeing the Hermit Kingdom as more of a geopolitical asset than irritant.
Meanwhile, the Korean public’s perceptions of China – including as a security threat – have shifted dramatically to be some of the most negative globally.
Then there is the matter of Sino–US relations, which are in a far more precarious position than 2018 – the year former president Moon Jae-in withdrew from the “comfort women” agreement. Even if Seoul might dissemble on the matter, Washington clearly views the trilateral pact as a crucial component of the region’s minilateral architecture for checking China, its “pacing threat”. With its dense web of initiatives, the trilateral partnership is designed to institutionalise cooperation and preclude a swift exit.
The upshot is that exiting the trilateral pact could be a tortuous and bruising process, with the potential to seriously jeopardise the health of the Korea–US alliance.
This alone does not guarantee the pact’s endurance. Seasoned observers of Korean politics have noted how, absent a powerful bureaucracy or bipartisan foreign policy tradition, individual presidents have huge discretion to shape foreign policy.
This is a dangerous dynamic for the United States. Viewing cooperation with Japan as domestically unpalatable and with previously fringe ideas such as nuclear-armed autonomy becoming more mainstream, a future Korean president could conceivably be willing to repudiate the Camp David agreement, come what may. Another relevant dynamic here is the growing fear of being drawn into any Taiwan conflict.
The United States will ultimately be hoping that power moderates, and that the enduring benefits of the alliance prove persuasive.