A surge in apprehension followed the establishment last week of a China-Central Asia Summit. “The war in Ukraine has weakened some of Russia’s influence in Central Asia,” warned the New York Times, “and China sees an opening”. Contrasted with the G7 meeting occurring at the same time in Japan, this was said to amount to “duelling summits” for influence.
The Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI, and China’s burgeoning economic partnerships with Central Asian nations, has certainly laid the groundwork for cooperation in areas such as trade, infrastructure and energy. Promises made at the China-Central Asia Summit of extensive financial support to the tune of 26 billion yuan (roughly US$3.8 billion) are indicative of strong economic collaboration, adding to the sense of unease.
This apprehension is exacerbated by Russia’s evident loss of power and influence following its invasion of Ukraine. Yet, despite all signs pointing towards China’s increased cooperation with the Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, there has not really been any abrupt change in China’s policy towards this region.
China is not aiming to be the dominant player in Central Asia or fill a power vacuum. Instead, by shoring up ties with its neighbours, China appears to be primarily focused on maintaining stability in its western periphery. This, in turn, would help construct a buffer zone to effectively manage its persistent security challenges to the east, in the Asia-Pacific region.
China’s diplomatic priorities offer a valuable insight into its ambitions towards Central Asia. These countries became China’s immediate neighbours following the collapse of the Soviet Union. China’s diplomatic blueprint highlights the significance it places on “major powers, its periphery, developing countries, and multilateral platforms”, and Central Asia plays a critical role in this schema.