For years, the European Union has approached North Korean affairs through a narrow lens: imposing sanctions, condemning Pyongyang’s human rights record, and providing humanitarian assistance. While the bloc has consistently denounced North Korea’s nuclear program, it has largely avoided deeper diplomatic engagement.
With North Korean troops deployed to fight against Ukraine, however, the North Korean threat has arrived at Europe’s doorstep. The growing military capabilities of North Korea and expanding theatre of operations require the EU to fundamentally rethink its strategy – moving beyond condemnation and sanctions toward sustained, multilateral diplomatic strategies grounded in long-term objectives that would enhance security both in Europe and Northeast Asia.
A request last week by South Korea’s Unification Minister Chung Dong-young for the EU to appoint a special envoy for Korean Peninsula affairs reflects Seoul’s longstanding efforts to draw Europe more deeply into regional diplomacy. Over the years, South Korea’s outreach strategy aimed at Europe has varied according to its political leadership, with liberal governments generally requesting European help in facilitating peace efforts with Pyongyang and conservatives pushing for tougher pressure on the North. But regardless of Seoul’s appeals, the EU has largely kept its distance, viewing the Korean Peninsula as a distant problem – something for regional powers and Washington to handle.
Such a detached approach, however, now comes with increasingly high costs.
European and Indo-Pacific security are now inseparably linked.
The primary imperative driving the need for a new European strategy is the deepening military cooperation between North Korea and Russia. Beyond the troops already deployed, the possibility of additional North Korean forces joining Russia’s conflict against Ukraine remains, threatening to further destabilise European security and complicate NATO’s efforts at keeping the continent safe.
Russian technological and military assistance could significantly advance North Korea’s weapons capabilities, potentially yielding sophisticated missile systems or other advanced weaponry that Moscow might deploy in Ukraine, directly threatening European security. Simultaneously, North Korean support – whether through arms transfers, ammunition supplies, or troop deployments – strengthens Russia’s hand in the conflict, making Moscow a more formidable adversary and raising the stakes for European security considerably.
This bidirectional threat underscores why weakening the Russia-North Korea axis must become a European priority. Effective action will require unprecedented intelligence cooperation with South Korea, the United States, and Japan, enabling real-time updates on North Korean activities, particularly those connected to the Ukraine conflict.
Beyond the Russia relationship, North Korea also poses other threats to Europe’s security. For one, the continent faces growing exposure to Pyongyang’s sophisticated cyber operations, which have evolved into a significant security challenge. For example, North Korean operatives, disguised as freelance IT workers, have successfully infiltrated European companies, reportedly siphoning funds to finance weapons programs. State-backed hacking groups are also believed to have launched cyber attacks in Europe targeting critical sectors including defence, aerospace, and nuclear technology.
The European Union’s existing strategy toward North Korea – centred on sanctions, pressure, and harsh rhetoric – has proven largely ineffective and requires fundamental revision. Decades of sanctions have failed to halt Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs, while condemnations of North Korea’s human rights situation, however justified, have done little to modify the regime’s behaviour or protect European interests.
What Europe needs instead is an approach developed in close coordination with Washington and Seoul, aimed at providing North Korea with compelling reasons to recalibrate its foreign policy priorities.
Kim Jong-un’s efforts to elevate and present North Korea as a “normal” state suggest that the North Korean leader seeks to transform his country’s long-held image as isolated and weak. This desire could present an opening for diplomacy. Rather than offering more sanctions – further pushing Pyongyang closer to Moscow – Europe should explore avenues that could lead North Korea to reduce its dependence on Russia and consider the potential benefits of improved relations with the West. In particular, supporting any resumption of US-North Korean diplomacy should become a European priority, as progress on that front would naturally reduce Pyongyang’s reliance on Moscow.
At the same time, Europe must acknowledge important limitations to this approach. The EU cannot successfully engage North Korea in isolation – any meaningful diplomatic initiative must operate in tandem with American efforts. Pyongyang has little interest in European engagement pursued for its own sake without tangible benefits. However, if the EU can demonstrate its capacity to facilitate or promote US-North Korea diplomacy, North Korea might gradually adopt a less antagonistic stance toward Europe.
To this end, the EU would benefit from strengthening diplomatic cooperation with South Korea and taking the Unification Minister up on his recent offer of appointing an envoy. A joint EU-South Korean push for the resumption of US-North Korean diplomacy could result in an improved security environment both on the peninsula and in Europe. The costs of continuing down the current path are high, likely resulting in deeper cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow, and a potentially expanded North Korean military presence in Europe.
European and Indo-Pacific security are now inseparably linked and the EU must now develop diplomatic mechanisms to engage meaningfully in a region that can no longer be treated as peripheral to its security. Getting Pyongyang back to the negotiating table with US President Donald Trump would be a wise place to start.
