Royal Australian Navy Seahawk Helicopters flypast the Australian-American Memorial, Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey Square, Canberra (Defence Imagery)

Canberra can’t want the alliance more than Washington does

Both major parties treat US support as a given, but an ambitious Australia can plan for its own defence.

Sam Roggeveen

1 May 20264 min read

Foreign policy pundit and CNN host Fareed Zakaria detects a trend, arguing in his latest editorial that Europe is moving towards “strategic autonomy” from the United States. Zakaria is not alone. Former think tanker and UK government adviser Ben Judah observed recently that in Britain, “the need for the UK to become more independent and autonomous is becoming consensus.” FT columnist Gideon Rachman saw movement towards “derisking” after the Davos summit in January, noting that “many of America’s allies need to relearn the habit of thinking for themselves about big strategic questions – without guidance from Washington.”

There is no indication of any such movement in Australia, as recent speeches by Defence Minister Richard Marles and Opposition defence spokesperson James Paterson illustrate. Here’s Marles, launching the 2026 National Defence Strategy (NDS) last week:

“…there is no effective balance of power in the Indo-Pacific absent the continued presence of the United States.”

And here’s Paterson responding to the NDS:

“…it is impossible to imagine a coalition big or powerful enough to support our core national interests – like the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific – without the US as part of it. So while I respect and understand why many Australians are confounded by the rhetoric and sometimes policies of the Trump administration, the idea that we can make our way safely in the world without them is absurd.”

Together the speeches make it clear that, across Australia’s political spectrum, the US is considered indispensable as an Asia-Pacific power.

Canberra cannot conjure up a vital US national interest where none exists.

But this misses the point: whether the United States will maintain a balance of power in Asia and help Australia “make our way safely in the world” will be decided by America, not anyone else. Australia doesn’t get a say. It cannot materially affect American calculations on these questions. Canberra cannot conjure up a vital US national interest where none exists. Either the security of Asia matters so much to America that it is willing to keep defending Australia, or it doesn’t Australia can’t want the alliance more than the Americans themselves want it.

And keep in mind that powerful voices in the US itself have doubts about the need to confront China, starting at the very top of the administration. The fact that the US has again chosen to go to war in the Middle East should also reinforce doubts about US capability and resolve in Asia. On the other hand, senior Trump administration officials continue to talk up America’s commitment to Asia, the US has offered its prized nuclear-powered submarine technology to Australia, and it is expanding its military basing options in the Philippines and Australia.

Opposition defence spokesman James Paterson and Defence Minister Richard Marles (@SenPaterson/X; Rodney Braithwaite/Defence Imagery)

Experts and political leaders will continue to argue over the extent of US commitment to defending its position in Asia. But it’s not even necessary to take a firm position on this question. All that’s needed is a degree of humility, an acknowledgement that one might be wrong about US resolve. Even if, like Marles and Paterson, you are convinced that the US will remain a reliable security partner for Australia, a small degree of doubt ought to be enough for you to conclude that it is not wise to bet your entire defence strategy on that judgement.

It is possible to hedge against US unreliability without damaging the alliance. Australia has done it before, having embraced defence self-reliance in the 1980s with no material damage to ANZUS. Somehow, over the course of the last decade, Australian governments convinced themselves that self-reliance within an alliance context was no longer enough. Australia needed to base US forces on its soil and buy American nuclear-powered submarines to secure its relationship with Washington. It was a solution looking for a problem because the alliance was already in excellent health.

The Marles and Paterson speeches reveal a worryingly narrow view of how Australia’s territory and interests can be secured. They are betting everything on America. But quite apart from that strategic judgement, it is also dispiriting to see such a lack of self-confidence and ambition in the two major parties. Australia has a huge continent to itself and is separated from its only plausible enemy by thousands of kilometres of ocean. The nation’s proud military tradition demonstrates an ability to fight effectively when necessary. Australia boasts one of the best performing economies in the world. It has prodigious state capacity and an enviable record of leadership and innovation in public policy on everything from health care to industrial relations to gun control to democratic elections. Why assume that Australians are incapable of solving the problem of independent national defence?

About the author

Sam Roggeveen

Sam Roggeveen is Program Director of the Lowy Institute’s International Security Program. He is the author of The Echidna Strategy: Australia's Search for Power and Peace (Opens in new window), published by La Trobe University Press in 2023.

Topics

Australia Defence & security United States AUKUS