In the summer of 2026, Gen Z protests in New Delhi demanded the education minister’s resignation under the banner of the Cockroach Janata Party. The state’s response went beyond conventional policing. By suspending mobile internet services and disrupting the Delhi Metro, authorities intervened in the infrastructure that sustains mobility, communication, and collective action.
Protesters, in turn, explored alternative ways to stay in touch, including Bitchat, a messaging app that uses Bluetooth mesh networks to relay messages between nearby devices without requiring internet access. Reports (Opens in new window) that the app was subsequently removed from online stores following government directives invoking national security and public order raise questions about the limits of technological circumvention.
The Indian state’s restriction of communication during crises such as protests is not a recent phenomenon. Since 2014, internet shutdowns have become a familiar instrument of governance in India, justified as necessary (Opens in new window) to maintain public order (Opens in new window). The government introduced the Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services Rules (Opens in new window) in 2017 and replaced them in 2024, to provide a dedicated legal framework for suspending telecommunications services.
Yet the framework has done little to ensure accountability, with shutdown orders issued on vague grounds, often without being made public or subject to meaningful independent oversight by the committees responsible for reviewing them. India has recorded more than 900 internet shutdowns since 2014 (Opens in new window), with Kashmir and Manipur experiencing some of the longest and most prolonged restrictions on connectivity.
The ease with which authorities can impose these restrictions lies partly in the centralised nature of telecommunications networks and the evolution of suspension laws that have progressively expanded the state’s power.
Mobile phones rely on cellular towers and network infrastructure operated by licensed telecom companies bound, under Clause 39.15 of India’s Unified Licence Agreement, to comply with government orders to suspend services. When authorities order a shutdown, operators can suspend connectivity across an entire area at the network level. This means vulnerabilities to state control are built into its architecture and institutional arrangements, allowing the state to turn the infrastructure of connectivity into a mechanism of disconnection.
Mesh-based connectivity apps like Bitchat matter less as a replacement for the internet than as a challenge to the assumption that communication must depend on it. They work without a SIM card, phone number, or central server, and each phone becomes a node that relays messages for others, so the communication network is assembled from the devices of the crowd itself.
Hong Kong’s pro-democracy protests in 2019 offered an earlier example of this logic (Opens in new window). As demonstrators sought ways to communicate amid concerns about internet restrictions and surveillance, Bridgefy, a Bluetooth-based messaging app, experienced a sharp increase in downloads.
India has its own precedent for such efforts. During the Citizenship Amendment Act protests in 2019, apps such as FireChat and Vojer were promoted (Opens in new window) as alternative communication tools for demonstrators in Bengaluru and elsewhere affected by internet shutdowns.
On 23 July 2026, during the early days of the Cockroach protests, the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C) sent takedown notices (Opens in new window)to GitHub, Google and Apple, demanding that BitChat, Briar and Bridgefy be removed from their platforms within three hours – but the apps remained live (Opens in new window).
According to the Internet Freedom Foundation (Opens in new window) (IFF), the government used the wrong legal tool, and issued a three-hour deadline close to midnight that left no realistic chance of legal recourse, failing a proportionality standard the Supreme Court set in 2020. The notices were reportedly withdrawn once they became public. In October, when the Cockroach protest surged again, the government tried again with different regulations to demand that Apple remove BitChat.