The Chagos archipelago dispute carries wider regional ramifications than the future of the UK–US military base on Diego Garcia. Mauritius has won the UK’s support for a deal over sovereignty of the disputed islands – but complications extend to interests of the Maldives, which now claims to have more legitimate rights over the archipelago. The regional conundrum caused by these overlapping claims also draws in India, with the potential to ignite fresh tensions in the Indian Ocean region. The Chagos has become a test of Delhi’s credibility in ambitions to shape the regional order. India will want to ensure its neighbours resolve their differences.
The Maldives has objected to the deal hammered out for the UK to transfer Chagos to Mauritius, which would also guarantee the continued UK-US base at Diego Garcia. The Maldives insists it has a legitimate claim to administer Chagos, considering geographical proximity and the history of Maldivian kings governing the archipelago (locally known as Foalhavahi). It has also offered the US continued operations at Diego Garcia.
This is a change of heart from the Maldives under President Mohamed Muizzu. The Chagos archipelago, located south of the Maldives, was separated from Mauritius by the UK in the 1960s and has been administered from London, with a joint UK–UK military base at Diego Garcia. As Mauritius launched a long campaign questioning the UK’s control over Chagos, the Maldives had maintained a neutral yet inconsistent policy between the two claimants, and failed to demarcate its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with either.
It was only in 2022 when the UK and Mauritius began negotiating over the future of Chagos, that then-Maldivian president Ibrahim Solih recognised Mauritius’ sovereignty over the archipelago and concurred with the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) decision to demarcate an EEZ.
But for nationalist and political reasons, Muizzu withdrew recognition of Mauritius’s sovereignty over Chagos after coming to office and refused to recognise the ITLOS demarcation. Muizzu then launched a special military operation in the disputed waters. In return, Mauritius suspended all diplomatic ties with the Maldives.
For India, these tensions introduce new complexities. Since its independence, India has seen the Maldives and Mauritius as a critical part of its regional calculations, especially as it equated its neighbours' security and stability to its own. But, in recent years, increasing Chinese presence in the region has triggered anxieties in Delhi about the changing balance of power. China enjoys strong economic and political ties with both countries and recently restructured the Maldives’ debts.
Delhi is attempting to maintain “the Indian Ocean as India’s Ocean” by expanding its influence and shaping the regional order based on its values and interests. It has amplified its security and defence cooperation with both countries along with maritime domain awareness. It has gifted defence assets, offered credit lines for capacity enhancement, and is even developing a naval harbour in the Maldives and an air facility in Mauritius. It also plays the role of first responder and preferred security partner through its Neighbourhood First policy and the Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions (MAHASAGAR) vision.
Delhi is attempting to maintain “the Indian Ocean as India’s Ocean” by expanding its influence and shaping the regional order based on its values and interests.
India is also institutionalising its cooperation. The Colombo Security Conclave (CSC), a regional grouping for maritime and non-traditional security challenges, has grown considerably in recent years. Similarly, the Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) has continued to monitor and promote maritime safety and security. It also promotes maritime security by coordinating on joint surveillance, piracy, illegal fishing, and trafficking. Both Mauritius and Maldives play a significant role in these initiatives.
But with the Maldives escalating the Chagos issue from a border dispute to a territorial one, India finds itself in a difficult spot, especially with growing friction within its regional security architecture. Historically, India has supported Mauritius, largely due to its scepticism of the West and support for decolonisation. But with the Maldives’ increasing stake in the dispute, Delhi is facing a dilemma. This comes at a time when Delhi is keen to play a stronger role in helping Mauritius conduct surveillance and monitor the EEZ around Chagos, especially given that the archipelago is 2,200 kilometres away from Mauritius.
Muizzu’s claims also risk the militarisation of the region. The Maldives is emboldened by Türkiye’s support after both countries signed a 2023 memorandum of understanding to enhance the Maldives’ defence capacity. The vessel and drones used in the special operation were acquired from Türkiye, potentially drawing Ankara in as a stakeholder.
For their part, the US and the UK have also opposed Muizzu’s actions. The UK has maintained that the Chagos issue is a bilateral one between the UK and Mauritius. US President Donald Trump dismissed Muizzu’s claims by warning that the US would take military action if anyone threatened the lease deal or endangered its operations. The current developments in West Asia have also further reinforced the importance of Diego Garcia, narrowing the Maldives’ space for further negotiations.
Any escalation by the Maldives risks drawing external players into the Indian Ocean region – compounding India’s predicament. The unresolved Chagos question has the potential to disrupt regional stability. India will have to step in and actively broker dialogue. Its capacity to manage this dispute will define its ability to shape the regional order.
