Recent history does not make the E-3 statement more credible. Twice now, with Ukraine (Opens in new window) and during the Iran war (Opens in new window), Europe’s best military response has been to mobilise so-called “coalitions of the willing” – a misnomer not least because the resulting coalitions don’t seem willing to do much of anything.
Beijing will, therefore, almost certainly not be deterred by the E-3 statement. Instead, it is much more likely to escalate, worsening Taiwan’s security and raising the chances of the types of outcomes that Europe fears most. Already Beijing has reacted harshly (Opens in new window) toward Europe’s interference, issuing a sharply worded statement and asserting the legitimacy of its patrols (Opens in new window).
This response is unsurprising. Beijing sees the Taiwan issue as an internal one and has little tolerance for what it perceives as meddling by outside powers. Coming from three European powers together, the statement is likely to be inflammatory for other reasons as well. It is likely to excite lingering Chinese resentment over Western colonial exploitation during the 18th and 19th centuries, a deep resentment across Chinese society. As recently as late May, a retired senior diplomat (Opens in new window) from China inveighed against echoes of European colonialism at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore after a tense encounter between the Chinese Navy and a Dutch warship in the South China Sea.
Beijing has many options if it chooses to respond to the E-3 statement with defiance, and none are good for Taiwan or Europe. It could further step up sea and air patrols or military exercises around Taiwan. It could exert new types of political and economic pressure on the island. China could also target Europe, either with economic punishments like export controls or by leaning into its close partnership with Russia, including through increased support to Moscow. One reason that Beijing has exercised restraint in the Russia-Ukraine War, most notably by refusing to aid the Russians with arms and munitions, is that China did not wish to alienate Europe. Now, this calculation could be altered to Europe’s detriment.
Finally, the European statement is unlikely to impress the United States. Like Beijing, Washington has few illusions about Europe’s military capacity and is unlikely to be swayed by cheap talk. Defence leaders in the current administration have already made it clear that their preference is for Europeans (Opens in new window) to focus on strengthening European defence (Opens in new window) rather than spreading their threadbare forces around the globe.
It is no longer clear that European rhetoric in support of Taipei aligns with the direction of the Trump administration’s Taiwan policy. Trump has been prudently reducing (Opens in new window) the scope of America’s commitment to Taiwan step by step – for example, by downgrading US–Taiwan defence ties – to reduce the risk of devastating conflict. To the extent that the E-3 statement works in the opposite direction, the Trump administration may not welcome Europe’s missive at all.
Whatever the goal, the E-3 statement directed at China seems most likely to backfire, leaving Europe facing new security challenges and Taiwan more vulnerable. Europe must resist the temptation to spread itself across theatres it cannot influence. Its priority should be figuring out how to support European security without US assistance, not inserting itself into geopolitical flashpoints elsewhere.