Quad, explained.
Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar speaks during the July 2025 Quad Foreign Ministers Meeting in Washington DC (Allison Robbert/AFP via Getty Images)
The Quad’s value was never in the optics – Delhi is a chance to prove it can function without leaders-level signalling.
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Can the Quad keep momentum without a leaders’ summit?Can the Quad keep momentum without a leaders’ summit?
The Quad’s problem is not relevance. It is momentum – and whether it can be sustained without a leaders’ summit.
The Foreign Ministers of Australia, India, Japan and the United States gather in New Delhi this week for the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting at an inflection point. Conflicts in West Asia and broader developments in the Indo-Pacific will shape discussions, alongside a review of progress on existing Quad initiatives. Over the past few years, the Quad has evolved from an abstract strategic idea into a platform for practical cooperation across maritime security, supply chains, critical and emerging technologies, and humanitarian assistance. The question now is whether it can be sustained without consistent leaders-level signalling from the United States.
The United States is not disengaged – Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s presence in Delhi underscores that. But the administration’s broader preference for bilateral deals and burden-sharing introduces uncertainty about sustained minilateral engagement. Plans for a leaders’ summit last year fell through, and there is nothing certain on the calendar for the next.
In this context, the Delhi meeting should not be seen as routine diplomacy. It is an opportunity to demonstrate that the Quad’s value lies not in leaders’ optics, but in its ability to function as a platform for ongoing, practical coordination.
That requires a sharper focus on delivery.
The Quad must move from announcing initiatives to demonstrating follow-through.
The Quad already has a broad agenda. Previous ministerial meetings have outlined cooperation across maritime security, economic resilience, critical technologies, and humanitarian assistance. The challenge now is not to expand that list, but to prioritise and implement.
Maritime domain awareness remains one of the most immediate areas where the Quad can demonstrate value, particularly in the Indian Ocean and wider Indo-Pacific. Cooperation on critical minerals, supply chain resilience, and energy security has also gained urgency as countries seek to build more reliable and diversified economic linkages. Emerging technologies – from AI governance to secure digital infrastructure – offer another area where coordination can move from principles to practice.
But the most important shift needs to be institutional rather than thematic. The Quad must move from announcing initiatives to demonstrating follow-through. That means clarifying who leads on what, aligning national efforts, and ensuring continuity across meetings.
This is where the role of Australia, India and Japan becomes more pronounced.
These three countries have been central to shaping the Quad’s agenda in recent years. If US attention becomes more episodic, they will need to play a more active role in sustaining momentum – not by redefining the Quad, but by ensuring that it continues to function as a platform for practical cooperation. This would mean investing political effort, coordinating agendas, and driving implementation where interests clearly converge.
The India–Australia Foreign Ministers’ Framework Dialogue, scheduled on the sidelines of the Quad meeting, offers a useful opportunity in this regard.
First, it provides a chance to align bilateral priorities with Quad-level outcomes. Australia and India are already working closely on maritime security, defence cooperation, and supply chains. Identifying areas where they can co-lead or jointly drive initiatives within the Quad – particularly in the Indian Ocean – would help translate alignment into delivery.
Second, it creates space to connect the Quad with other emerging minilateral and trilateral arrangements. Initiatives such as the Australia–India–Indonesia trilateral, as well as the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) with Japan, can complement the Quad’s work by focusing on specific regions or sectors. Rather than treating these as separate tracks, there is value in ensuring that they reinforce one another.
Third, the dialogue can help connect the Quad’s agenda more carefully with Southeast Asia. This should not be framed as the Quad stepping into ASEAN’s space, but as ensuring that its initiatives on maritime security, supply chains, infrastructure and resilience are responsive to regional priorities. For Australia and India, both of which are deepening engagement with Southeast Asia in different ways, this is a useful area for coordination.
And it would show the Quad functioning as a habit of cooperation – not just a moment of alignment.
About the author
Premesha Saha
Premesha Saha is a Senior Policy Fellow at Asia Society Australia, focusing on Indo-Pacific geopolitics and regional security architecture.
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