The Morrison government has recently been talking up its economic engagement strategies with India, Vietnam and Indonesia and then used the recent budget to fund new trade diversification programs.
So, it is perhaps not surprising that some companies might have taken up the implicit message to pull back from China amid the worst diplomatic relationship in half a century.
But the more devastating message for Australia’s foreign policy settings from these ABS figures is the way investors have also used the Covid year to pull back from all three regions where the government is trying to increase security and economic engagement in response to rising Chinese power.
The stock of total investment in Japan fell 19% to $112 billion – which is ironically almost the same as the China fall – despite a range of initiatives and visits to bolster that bilateral relationship.
Likewise, the overall Indian investment stock fell even more, by 22% to $15 billion, and the direct investment halved, just like with China, to less than $1 billion, two years after the lengthy report on Indian economic engagement by former top diplomat Peter Varghese.
Meanwhile, total investment into Southeast Asia fell 25% to $92 billion, and the more diplomatically sensitive direct investment stock plunged a staggering 40% to $27 billion, three years after Australia hosted the first summit of leaders from those countries in Sydney.
And this withdrawal of Australian capital from the four main Asian economic zones has happened in a year when two lengthy reports on the need to increase business engagement in Asia were issued by the Business Council of Australia with Asia Society Australia and separately by Asialink.
But the total identified stock of Australian investment in the high-priority countries of India, Indonesia and Vietnam (with a combined population of 1.7 billion) is now little more than 0.5% of total offshore investment. Capital may go into them via third countries. But that figure compares with 4% for New Zealand (population 5 million) and the 20% for the United Kingdom (population 67 million).
There is no settled relationship between increased security ties and the deep economic connection that comes from direct investment, although the implicit message of government rhetoric is that they are mutually reinforcing to some extent.
But contrary to the economic determinist school of thought that prevailed in the Asian Century White Paper, the mutually beneficial economic relationship with China has so far failed to mitigate the downturn in diplomatic relations.
However, a situation where business seems to be taking up the message to pull back from China but not stepping up engagement with other so-called “like-minded” regional countries leaves Australia looking exposed economically, and perhaps also exposed in security terms.