Since disturbing reports about a Russian bid to base aircraft in Indonesia broke last week, both sides of Australian politics have continued to exploit the issue to their advantage as the election campaign rolls on. For the opposition Coalition, the incident demonstrated the Labor government’s lack of transparency and weak national security credentials; for Labor, the hyping of the incident underscored the Coalition’s recklessness and inexperience in managing foreign relations.
But this heated pre-election political debate has left Australians none the wiser about the nature of Russia’s strategic interests, Indonesia’s foreign policy, and Australia’s relationship with Jakarta.
First, Russia’s interest in increasing its defence presence in Southeast Asia is clear. While Moscow is, overall, a declining power in Asia, with limited economic and political relevance to the region, its isolated international position drives it to seek niche forms of cooperation. Over the last six months alone, Russia and Indonesia held a first navy exercise, and a Russian submarine made a port call in Malaysia. Some experts dismiss these activities as a superficial form of geopolitical advertising. Naval assets aren’t required for the war effort in Ukraine, so sending them to Asia sends a message that Russia remains a great power, without much cost.
Russia’s decision to send Sergei Shoigu, a close ally of Vladimir Putin, to Indonesia and Malaysia in February, where he was received at the highest levels, suggests there may be more substance behind Moscow’s intentions. Increasing defence sales to the region is doubtless one objective. But obtaining privileged military access would also serve Russia’s interest, allowing it to collect intelligence on the United States and its allies and giving it leverage to disrupt politics in Asia. In the words of Ian Storey, one of the closest observers of Russia’s activities in Southeast Asia, Russia’s interest in basing in Indonesia was “at least somewhat plausible”.
While Russia’s interest in Southeast Asia is unsurprising, many analysts have already pointed out that Indonesia’s traditional foreign policy approach, emphasising sovereignty and non-alignment, makes agreement to any kind of basing arrangement almost impossible. Just as a firm non-alignment stance, and prickly sensitivities about sovereignty can sometimes make defence ties with Australia slow and frustrating, these same mindsets are a fillip when it comes to slowing down Jakarta’s cooperation with malign actors including China and Russia. Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto is fond of quoting a proverb: “A thousand friends is too few, one enemy is too many.” This philosophy militates against sharp moves that would alarm Jakarta’s neighbours, including Singapore and Australia.
So what can – or should – an Australian government be doing to prevent the unpalatable prospect of closer Russia-Indonesia defence ties? Australians should not kid themselves about Canberra’s ability to influence Jakarta. Indonesia is a sovereign country of more than 280 million people, and may become the fifth largest economy in the world by the end of this decade. It has newly become a member of the BRICS and rightly seeks a greater global role in line with its growing weight. In the Pacific Islands region, Australia seeks “strategic denial” – in other words, to prevent a hostile power from obtaining any security foothold. Even in the Pacific, this is a daily struggle. Aspiring to exert the same influence in maritime Southeast Asia is delusional.
Relations have been so stable that Australia may have grown complacent.
This means that the only policy lever available to Australia when it comes to influencing Indonesian foreign policy is … the bilateral relationship with Indonesia. And contrary to the claims of some over-heated commentary, Australia’s relations with Indonesia are in pretty good shape. Compared to past ups and downs – with disputes about the death penalty, live cattle exports, people smuggling and spying turning the relationship into a rollercoaster ride – ties with Indonesia have been stable in recent years, and new dialogue mechanisms exist which provide the two partners with opportunities to exchange perspectives on strategic issues.
In fact, relations have been so stable that Australia may have grown complacent. Both Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Opposition leader Peter Dutton have said they value the Indonesia relationship. But in different ways, each has missed opportunities to invest. Albanese skipped Prabowo’s inauguration last October, breaking with a long-running tradition that Australian prime ministers since John Howard have attended. He hasn’t visited since, either. Likewise, Dutton’s statement that he would make his first bilateral overseas visit to Washington, rather than Jakarta, suggests he judged that – compared with the urgency of engaging the Trump administration – Indonesia could wait. Both political judgements are particularly inopportune, as Prabowo is a more active, but less predictable foreign policy leader than his predecessor. Prabowo also appears to delegate little power to his foreign or defence ministers, and the foreign ministry has been sidelined, making leader-level contact even more important.
Closer defence ties between Russia and Indonesia are an unpalatable prospect for Australia, especially in view of the new and unprecedented level of cooperation between Moscow and Beijing. But ultimately Australia’s diplomatic relationship with Indonesia is the only tool at its disposal to mitigate against the risk of further strategic surprise. Canberra should urge Indonesia to consult its neighbours and consider the impact of a Russian presence in the archipelago on broader regional dynamics. And it will doubtless be prepared to respond to the obvious rejoinders: that Australia itself hosts foreign forces from the United States on an ongoing rotational basis and that the United States and Australia seek greater rights to access, basing and overflight elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific.
