Quad, explained.

Quad foreign ministers Toshimitsu Motegi, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Marco Rubio and Penny Wong walk past the flags of Japan, India, the United States and Australia at the G20 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Atlanta, 31 October 2026.

Quad foreign ministers in Atlanta, 31 October – their statement had plenty to say about artificial intelligence and critical minerals, and nothing at all about ASEAN (Erik S. Lesser/Getty Images)

In Manila, the Quad must work for ASEAN, not around it

Minilaterals move fast and ASEAN moves slow – the upcoming summit is a chance for Australia to make the two work together.

Premesha Saha

10 November 20264 min read

ASEAN leaders are set to meet (Opens in new window) in Manila from 16 to 18 November for the ASEAN Summit hosted by this year’s chair, the Philippines. On its sidelines, Washington has signalled (Opens in new window) that leaders of the Quad – Australia, India, Japan and the United States – will hold their first summit in more than two years (Opens in new window). The “Squad” of Australia, Japan, the Philippines and the US may also meet, after its defence ministers gathered in Cebu (Opens in new window) late last month.

Southeast Asians are watching with some unease. ASEAN may be the venue where the major powers meet, but there is a growing concern (Opens in new window) that it is becoming the backdrop for others’ agendas rather than the driver of its own.

Confidence in Washington is slipping too. In the latest ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute survey (Opens in new window) of regional elites, US leadership under Trump – with its punitive tariffs and unpredictable foreign policy – overtook aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea as the region’s top geopolitical concern.

But casting the choice as minilaterals versus ASEAN misses the point. The real question for Manila is whether these groupings can be made to work for ASEAN.

The two do different things well. ASEAN’s strength is legitimacy. It brings everyone to the table, and gives regional initiatives an ownership no outside power can provide. Its limitation is pace: consensus among 11 members with very different ties to Beijing takes time, and on hard security questions is often out of reach. Minilaterals are the reverse. A few like-minded countries can move quickly and deliver, but they lack the broad legitimacy that only an inclusive regional body can confer.

With Trump arriving in Manila after midterm losses, Australia, Japan and India must fund and staff these initiatives so they outlast shifts in Washington’s mood.

The answer is a division of labour: pilot in minilaterals, consolidate in ASEAN. Small groups of willing partners are well suited to trialling new forms of cooperation, from shared maritime surveillance to joint coast guard training, and refining them through practice. Once an initiative shows results – vessels tracked, crews trained, procedures tested at sea – it can be opened to every member through ASEAN-led forums, giving it regional ownership and staying power. That is how minilaterals become enablers of ASEAN rather than substitutes for it.

The maritime domain shows why this matters. At sea, the pressure is constant. In the South China Sea in July, a dozen Chinese coast guard ships, backed by maritime militia, fired water cannon (Opens in new window) at Philippine vessels near Scarborough Shoal. Manila wants to conclude (Opens in new window) a code of conduct this year, but the hardest issues remain unresolved. Against this kind of grey-zone coercion, practical cooperation among a few capable partners can achieve what consensus cannot.

Yet the Quad’s own focus is drifting. Its statements have long affirmed “ASEAN centrality”. But when its foreign ministers met in Atlanta on 31 October, their joint statement (Opens in new window) mentioned neither ASEAN centrality nor the South China Sea, focusing on the Strait of Hormuz, critical minerals and artificial intelligence. Holding the leaders’ summit in ASEAN’s house will put that gap on display.

A rubber-hulled boat seen through night goggles — Practical cooperation among a few capable partners can achieve what consensus cannot (Matthew Williams/DVIDS)

Australia should use Manila to close it, with four priorities.

First, turn surveillance into capability. Through its maritime domain awareness partnership (Opens in new window), the Quad already offers satellite data and training that help regional agencies track “dark” vessels that switch off their transponders.

But data alone changes little. Recent (Opens in new window) research (Opens in new window) points to the real constraints: thin analytical capacity, agencies that do not share information, and too few vessels to respond. The Quad’s support should shift from supplying data to building capability partners own: trained analysts, national fusion centres and coordination between navies, coast guards and fisheries agencies.

Second, bring Southeast Asia’s coast guards on board. The Quad’s coast guard observer mission has so far involved only the four Quad countries. Officers from the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia should join the next one.

Third, protect undersea cables, which can be damaged in ways that are hard to attribute. Australia’s Cable Connectivity and Resilience Centre (Opens in new window) and the Quad’s cable work have focused on the Pacific. They should be extended to Southeast Asia, with repair capacity near chokepoints such as the Malacca Strait.

Fourth, build a path back to ASEAN’s own machinery. The ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) already brings ASEAN, all four Quad members and China together. In September, under its maritime security working group co-chaired by the Philippines and Japan, all four Quad navies sailed alongside (Opens in new window) Southeast Asian ships in drills off the Philippines. Successful Quad initiatives should be channelled into the ADMM-Plus and the East Asia Summit, where the region can own them.

Australia is well placed to lead. It was ASEAN’s first dialogue partner and sits in both the Quad and the Squad. Canberra must brief Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur and Hanoi before and after Manila, so neither grouping is read as a bloc built in ASEAN’s backyard. And with Trump arriving in Manila after midterm losses that handed Democrats (Opens in new window) control of Congress, Australia, Japan and India must fund and staff these initiatives so they outlast shifts in Washington’s mood.

The Quad has spent years saying it supports ASEAN centrality. Manila is the moment to show it, by working for ASEAN, not around it.

About the author

Premesha Saha

Premesha Saha is a Senior Policy Fellow at Asia Society Australia, focusing on Indo-Pacific geopolitics and regional security architecture.

Topics

Quad ASEAN Philippines South China Sea Australia