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Taiwan, explained.
Taiwan's Air Force Thunder Tiger Aerobatics Team performs over Taipei in 2024 (Yan Zhao/AFP via Getty Images)
An E-3 intervention will antagonise Beijing and impress nobody – not even Washington.
Europe leans in on Taiwan. But to what end?Europe leans in on Taiwan. But to what end?
About the authors
Lyle Goldstein
Lyle J. Goldstein, PhD is director of the Asia Program at Defense Priorities and serves concurrently as director of the China Initiative at the Watson School of International and Public Affairs of Brown University.
Jennifer Kavanagh
Jennifer Kavanagh is a senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities, a think tank in Washington DC.
The British, French, and German offices in Taipei recently issued an unusual scolding to Beijing over its stepped-up sea patrols (Opens in new window) in waters around Taiwan. Restating their opposition to any coerced change to the cross-strait status quo, they warned (Opens in new window) “it is fundamental that all navigational rights and freedoms and the safety of seafarers and vessels are guaranteed and respected.”
Whatever the statement by this “E-3” hopes to accomplish, it amounts to little more than empty virtue signalling that is most likely to drive escalation and leave both Europe and China less secure. Europe does have interests in Asia worth protecting, but its efforts to do so will be best served if it focuses first on its own regional security challenges before trying to throw its weight around elsewhere.
There are at least three reasons why the E-3 may have decided to wade into East Asian security now, a moment when Europe-China relations are at a low point due to economic disagreements and European frustration with Beijing’s continued aid to Russia.
First, European states have long been the most notable embodiment of post-Second World War norms against the use of military force to change borders (Opens in new window), largely due to their own 20th-century experience in two continent-rending wars and consistently oppose any change to Taiwan’s status by coercion. Second, the war in Iran and disruption of maritime traffic (Opens in new window) through the Strait of Hormuz has raised Europe’s awareness about the vulnerability of vital maritime passageways. In this geopolitical context, new Chinese activity in waters around Taiwan may be particularly worrying to European observers, given their dependence on East Asian sea lanes (Opens in new window).
In a titanic battle between the world's two largest fleets, belonging to the US and China, just a handful of European warships would hardly make a difference.
Finally, with the NATO summit set to be held next week, the E-3 may hope that their statement in support of Taipei curries favour with the United States, reducing Trump’s criticism both of what he perceives as insufficient European defence spending (Opens in new window) and the continent’s lack of support to US military operations in Iran (Opens in new window). They may even see an assertive stance on Taiwan as a way to win greater US involvement European security.
The E-3 statement is likely to do little to advance Europe’s or Taiwan’s interests along any of these three trajectories, however.
For starters, given Europe’s limited military capacity, the E-3 warning will not protect Taiwan or reduce Chinese military pressure directed at the island. All sides are fully aware that the Europeans have little to offer in the way of military forces that could assist the beleaguered Taiwan. In a titanic battle between the world’s two largest fleets, belonging to the US and China, just a handful of European warships would hardly make a difference (Opens in new window). While France and Britain do possess potent nuclear submarines, such forces would likely arrive too late and in too small a number to impact the outcome of a conflict, especially since these submarines have small magazines and thus limited firepower.
HMS Anson prepares to enter HMAS Stirling near Perth (Kevin Walton)
Recent history does not make the E-3 statement more credible. Twice now, with Ukraine (Opens in new window) and during the Iran war (Opens in new window), Europe’s best military response has been to mobilise so-called “coalitions of the willing” – a misnomer not least because the resulting coalitions don’t seem willing to do much of anything.
Beijing will, therefore, almost certainly not be deterred by the E-3 statement. Instead, it is much more likely to escalate, worsening Taiwan’s security and raising the chances of the types of outcomes that Europe fears most. Already Beijing has reacted harshly (Opens in new window) toward Europe’s interference, issuing a sharply worded statement and asserting the legitimacy of its patrols (Opens in new window).
This response is unsurprising. Beijing sees the Taiwan issue as an internal one and has little tolerance for what it perceives as meddling by outside powers. Coming from three European powers together, the statement is likely to be inflammatory for other reasons as well. It is likely to excite lingering Chinese resentment over Western colonial exploitation during the 18th and 19th centuries, a deep resentment across Chinese society. As recently as late May, a retired senior diplomat (Opens in new window) from China inveighed against echoes of European colonialism at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore after a tense encounter between the Chinese Navy and a Dutch warship in the South China Sea.
Beijing has many options if it chooses to respond to the E-3 statement with defiance, and none are good for Taiwan or Europe. It could further step up sea and air patrols or military exercises around Taiwan. It could exert new types of political and economic pressure on the island. China could also target Europe, either with economic punishments like export controls or by leaning into its close partnership with Russia, including through increased support to Moscow. One reason that Beijing has exercised restraint in the Russia-Ukraine War, most notably by refusing to aid the Russians with arms and munitions, is that China did not wish to alienate Europe. Now, this calculation could be altered to Europe’s detriment.
Finally, the European statement is unlikely to impress the United States. Like Beijing, Washington has few illusions about Europe’s military capacity and is unlikely to be swayed by cheap talk. Defence leaders in the current administration have already made it clear that their preference is for Europeans (Opens in new window) to focus on strengthening European defence (Opens in new window) rather than spreading their threadbare forces around the globe.
It is no longer clear that European rhetoric in support of Taipei aligns with the direction of the Trump administration’s Taiwan policy. Trump has been prudently reducing (Opens in new window) the scope of America’s commitment to Taiwan step by step – for example, by downgrading US–Taiwan defence ties – to reduce the risk of devastating conflict. To the extent that the E-3 statement works in the opposite direction, the Trump administration may not welcome Europe’s missive at all.
Whatever the goal, the E-3 statement directed at China seems most likely to backfire, leaving Europe facing new security challenges and Taiwan more vulnerable. Europe must resist the temptation to spread itself across theatres it cannot influence. Its priority should be figuring out how to support European security without US assistance, not inserting itself into geopolitical flashpoints elsewhere.
