Afghanistan, explained.
Badakhshan Province, 4 October 2026, covering the Wakhan Corridor and Pamir region in Afghanistan (Javid Ashna via Getty Images)
In treacherous terrain, the Taliban has carved a path to potentially strengthen its position with China and against Pakistan.
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Could the Taliban’s new road to China drive negotiating power?Could the Taliban’s new road to China drive negotiating power?
The Taliban regime in Afghanistan has spent 365 million Afghanis – about US$5.5 million – building a road through one of the most remote corners of the country towards the Chinese border. It may turn out to be little more than a rough mountain road. But it could also give Afghanistan something it lacks: leverage.
At the northeastern edge of Afghanistan in theWakhan Corridor, (Opens in new window) this new road is quietly changing the strategic geography. The Taliban's Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development inaugurated (Opens in new window) the 121-kilometre gravel road on 4 October 2026, running from Broghil in Wakhan district to China’s border. The route includes four bridges, 66 culverts and more than 3,000 metres of retaining walls.
The road does not yet mean that Afghan trucks can simply drive into China, and there is no commercial border crossing. But it brings Afghanistan physically closer to a country that has become increasingly important to the Taliban's regional diplomacy. That possibility matters.
For years, Afghanistan has depended heavily on Pakistan for access to international markets. That dependence has become uncomfortable as relations between Kabul and Islamabad have deteriorated. The two countries shut major border crossings after deadly fighting in October 2025, disrupting bilateral trade and leaving hundreds of trucks stranded. The closure exposed how vulnerable Afghanistan remains to decisions made by its neighbour.
The consequences have gone beyond trade and impacts citizens. Before the closure, more than 70% (Opens in new window) of medicines used in Afghanistan were imported from Pakistan, according to the European Union Agency for Asylum. So, the attraction of another route is obvious.
The Wakhan Corridor is a narrow strip of Afghan territory extending eastwards between Tajikistan and Pakistan before reaching China's Xinjiang region.Its strategic importance is hardly new (Opens in new window). During the 19th century’s Great Game era, it served as a buffer between the British Empire in India and the Russian Empire to the north.
The mountains that once made Wakhan useful as a buffer also made it extraordinarily difficult to reach. High passes, severe winters and poor infrastructure have kept the corridor isolated. The new road does not change that geography, but it does begin to work around it, and Beijing has been paying attention.
In February, Afghanistan's ambassador to China, Mawlawi Asadullah Bilal Karimi, met Liu Jinsong, head of the Department of Asian Affairs at China's foreign ministry. According to Chinese and Afghan accounts, the discussions included China-Afghanistan relations. Afghan reporting also said activation of the Wakhan Corridor was discussed.
In March, Afghanistan’s Acting Minister of Commerce Nooruddin Azizi also met China's Special Representative in Kabul, Yu Xiaoyong (Opens in new window) in Kabul to discuss connectivity and transit.
While this demonstrates diplomacy around the idea, there is a distinction between a road reaching China, and China agreeing to open a full commercial crossing. Beijing has made no public commitment to do so, and that is likely to remain the challenge.
A functioning trade route would require customs facilities, security arrangements and infrastructure, as well as a road capable of handling sustained commercial traffic. A high-altitude gravel road through the Pamirs is a different proposition from a modern trade corridor.
China's calculations are likely to be cautious for another reason: security. (Opens in new window)Beijing has maintained pragmatic relations with the Taliban while stressing its concerns about militant groups operating from Afghan territory, particularly those that could threaten China's Xinjiang region. China has also supported security cooperation along the Wakhan frontier. In 2025, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi (Opens in new window) said Beijing supported the resumption of bilateral patrols in the corridor and called for stronger Afghan action against the East Turkestan Islamic Movement and other militant groups.
For Beijing, therefore, the road is not simply about moving goods. It is also about what happens in the mountains beside Xinjiang. This is where the road becomes more interesting than its modest size suggests.
The new road does not change that geography, but it does begin to work around it, and Beijing has been paying attention.
Afghanistan has long been described as a potential bridge between Central Asia, China, South Asia and the Middle East. Its geography offers that possibility, but decades of war, political instability and inadequate infrastructure have prevented it from becoming reality. The Taliban now appears determined to test that proposition. (Opens in new window)
The most ambitious possibility would be a wider network linking China through Afghanistan to Iran and the Arabian Sea. Afghanistan already has access to Iran's Chabahar port, which offers an alternative to Pakistan's seaports. But that route has also been subject to geopolitical uncertainty, making the search for multiple routes more significant. But it would be a mistake to portray the Wakhan road as a ready-made alternative to Pakistan's ports, as the road is only the first piece of a larger puzzle.
Beijing may see value in greater economic access to Afghanistan. It may also see strategic value in having another potential connection to Central Asia and the wider region. But China has shown little appetite for taking unnecessary risks in Afghanistan. The road therefore matters less because it guarantees trade than because it creates possibility.
For Kabul, the symbolism is powerful. The Taliban can point to a domestically funded infrastructure project reaching towards China at a time when Afghanistan remains internationally isolated. More practically, it gives Kabul a card to play in its difficult relationship with Pakistan.
About the author
Shadi Khan Saif
Shadi Khan Saif is a Melbourne-based journalist and a former Afghanistan/Pakistan correspondent for Reuters and Deutsche Welle.
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