By the numbers: Lowy Institute Poll 2025

The international order is fracturing, and Australians sense it. Across every domain – territorial integrity, trade, human rights, the environment, and war – the rules are being torn up. Yet while the United States dismantles key aid institutions and parts of Europe slash their budgets to re-arm, Australians are holding firm.

This year’s Lowy Institute Poll shows the strongest support for development cooperation in eight years. Two-thirds of Australians say the aid budget is about right (49%) or too low (17%). The ANU’s 2024 Development Policy Centre survey echoes this sentiment, with over half saying Australia gives the right amount of aid (29%) or too little (22%).

To capitalise on this moment, narrow and defensive debates need retiring.

These polls challenge a long-held belief in Canberra that the public does not support aid. Skittish MPs and senior officials should take note: they may have more political space than they realise.

But to capitalise on this moment, narrow and defensive debates need retiring. Questions like: “is aid important?’ or “should we cut it to fund defence?” miss the point. They also miss the moment. The real challenge is assessing how development cooperation can best build peace, drive prosperity, uphold rights, and accelerate environmental protection.

As the government and Australia’s development ecosystem prepare to mark two years since the launch of Australia’s International Development Policy, three strategic truths demand urgent attention. Ignoring them will come at a cost.

1. Lower and middle-income countries are rising in strategic importance

The Indo-Pacific is no longer just a development theatre. It’s the frontline of Australian foreign policy. As US leadership grows more erratic and Europe falters, our region matters more than ever. Countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam, and Papua New Guinea are becoming more relevant to Australia as partners, markets, diplomatic swing states, and nodes of influence.

Meanwhile, Australia’s development program is evolving – moving beyond the outdated “aid recipient” paradigm to become one of the most sophisticated tools we have to maintain trusted relationships, demonstrate utility, and sustain presence in the region.

Lower-and middle-income country development trajectories will shape the regional context Australia operates in. By 2050, five ASEAN countries could rank among the world’s top 25 economies. Australia won’t. If we want enduring partnerships based on trust and shared progress, development cooperation is one of the few tools that delivers real outcomes with minimal coercive baggage.

It also delivers enduring value for Australia: from stabilising fragile regions to opening trade and investment opportunities.

2. Development challenges are threat multipliers

Inequality, poverty, subnational conflict, and economic stagnation are not just humanitarian issues. They’re structural risks. Left unaddressed, they increase the chance of crisis in our near neighbourhood.

The prospect of another INTERFET or RAMSI is potentially underrated. Violence in Papua New Guinea’s Highlands, transnational organised crime and shrinking civic space in the Mekong, or Bougainville’s independence push all demand serious attention.

At a time when Australia is preparing for possible conflict in the South China Sea, Taiwan and beyond, we cannot afford to be blindsided by preventable disruptions closer to home.

Development is prevention. It builds resilience in institutions, economies, and governance. It buys time, creates options, and reduces the likelihood of evacuating citizens, deploying troops, or scrambling for influence after the fact. It must be central to Australia’s Indo-Pacific strategy, not an afterthought.

3. The budget numbers don’t lie

As global risks rise, Australia’s international spending has stalled. In 1999, international portfolios made up nine per cent of the federal budget. A quarter-century later, that share is unchanged. But beneath the surface, development assistance has fared the worst.

It has grown almost five times less than intelligence, half as much as policing, and even lags behind the erratic funding of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade itself.

Debating defence spending is necessary when the world feels dangerous. But if we fixate only on the defence dollar, we leave the rest of the international affairs portfolio vulnerable. And that leaves Australia vulnerable.

Australia must shift from a scarcity mindset dominated by annual cost-cutting to strategic decision-making driven by the scale of our interests and the risks we face. The challenges to Australia’s international relations are growing. So are the demands to respond.

That’s a big and expensive shift. Arguing otherwise is gaslighting the public. Arguing that only an increase to defence spending is required is narrow. Cutting aid to fund defence is a false economy. It undermines Australia’s broader strategic posture. Downplaying this reality misleads the public.

Time to move beyond the defensive crouch and ask: what next?

The world has changed. The public gets it. It’s time for international affairs leaders across government, academia and civil society to stop justifying aid and start grappling with the next set of strategic questions:

• How can Australia’s development program adapt to the shocks likely coming in the next 3–5 years?
• Where can it hedge risk and open doors?
• How can we use development diplomacy to build coalitions and shape rules?

The Lowy Institute’s data shows Ministers have permission to act. The circumstances demand it. And the public appears ready to support a bigger role for Australia – not just in defence, but in diplomacy, development and broader international cooperation.

This is a rare alignment between public sentiment, strategic need, and policy opportunity. Government and Opposition alike should seize it, and act.

Three years ago, having seen Australia subjected to a long campaign of Chinese economic coercion and trade blockages, the newly elected Labor government adopted a phrase to describe its approach to the Asian superpower: “cooperate where we can, disagree where we must, and engage in the national interest”.

The approach captured by those words has framed Australia’s relationship with its largest trading partner ever since. It reflects a high degree of caution, given China’s military assertiveness and human rights record, as well as the reality that no country can ignore China if it wants to continue to grow economically, transition its energy supply, or prevent the next pandemic.

Today, Australia again faces unjustified tariffs from a superpower. But this time, it is Australia’s principal ally that is wielding the stick.

Australia would do well to apply the same pragmatic approach to the United States – a country that remains pivotal to many of its interests, but also one with which Australia finds itself increasingly at odds.

Even as the United States drifts further from its historical expression of national principles, Australia does not have the luxury of disengaging.

The recently released 2025 Lowy Institute Poll suggests many Australians already look to the United States with a good measure of pragmatism.

With Donald Trump in the White House, only 36% of Australians trust America to act responsibly – a 20-point drop since last year and the lowest level in two decades.

Despite this, the vast majority (80 per cent) continue to view the US alliance as important to Australia’s security. And more Australians think the country should remain close to the United States under Trump (57 per cent) than those who think it should distance itself (40 per cent).

The question is: where must Australia disagree, and where should it continue to cooperate with America?

A long list of disagreements

Many of Trump’s actions directly undermine the rules-based order under which Australia has prospered.

Of all the policies tested in the Lowy Institute Poll, Australians were most disapproving of Trump’s attempts to acquire Greenland (89 per cent), an objective he has repeatedly refused to rule out using force to achieve.

As the purported leader of the free world, publicly flirting with territorial expansion at the expense of smaller powers undercuts a fundamental prohibition on the threat or use of force, as well as allies’ arguments against respective Russian and Chinese designs on Ukraine and Taiwan.

Trump’s decision to strike Iranian nuclear facilities in the absence of an imminent threat to the United States has again ignited concerns about eroding constraints on the use of force – whatever the merit of the objectives, how they are achieved matters, as do the consequences such actions could unleash in the Middle East.

On Ukraine, Trump has blamed the war on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, shown sympathy for Vladimir Putin, haphazardly sought a peace agreement at Ukraine’s expense, and voted with Russia against European allies on UN resolutions on the matter.

Australians, on the other hand, continue to stand firmly against Russia’s aggression. Australia can and should do more: a strong majority back continued sanctions on Moscow (84 per cent), providing military aid to Ukraine (73 per cent), and participating in a potential European-led peacekeeping mission (71 per cent).

On trade, the divergences are sharp. A vast majority of Australians (81 per cent) disapprove of Trump’s use of tariffs to pressure other countries. Beyond seeking exemptions from US tariffs, Australia must continue to champion the cause of open, rules-based trade – a system it has long prospered from.

On climate change, the positions are hard to reconcile. Trump is an ardent climate denialist and has ordered America’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. By contrast, the Albanese government is bidding to host next year’s UN climate summit with Pacific nations – an initiative that carries strong public support (70 per cent). If Australia secures the hosting rights, it will find itself leading global climate action when the United States – the world’s second largest emitter – is backtracking on its commitments.

Finding common ground

If we believe US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth’s recent speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue, deterring Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific remains a top priority for the US administration.

A majority of Australians agree. Seven in ten think it likely China will become a military threat to Australia in the next 20 years, while 60 per cent think Australia should do more to deter China militarily.

But there are mixed signals here, too. With the Pentagon conducting a review into AUKUS, some believe a program for Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines – which two-thirds of Australians favour – is now at risk.

The United States has also called on Australia, among other allies, to significantly bolster its defence spending. Half of the public (51 per cent) think Australia should increase its defence budget.

Yet, while allies scramble to respond to US pressure on spending, a fundamental question lies unanswered: does America have the resolve and focus to continue leading deterrence against Chinese aggression? If China sought to take Taiwan by force, few analysts are confident that Trump would put US troops into the fray.

Closer to home, Australians remain somewhat optimistic – 63 per cent think that if Australia were attacked, the United States would come to its defence.

Engaging in our national interests

Clearly, Trump has dispensed with the notion of values in American foreign policy. Notions of loyalty or “mateship” no longer hold currency.

But even as the United States drifts further from its historical expression of national principles, Australia does not have the luxury of disengaging. It should continue to seek cooperation, both on mutual economic interests and the common cause of deterring armed conflict in Asia.

At the same time, Australia’s leaders must be ready to stand their ground, including on global security, open trade, climate action, and the preservation of the rules-based order.

Australians expect nothing less.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese was asked during a National Press Club appearance this month whether China was a security threat to Australia. Here’s what he had to say:

“I think that our engagement with the region and the world needs to be diplomatic, needs to be mature and needs to avoid the, you know, attempts to simplify what are a complex set of relationships.”

When pressed, he added:

“We have strategic competition in the region. We have that, we have a Defence Strategic Review which outlines what Australia’s defence needs are. And we engage constructively in the region, including with China and including with ASEAN nations.”

Fortunately, the respondents to the Lowy Institute Poll are required to be more direct. In 2025, 69 per cent of respondents saw it as very likely or somewhat likely that China would become a military threat to Australia in the next 20 years, down from a high of 75 per cent in 2022 and 2023.

Around the same percentage – 67 per cent – support Australia acquiring nuclear powered submarines. And 60 per cent favour doing more to work with allies to deter China’s use of military force. Fewer – 51 per cent – support Australia spending more on defence (though we do not know by how much, and at what cost to other spending). Just 51 per cent say they feel very safe or safe, when reflecting on world events. And when it comes to threats to Australia’s security, 61 per cent saw a military conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan as a critical threat over the next ten years.

Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles is more forthcoming than Albanese. At the recent Defending Australia summit, hosted by The Australian newspaper, Marles made the following points, which at least reiterate the gist of the 2023 Defence Strategic Review (rather than just referring to its existence):

“In terms of our own defence capability needs, our risk is not so much the invasion of the continent. We are fortunate that we are an island nation surrounded by oceans, but on the other hand, we are deeply reliant on our sea lines of communication. The supply of the country – almost all of our liquid fuels are imported by sea, but also through export revenues. And so that is our strategic risk. It’s the disruption of those sea lines.”

When pressed in the question-and-answer session, Marles elaborated on concerns about China’s rapid build-up of conventional military and nuclear forces.

Albanese and Marles could also have reasonably pointed out, as Foreign Minister Penny Wong has done, that Australia has concerns about aspects of China’s behaviour, like its military cooperation with Russia and coercive and dangerous actions towards the Philippines and Taiwan.

What is required is a willingness by the Prime Minister to speak more directly about Australia’s strategic circumstances.

The results of the 2025 Lowy Institute Poll suggest that Albanese could be much more forthcoming with Australians about the strategic circumstances we face. This doesn’t need to mean explicitly labelling China a threat, like Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney did recently. Australians already get the picture and most understand that, on balance, relations with China will be more competitive than cooperative in future. There’s little evidence from the results of previous Lowy Institute polls that Australians want their political leaders to take an overtly confrontational approach to Beijing, either. In 2024, just 45 per cent wanted Australians to do more to work with allies to deter China’s use of military force, even if it meant harming the relationship with China.

Instead, what is required is a willingness by the Prime Minister to speak more directly about Australia’s strategic circumstances, including the challenge posed by China, and the policy responses that are required to meet the moment. Without such a clear conceptual framework around the strategic and foreign policy debate in Australia, the government’s responses to pressure from the United States for increased defence spending risk appearing reactive and defensive.

Criticism of Australia’s alliance with the United States is not a surprising feature of public debate. What is surprising is to hear it from a Liberal member of parliament.

Opposition defence spokesperson Andrew Hastie’s call this week for greater transparency from the government regarding the status of US personnel stationed in Australia is therefore worth pausing on. “When America conducts combat operations, we want to know what our level of involvement will be,” Hastie said, calling for a “parties of government committee dedicated to defence so that we can have these debates”.

The Liberal party has, historically, been a party of full-throated support for the alliance. Debate about risks to national sovereignty stemming from Canberra’s 70-plus-year partnership with Washington have been more normally associated with the joint facilities such as Pine Gap or today with criticisms of AUKUS.

But from whatever perspective one arrives at this question, it is vital to discuss it.

Social licence is critical for any government to enact policies. To enact a set of policies as complex and significant as those involved in managing the alliance with America should require an enormous amount of this license. It is curious, then, that historically it has not.

Lowy Institute polling has consistently shown that while a majority of Australians consider the alliance with the United States to be important to Australia’s security, those numbers have only been vaguely equal with those who trust America to act responsibly in the world twice – in 2009 and 2011.

Australia’s defence and foreign policy discussions, particularly in relation to the United States, are unusually opaque and arcane. The United States itself has robust public mechanisms to discuss such issues, from Congressional Committees and Subcommittees on Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, and Intelligence to its myriad network of foreign policy and defence think tanks and institutes. The interested American citizen has much greater access to a broader range of foreign policy analysis than their Australian counterpart.

Greater transparency would not harm national security – it does not do so in the United States.

The prime minister John Howard’s invocation of ANZUS after the attacks of September 11, 2001, and Australia’s subsequent commitments to America’s military action in Afghanistan and Iraq, featured debates questioning the Australian commitment, objections that were largely pushed aside by an assumption of American primacy. But younger Australians today will recall the post-9/11 era rather than the “unipolar moment” that followed the end of the Cold War. They will have grown up seeing an America that, to paraphrase George Kennan, in its “prehistoric monster” form thrashes its tail about and tramples its surroundings. These are the people who will manage Canberra’s relationship with the United States in the future and must be convinced of the social licence underpinning the alliance if it is to continue in its current form.

So, Hastie is right. Greater transparency would not harm national security – it does not do so in the United States. It would build trust in the Australian public, and produce a more robust discussion about the successes and shortcomings of current Australian policies. Why, for instance, has the Albanese government not released an unclassified version of its urgent climate risk assessment?

It is a strange quirk of Australia that successive governments have preferred to have surface-level discussions about foreign affairs and defence. This does not square with the oft-repeated assessment of the present that Australia faces its most challenging strategic circumstances since the Second World War. Nor does it chime with the fact that Australia’s most important security partner continues to act in ways which increasingly do not align with its values.

Australia’s wartime prime minister John Curtin explained more challenging circumstances to the Australian people. It is not unreasonable to expect that same kind of leadership now. Transparency is an asset to national security. Opacity is a risk to national sovereignty.

An overwhelming majority of Australians (81%) disagree with Trump’s tariff policies, according to the latest Lowy Institute Poll. But despite the media infatuation with Australia “getting a better deal” on tariffs from the United States, most Australians (61%) see the US tariffs on Australian exports as an important, but not a critical threat to Australia’s vital interests over the next ten years.

The public has this right – it is not the direct tariffs that pose the biggest threat. Rather, it is the rebound effects of the on again/off again/on again tariffs that threaten the global economy.

Australia’s dependence on commodity exports means that what happens in global markets is far more important than the bilateral trade relationship. The strength of Australia’s commodity exports has also left the economy more dependent on imports for a wide range of products. The public support shown for industry policies reflects valid concerns about Australia’s vulnerability to supply chain disruptions. But while the broad sentiment is supportive, the government should be careful about taking the public’s support for granted. Just like the clamour to “do something” about tariffs on Australia, the public will want to see results from industry policy.

The tariff policy agenda is clear – Australia does not benefit from trying to retaliate. But that does not mean that we should not be supporting other countries’ efforts to push back where they have market power as a means of raising the cost to the US economy. Only US businesses have the influence to change Trump’s tariff agenda.

A coordinated approach to isolate retaliation to the United States and China will be essential to avoid a domino effect increasing tariff and non-tariff barriers across the board.

Petitioning for special treatment for Australia on the basis of our trade deficit with the US and security relationship (AUKUS and US “bases”) is unlikely to be successful and buys Australia into the role of supplicant. A cooperative front with other countries will reduce the options for the Trump administration, and strengthen the hand of US businesses that are harmed by the tariffs.

Cooperation is also critical in pushing back against China’s export policies. The risks of a global trade war are rising as China seeks alternative markets for its exports. This trade diversion impact of the US tariffs on China has been made more difficult for countries to manage by the Chinese government’s expansion of its export subsidies to offset declining demand in China in the wake of the property market collapse. The size of China’s manufacturing base and its breadth (expanding high tech exports adding to rather than replacing low tech exports) pose real risks to manufacturing industries in a host of countries, particularly in Asia.

A rise in anti-dumping tariffs in response could well achieve Trump’s stated goal of countries raising tariffs on Chinese goods. A coordinated approach to isolate retaliation to the United States and China will be essential to avoid a domino effect increasing tariff and non-tariff barriers across the board. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for TransPacific Partnership (CPTPP) is a good place to start to keep protectionism at bay as countries react to the changing trade environment.

The CPTPP is also a good place to start when designing industry policy. While the Lowy Institute Poll found that 83% of Australians supported making more goods in Australia even if it cost more, reality is that few, if any, supply chains can be fully Australian. We will continue to rely on trade partners for inputs into production, even if the final product is made in Australia. Strengthening trade relationships to diversify sources is a much lower cost strategy than on-shoring production.

Targeting clean energy, critical minerals, green metals and fuels plays to Australia’s potential strengths as a land of sun and wind, with good mineral resources. These industries also play to security needs as fuel imports are highly vulnerable to shipping disruptions, and transport is essential for food security. Whether critical minerals will provide us with leverage with the United States on security is less clear, as is the premium on green metals if the world abandons attempts to reduce carbon emissions. While the targets are well selected, a much more comprehensive approach addressing barriers and more money, including R&D, will be needed to achieve results. While most Australians (82%) still support subsidising the development of renewable technologies, the downward trajectory (from a high of 91% in 2021) suggests support is conditional on the delivery of promised outcomes, not least lower electricity prices.

The Lowy Institute Poll provides a great snapshot of Australian attitudes on a wide range of areas where Australia’s interests intersect with the world. While the Australian government can take heart from general support for its approach on the economic intersects, it should not take this support for granted. The much harder task involves delivery – on trade partnerships and on the promise of industry policy. More honest conversations are required with the Australian public about the costs and compromises needed.

Something interesting is happening in how Australians think about their own country’s influence in the Pacific. According to the Lowy Institute’s 2025 poll, 39 per cent of Australians now see Australia as the most influential power in the Pacific Islands, a notable increase from last year’s result of 31 per cent.

Australia has overtaken China, previously seen by Australians as the dominant player, which holds steady at 34 per cent.

These figures suggest a shifting perception domestically, perhaps reflecting Canberra’s energetic “listening” diplomacy, through which Australia has ramped up diplomatic effort and significantly increased financial assistance to the Pacific over the past three years. Canberra’s approach of marrying generous aid packages with not-so-subtle diplomatic leverage on security matters appears to have resonated at home.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s government has successfully positioned itself as a more responsive partner to Pacific concerns, particularly on security, climate change, and economic resilience. Canberra’s recent agreements with countries including Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu, and Nauru – which blend financial support, migration pathways, and security consultations – have clearly influenced public perceptions of Australia’s regional influence.

US influence evaporates

Meanwhile, American influence in the Pacific is evaporating like wet footprints in the hot sun.

The United States was already lagging behind China in 2024 (at 25 per cent versus China’s 34 per cent), but this year’s result shows only around half as many Australians think America holds the most influence in the Pacific (18 per cent) as those who think the same of China (34 per cent).

This year’s poll shows that Australians have been quick to realise that America’s language on “the China challenge” in the Pacific is not matched by its actions.

Would anyone paying attention have expected a different result? Especially given the Trump administration’s firebombing of USAID’s budget, programs and now staff, not just in the Pacific but globally, a brutal process that commenced on Donald Trump’s first day back in the White House on 20 January 2025.

The Trump tariffs were announced just after this year’s polling. Even so, with tariffs of 32 per cent against Fiji, 30 per cent against Nauru, 22 per cent against Vanuatu, and none but Palau spared overall, “America First” rhetoric is being felt in the region more like “America Only”.

More recently, Trump gave a green light to US deep sea mining in the Pacific Ocean as potential source of critical minerals, diving feet-first into an issue that threatens to divide the Pacific Islands Forum along economic, political and environmental lines.

This year’s poll shows that Australians have been quick to realise that America’s language on “the China challenge” in the Pacific is not matched by its actions. The contradictions, or, more generously, the ambiguity, with respect to America’s reliability as a partner to Pacific countries is undeniably hurting America’s relations in the region.

Ambiguity may be a viable posture for hot-button issues such as Taiwan, but in diplomatic relations, America will be judged by its reliability and consistency.

At the 2024 PIF Leaders’ Meeting, senior Biden administration official Kurt Campbell was caught in a hot mic moment telling Albanese that the United States was giving Australia ‘the lane’ in the Pacific. The reality is that America is giving China the lane. Australia’s not going anywhere.

Permanent contest

And the competition remains intense.

While Australia is undeniably the largest aid donor in the region, and uniquely maintains a diplomatic presence in every PIF member state, Beijing’s bare-faced influence-building is plain as day.

The China-Pacific Island countries Foreign Ministers’ meeting last month foreshadowed increased Chinese presence in security and policing, development, and stronger economic ties with those Pacific countries that recognise China over Taiwan. Beijing’s blend of visa-waivers, economic incentives, infrastructure financing, and diplomatic duchessing, ensures its presence is both felt and appreciated across island capitals.

To Canberra’s chagrin, plenty of Pacific countries are evidently happy to buy what China is selling.

In 2024, China registered 26 Coastguard vessels with the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, signalling a more assertive regional maritime presence. It is not clear how China intends to deploy its more than two-dozen vessels, but if the dynamics in the South China Sea are any indication, it will likely result in Chinese vessels harassing other countries, while protecting its own fishing fleet – widely understood as often responsible for illegal fishing in the Pacific Ocean.

In theory, using Coastguard vessels rather than warships extends China’s maritime domain awareness and access without being as provocative as a military presence. That said, Chinese Coastguard behaviour in the South China Sea is already stretching the definition of “grey-zone activities”.

China’s rapid advance into the security sector since signing its controversial security pact with Solomon Islands in 2022 indicates persistent ambitions. Its Pacific police training programs, not just in Solomon Islands, but also in Vanuatu, Kiribati, Samoa, and Fiji are increasingly publicised by China in an attempt to market itself a contributor to regional security rather than a threat to stability.

To Canberra’s chagrin, plenty of Pacific countries are evidently happy to buy what China is selling, even while some countries including PNG and Fiji are aligning more closely to Australia’s worldview.

Therein lies the rub: while perceptions do matter, it is Pacific countries’ own strategic choices that will ultimately be the deciding factor in who has influence and how the regional balance of power is shaped for decades to come.

Explore the 2025 Lowy Institute Poll and 21 years’ worth of data on our interactive website: https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/

When it comes to Australia’s attitudes towards democracy, this year’s Lowy Institute Poll is a good news story amid a backdrop of global democratic decline. According to the 2025 poll, three-quarters of Australians (74%) say democracy is preferable to any other kind of government, a record high. Given that gripes about the system are a feature, not a bug, of democracy, this result demonstrates that despite its faults, Australians fundamentally value and appreciate democracy as a system of government and set of values. Democracy guarantees us freedom to complain about it, and yet, Australians have chosen to look at the glass as half full.

Australia’s democratic stability makes it a welcome outlier as the state of global democracy has grown more discouraging with each passing year. The past two and a half decades have been marked by a steady global democratic decline. According to the latest V-Dem Institute Report, the world has fewer democracies than autocracies for the first time in over 20 years.

There are many reasons for this democratic backsliding, but citizen disillusionment with democracy often plays a significant but often underappreciated role. Citizens must maintain faith in democracy for it to function and thrive. If their commitment to democracy wavers, then democracy is in trouble. If enough citizens don’t think that “democracy is preferable to any other kind of government” then they become vulnerable to populist appeals and support leaders who would violate democratic principles to “get things done” or because they align with their political or ideological positions. If citizen faith in the democratic process wavers, it excuses constitutional overreach and violations. It erodes norms of tolerance against opponents and stokes polarisation. It excuses or justifies violence and corruption as political solutions.

Threats and challenges appear to have renewed rather than diminished Australia’s appreciation of its democratic systems.

The backdrop of global democratic backsliding also makes the Lowy Poll results all the more interesting. One would think that the displays of democratic dysfunction around the world, most notably by the United States, would contribute to a souring against democracy. The Lowy Institute Poll results also stand alongside polling that shows that Australians are growing increasingly distrustful of their political institutions and leaders. A 2023 Australian Public Commission poll similarly shows that Australians highly value democracy but also revealed that half of Australians perceive widespread corruption in democratic institutions and processes.

Democratic backsliding is also occurring in the context of intense geopolitical competition and an assertive China that has invested heavily in promoting the benefits and efficiencies of its nondemocratic political system. The “China model” of state-led market reforms and centralised authoritarian government has been touted as a successful development model. China has worked tirelessly to transform the international system to reduce the influence of democratic and liberal values. That is made all the easier as the United States has engaged in an extraordinary act of self-harm by steadily retreating from defending the liberal international order it created.

The spread of disruptive digital technologies has also harmed democracy. Social media and other digital technology platforms have been contributing factors to the global democratic decline – expanding the scale and spread of disinformation, polarisation, distrust around election results and assaults on privacy. They have enabled digital foreign interference and influence campaigns, while the intersecting dynamics of technological disruption and concentrated power are embodied in a “Big Tech” ethos that has grown more authoritarian. The 2025 Lowy Institute Poll also reflects these concerns. Seven in ten Australians (70%) think social media has a more negative than positive impact on democracy.

But these threats and challenges appear to have renewed rather than diminished Australia’s appreciation of its democratic systems. Perhaps the rapid erosion of democratic norms of our main ally, the United States, and the daily assaults on its constitution under Donald Trump, have put the value and effectiveness of Australia’s own democracy in sharp relief. The Lowy Institute Poll also shows a sharp drop in “warmth” and trust in the United States, but trust, warmth and confidence in China are also historically low and threat perceptions remain high. The merits of its authoritarian, centralised system also took a deep hit during the Covid-19 pandemic and the China model has gradually revealed its flaws.

While Australia’s faith in democracy is a welcome contrast to declines in the United States, Australia must also be consistently vigilant to safeguard its own democracy. Poll results demonstrating Australia’s majority preference for democracy is a solid foundation, but it is insufficient. People might support democratic norms in the abstract but can still support and justify antidemocratic behaviours and leaders.

Australia also faces a stark international context devoid of global democratic leadership. The United States, the traditional global defender of liberalism and democracy, has softened in its support of democratic standards. America is no longer interested in being the protector of the liberal democratic rules-based order under which Australia has benefited enormously. It’s clear that safeguarding democratic principles and norms at home and abroad are becoming increasingly intertwined. It will be interesting to see if these positive feelings towards democracy translate into more robust support for Australia to position itself diplomatically, not just domestically, to champion democratic institutions.

Explore the 2025 Lowy Institute Poll and 21 years’ worth of data on our interactive website: https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/

The 2025 Lowy Institute Poll asked a question it has never asked this year: If Australia were attacked directly by the military of another country, and you were physically capable of doing so, would you be willing to fight to defend Australia?

More than half (52%) of Australian adults say that they would. One-quarter (24%) say they would not, while another quarter are undecided. Younger Australian adults (37% of those aged under 45) are far less willing to defend the country if attacked than their older counterparts (65% of those aged over 45).

This figure is not emblematic of some putative crisis of patriotism, as some argue. The roots of the recruitment shortfall for the Australian Defence Force are deeper and more serious. There is a tension between the ADF’s missions and how they are explained to Australian society. Resolving this tension is critical to the ADF being able to achieve those missions. As is so often repeated, the ADF’s personnel are its most important capability. If the ADF cannot recruit and retain personnel, it will be unable to achieve its objectives.

According to the 2024 National Defence Strategy, the ADF’s overarching strategic objectives are to deter actions against Australia’s interests, shape its strategic environment, and respond with credible force when required. The keen-eyed observer will notice that only one of those missions involves the prospect of actively defending Australia if attacked. By definition, deterrence is a peacetime operation – a negative peace, perhaps, but peacetime nonetheless.

Successive governments have failed to adequately explain why peacetime service actively benefits Australia. Nor have they explained why it is worth doing when there is always the possibility that it may transition to wartime service, the most difficult thing a society can ask of its members.

It is difficult to argue that any ADF deployment since – or perhaps including – Vietnam has been in the direct defence of Australia. This is not to say that these deployments were not important or useful. It is to note that the vast majority of Australian military deployments since the end of the Second World War have sought to promote Australian security from indirect threats, through indirect means.

This is because it was understood that Australia’s security was underpinned by a deterrence structure led by the United States. In order for deterrence to be effective, an adversary must be convinced that retaliation will take place. Since Australia has, historically, been unable to deter, shape, or respond to events wholly alone, we have sought to fit into the strategic structures of another power. This has served Australia well in the past. It no longer appears fit for the future.

It is hard to see shared values with a country that threatens to annex its neighbours, cracks down on free expression, and sends armed plain-clothes officers to disappear migrants off its streets.

A career in the ADF can readily provide people with what they seek in their employment. But if its principal role today is deterrence, the government must explain what exactly it is seeking to deter, what price Australians would pay if deterrence fails, and convince Australians that this price is indeed worth paying.

There is a truism permeating conversations about Australia’s situation today, that we face the most challenging set of strategic circumstances since the Second World War. The assumption behind this is that the rise of China threatens the established power of the United States, and that this will lead inevitably to war – Thucydides’ so-called trap.

This is a partial reading of Thucydides. It excludes the idea, the increasingly inescapable fact, that the established power has little desire to maintain its role in the world or bear the costs of deterring major conflict, and that it faces major domestic political challenges.

The future of the ADF is necessarily tied to Australia’s youth. Young people today desire careers give them purpose, happiness, and align with their values. If all the Australian government can say in those terms to justify fitting into US strategic architecture is that we share values, this is a losing argument. It is hard to see shared values with a country that threatens to annex its neighbours, cracks down on free expression, and sends armed plain-clothes officers to disappear migrants off its streets.

A conversation about recruitment which posits a supposed lack of patriotism for very real shortfalls is not a serious one. Military service is not like other jobs. It is, at its core, a career in which people are ultimately expected, if necessary, to kill or facilitate the killing of others.

Australia exists in a set of circumstances in which threats to our prosperity are unlikely to be direct, but are no less severe for it. This makes a clear articulation of the ADF’s purpose more important than ever. Platitudes about patriotism are an unhelpful misdiagnosis of a much more serious problem. If events reach a point where a direct attack on Australia is imminent, this constitutes a complete failure of policy. Let us recall that the last time a foreign military force landed uninvited on Australian shores, 1788, the continent’s history was inexorably changed.

Explore the 2025 Lowy Institute Poll and 21 years’ worth of data on our interactive website: https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/

Every year the Lowy Institute Poll takes the heartbeat of the nation to reveal what Australians think about big international questions and their nation’s place in the world, with the latest edition released today. Australia being a democracy, public opinion ought to count for a great deal, so it’s worth thinking about how the nation’s elected leaders should interpret the data that my colleague Ryan Neelam, Director of our Public Opinion program, presents to them each year. I would offer three observations.

First, our political leaders should ask themselves whether the poll tells them what Australians think, or whether it merely reflects politicians’ own views back at them?

For instance, over 20 years of polling, the Lowy Institute Poll finds overwhelming and consistent public support for Australia’s alliance with the United States.

Once, my default assumption on issues such as the alliance, where voters have little direct experience or knowledge, would have been that they look to their leaders for guidance. If that’s true, then consistent public support for the alliance can simply be put down to the fact that both major political parties regard the alliance as central to Australian security and foreign policy. Yet support for our major parties appears to be in terminal decline and trust in politicians has dropped dramatically over the last half-century. The fact that support for the alliance is holding steady suggests something more is going on than just “authority bias”.

A skilled politician will balance polling results with evidence of how people actually behave.

My second observation is about “revealed preferences”. Opinion polls can tell us what people think, but most of the time they cannot tell us how much or how deeply people care about an issue. A skilled politician will balance polling results (which tell us what people say they believe) with evidence of how people actually behave. Economists call this “revealed preference”, and there’s a good example in the 2025 Lowy Institute Poll.

We asked Australians whether they thought more goods should be made in Australia, even if they cost more.

There you have it: 83 per cent support for Australian-made goods, even if they cost more. But do Australians mean what they say? When they make consumer choices, does it reflect this stated preference for Australian-made?

The demise of the Australian car industry suggests the answer is “no”. Support for Australian-made goods didn’t save the local clothing and footwear industry either, or tech and electronics.

Polls are not powerless in discerning the depth of public feeling. For instance, between 2008 and 2011, the Lowy Institute Poll asked Australians how much they were willing to pay for electricity if it helped to solve climate change.

The fact that up to 41% of people said they were unwilling to pay anything extra suggests that, by asking the right questions, polls can bridge the gap between stated and actual preferences.

But just to underscore the complexities here, since 2015, successive Lowy Institute polls have also found that a majority of Australians support action on climate change even if it involves significant costs. The question of who pays those costs is, of course, left open.

Finally, when considering public opinion, politicians also need to ask themselves deep questions about the nature of Australia’s political system, and their role as elected representatives. Is their job to divine the mood of their electorate or the nation and then translate that into policy? Here, it’s important to remember that Australia is not just a democracy but a representative democracy in which elected officials are expected to display judgment and wisdom. The great Irish politician and philosopher Edmund Burke put it best, in a speech to his constituents in 1774, saying that “the happiness and glory of a representative” should be to give “unremitted attention” and “great weight” to the opinion and wishes of constituents, and to “prefer their interest to his own.” But, in the end:

“Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.”

Explore the 2025 Lowy Institute Poll and 21 years’ worth of data on our interactive website: https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/